аЯрЁБс>ўџ *,ўџџџ)џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџьЅСc П]jbjb№S№S  š1š1Їџџџџџџ]ZZZZZ f Z%ъ~~~~~~~~šœœœœœœ,єnШ]~~~~~Шш~~~шшш~j~~š*B~šшВшššr =дЅБZZшšFurther Left? Further to the “left”, as the political spectrum was defined in the mid-twentieth century, were those coming out of a Marixist tradition who felt that Social Democracy was insufficient. What were the prospects of a shift from social democracy to something futher to the left? The prospects were always small, in large part because of the intellectual reaction of the First World left to the economic history of the twentieth century. The most powerful intellectul criticism of Marxism was the “it ain’t so” line of criticism: that the claims of Marxism-as-social-science were simply wrong. This criticism is powerful because true. And thus the lingua franca of the left has been a dialect of retreating and increasingly abstracted Marxism. Thus those claiming to be to the left of social democracy have had little constructive to say to the mixed economies and democratic governments of the industrial west in the late twentieth century. One mode of retreat and abstraction that the market had temporarily avoided immiserizing its own working classes by imperialism. This was always implausible from a quantitative standpoint: however large in proportion to peripheral economies were the spoils squeezed by imperial cruelty, the spoils were always small relative to production and investment in the core industrial west. From the seventt-of-center Labour Party into two. The Labour Party had won 47 percent of the seats in the eenth century on the west was too rich, and the non-west was too poor, for exploitation of the peripheries of empire to signiћcantly affect the economic dynamic. This stage of the retreat added to the left s burdens a suspicion of international trade and investment as a form of “unequal exchange.” The second stage on the retreat was to argue that even though capitalism made workers productive, it “alienated” them from their true selves. In their advertising-induced thirst to consume, they sold their creatiRСSvЫG’gAMAйЋЕъ”PLTEџџџџџЬџџ™џџfџџ3џџџЬџџЬЬџЬ™џЬfџЬ3џЬџ™џџ™Ьџ™™џ™fџ™3џ™џfџџfЬџf™џffџf3џfџ3џџ3Ьџ3™џ3fџ33џ3џџџЬџ™џfџ3џЬџџЬџЬЬџ™ЬџfЬџ3ЬџЬЬџЬЬЬЬЬ™ЬЬfЬЬ3ЬЬЬ™џЬ™ЬЬ™™Ь™fЬ™3Ь™ЬfџЬfЬЬf™ЬffЬf3ЬfЬ3џЬ3ЬЬ3™Ь3fЬ33Ь3ЬџЬЬЬ™ЬfЬ3Ьvity and life-activity to become less than human cogs on the assembly line. But this ducked the question: people become cogs only if they have insufћcient wealth and insufћcient skills to live well while working at jobs that reward and nurture their creative impulses. “Alienation” is a consequence of a skewed distribution of income. When society becomes richer and other opportunities become more attractive, people stop being willing to perform “alienating” jobs. A richer and more equal society allows those close to the bottom of the income distribution to become more choosy both about the types of jobs they will take and about the terms under which they will take them. But the major harm done by the retreat has been the stamping into the far left of a reliance of hierarchies and bureaucracies. Whatever social arrangement is chosen, it cannot be the market. And in practice the alternative has always been control by the government, or by some fraction of its administrative bureaucracy. The government has limited administrative competence, limited degrees of accountability to those in whose name it is acting, and objectives other than that of providing for the general welfare. The tasks of designing institutions so that they advance the general welfare rather than the narrow power and wealth interests of those who hold positions that turn out to be key ones are very difћcult. Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966). pp. 138-39: One need not have a specific idea of a reasonably constructed automobile, a well planned neighborhood, a beautiful musical composition, to recognize that the model changes that are incessantly imposed upon us, the slums that surround us, and the rock-and-roll that blares at us exemplify a pattern of utilization of human and material resources which is inimical to human welfare.  "$bnСУ^_•ЂКМ* , ЇЉghь№(HВИX]ћјјєјјјєјјјјјј№ъ№№ 6B*CJB*CJ6CJCJ5CJЖZ[]ѕѕѓё „„ЄЄЖZ[]§§ћАа/ Ар=!А"А# $ %Аype Librariesџџ Pwrbk 1400 HD Brad De Longџџ66Pwrbk 1400 HD:System Folder:Extensions:Type Libraries:jHELPDIR66Pwrbk 1400 HD:System Folder:Extensions:Type Libraries:ююAliasю Pwrbk 1400 HDЏИt#BDŒType LibrariesТА" ќqakџџџџ ExtensionsŒ [4@ёџ4NormalCJOJPJQJmH <A@ђџЁ<Default Paragraph Font<ўoђ< Blockquote„h„hЄ<Є<PJ4ўoёџ4 RestartListdђџPJЇ џџџџ џџ џџчЇ>] ]]…ерТЮйф№ћX ˆЉџџ Brad DeLongIPwrbk 1400 HD:From old powerbook:Website:TCEH:1998_Draft:The last Marxistџ@€ІІ„?фІІ5ќXJJJJJ J Ї`@` `@`` @``,@GTimes New Roman5€Symbol3 Arial3Times"1ˆаhфZ&†фZ&† $ЅРДД€0жЕџџ Further Left Brad DeLong Brad DeLongTypeLib&&{00020813-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}Version1.2\\&&{00024412-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}WorkbookEvents\\ProxyStubClsid&&{00020420-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}rrTypeLib&&{00020813-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}Version1.2r       !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~€‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹ŒŽ‘’“”•–—˜™š›œžŸ ЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌ­ЎЏАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩЪЫЬЭЮЯабвгдежзийклмнопрстўџџџфхцчшщъьэюя№ёђЯєФџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ -XVII. Climbing Out of the Great Depression- A. Western Europe 1. Recovery in western Europe s major powers As we have seen, Germany recovered from the Great Depression relatively rapidly once Hitler had taken power. With the Gestapo in the backgrouъQƒRўTpUuW0aœœœœ…œsЕјКфОjРФСДЪcаъсќцьію’ѓ›ѓœѓѓЊѓЋѓЌѓ§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§єђ§єђ§**&`#$„ќџ„ўџ р…ŸђљOhЋ‘+'Гй0dˆЈДШдф ј  , 8DLT\' Further LeftWourt Brad DeLongradNormalL Brad DeLong1adMicrosoft Word 8.0d@@ЈІЧg•Н@ЈІЧg•Н *Ќѓ­ѓЎѓж—ј˜њ˜™œœ(œ*œhœjœlœnœpœ œЂœЄœІœЈœюœ№œђœєœ   "§§§ћ§§§§ѕ§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ѕ§§§ЄЄ, 00€PSАа/ Ар=!А "Аp# $ %ААТАТ Хвд €h €а €а €а €а €а €а €а €а......... The conventional pretense was that the man did not seek the office: the office sought the man.339  In the phrase  conventional pretense the emphasis should be on the word pretense. See Gil Troy (), See How They Run (). 339 ж—˜˜˜˜Њ˜ޘю˜њ˜™™œ(œ*œhœpœ œЈœюœєœ  &T V \  ’ К М Ё Ё"ЁЅШЅЬЅшЅІNЇTЇVЇLЉ0Џ\ЏhЏlЏžЏ ЏфЏшЏLБPБVБXБDЕJЕН$Н&НЪСаСвСzФžЧ‚ЫˆЫŠЫЖЮМЮОЮ>бDбlдnдкдъд0ж2жвлдлмЄміяээшуснкнкнункнкнкнкукншкнкндкшнкнкакнкнкшкакшкшккшкшкакікакікяэ6CJ 56CJCJ5CJ5OJQJ0J+mH6 j0J-Uj0J-CJUR A. Western Europe 1. Halfway recovery in Britain 2. Slow decay in France 3. The idea of the  welfare state B. America 1. FDR2. 3. The defining moment In the long run Franklin D. Roosevelt s policies mattered not because they cured the Great Depression, but because they left behind a different a much more social democratic America. In sector after sector, the Great Depression encouraged and allowed to do things that brought the U.S. government much closer to the social democracies of Eny. Yet from that base British military operations in the nineteenth century were largely mopping-up operations: small wars against Indian powers that had no chance of assembling the resources to match the British-controlled forces in India. Possession of India gave the British an immense interest in Egypt. Control over Egypt, and the link between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, could cut several months off of the time needed to travel to or communicate from London to the centers of British influence atўџ еЭеœ.“—+,љЎDеЭеœ.“—+,љЎD hpˆ˜  ЈАИР Ш с' Delong groupftж:  Further Left Title˜ 6> _PID_GUID'AN{4A0B4701-0120-11D2-8B16-EBDCF8436DC2}terwards by the Ottoman Empire had established their substantive independence within a generation: by 1830 Muhammad Ali was an independent monarch in all but name. Muhammad Ali serves as an example of how limited were the options of forward-looking non-European rulers in the age of industrialization. He saw what needed to be done: that Egypt needed to borrow and adapt the technologies of Europe’s industrial revolution. He hoped to bring in foreign technical experts to train and educate factory workers and engineers. By the middle of the 1830s Egypt was perhaps tenth among the nations of the world in mechanized cotton textile manufacture. (However, without coal or wood to drive steam engines, Egyptian textile machinery was ox-powered.) It is hard to know how close Muhammad Ali’s plans for industrialization came to setting up a self-sustaining virtuous circle of development. But it is clear that it did not reach the threshold. Maintenance was neglected. Workers were hard to find. Managers were very hard to find. The Egyptian state was not a very good entrepreneur. And eventually the British forced free trade on Egypt, eliminating the possibility that its (inefficient) textile industry might shelter behind tariff walls, and then somehow gain the experience and expertise necessary to become competitive on world markets. [Egyptian economic growth, 1800-1913] Egypt did receive one more chance. In 1863, six years before the completion of the Suez Canal, the relatively young khedive Ismail took the throne. Ismail had been educated in France: he was open to European influences, eager to modernize his country, and eager to play the role of the open-handed Eastern ruler. He became ruler of Egypt in 1863, in the middle of the “cotton famine” created by the American Civil War and the consequent temporary disappearance of the U.S. South from the world’s cotton supply. The consequence was a cotton boom everywhere else in the world: the factories of the industrial revolution needed cotton to run on, and they were willing to pay almost any price for it. Egypt grew cotton. And so for a few years it seemed as though Egypt’s economic resources and wealth were growing rapidly and were inexhaustible. But the khedive Ismail was more than extravagant. The Egyptian national debt was 7 million British pounds or so at Ismail’s accession. It had swelled to 100 million British pounds 13 years later—and interest charges on the debt amounted to 5 million a year. In 1876 the Egyptian government declared bankruptcy, and the creditors of the khedive became the rulers of the country. Ismail abdicated. Two financial controllers—one British, one Frence, for the bankers who had loaned to Ismail came overwhelmingly from those two counties—were appointed with substantial control over taxes and expenditures. Their task was to make sure that Egypt was governed by Ismail's son to keep up revenue and pay off the debt. The Egyptians wondered why they were being highly-taxed to pay off debts run up by their extravagant ex-khedive. If Ismail had borrowed more than he could repay, wasn't that a problem for the bankers? Why was it a problem for the Egyptian people, and why should they be taxed and ruled by foreigners as a result? Discontent led to attempted revolution against foreign domination and high taxation. British troops restored order and suppressed the uprising in 1882. Thereafter the khedive was a British puppet: the strategic importance of the Suez Canal for communications with India meant that British troops were to stay in Egypt on varying pretexts and for various reasons until 19 ўџџџўџџџ ўџџџ"#$%&'(ўџџџ§џџџ+ўџџџўџџџўџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџRoot Entryџџџџџџџџ РFШYД€D6-•Н-€ж1Table\ШYД€,Љu0u0жtџџџџџџџџџџџџжьжXжмШ`HWordDocumentШY жЌжЌФЂ џџџџџџџџЪCD ШYДSummaryInformationD Q(џџџџDЪCиDocumentSummaryInformationf8џџџџџџџџџџџџ!CompObjDЪџџџџШY ЪDXЪCDObjectPool>ж0жжџџџџџџџџџџџџ€D6-•Н€D6-•НжЧЌЧЌџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ"  ўџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџўџџџџџ РFMicrosoft Word DocumentўџџџNB6WWord.Document.8ational Congress—with its demands first for self-government and later for independence—was founded in 1885. By 1900 India was covered by a relatively dense network of railroad lines—paid for in large part by Indian taxpayers, and built to allow soldiers to easily move into and raw materials to easily move out of India. Indian manufacturing production was beginning to recover from the shock imposed by Britain’s industria