Dean G. Acheson on his January 12, 1950 , National Press Club speech and the origins of the Korean War:

from Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 690-2, 763-4:

...General Eisenhower began discussing foreign policy in terms surprising for him. The great chain of events begun under his benefactor, General Marshall, he called a "purgatory of improvisation." In the same speech, relating what he termed some "plain facts" about the period leading up to the attack on South Korea, the General grossly distorted my [National] Press Club speech... and, when I publicly set the record straight, severed all relations with me. It appears to be true that one who unjustly injures another must in justificaiton become his enemy. During the eight years of his Presidency I was never invited into the White House or to the State Department or consulted in any way. However, this involved no invidious discrimination, since my chief, President Truman, was treated the same way.

To return to General Eisenhower's Cincinnati [foreign policy] speech, he revived the [Senator Robert] Taft charge that I had, in effect, invited the attack on Korea, starting with a highly expurgated quotation of my speech: "In January of 1950 our Secretary of State declared that America's so-called 'defensive parameter' excluded areas on the Asiatic mainland such as Korea. He said in part: 'No person can guarantee these areas against military attack. It must be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary.... It is a mistake... in considering Pacific and Far Eastern problems to become obsessed with military considerations'."

That statement, I said,

purports to be a quotation and accurate paraphrase of a speech I made before the National Press Club in Washington on January 12, 1950.

As stated it tortures the facts. It says things I didn't say and omits a significant and relevant part of what I did say. The General could have discovered this by reading my speech.

In my press club speech I spoke of the Aleutian Islands, Japan and the Ryukyus, and the Philippines as being our "defensive perimeter" in the Pacific area. The Aleutians are part of our own nation, we had occupation forces in Japan and the Ryukyus, and we have special military arrangements as well as unusually close bonds of friendship with the Philippines. My point was that if this line were attacked we would defend it alone if necessary--just as we would our continental area.

The General's speech says [that] I "excluded areas on the Asiatic mainland such as Korea." Now, "areas on the Asiatic mainland" also include Indo-China, Malaya, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan--so presumably he meant I excluded them also. The fact is, however, that I used no language whatever "excluding" Korea or any other area in the Asiatic mainland or suggesting any lack of interest by the United States in the event of an attack on any area of the Asian mainland in general or Korea in particular. The General's statement represents me as saying what I did not say.

On the contrary, I referred specifically to these "other areas in the Pacific."

The General or those upon whom he relied dealt with my specific statement on these other areas by cutting it out from between two other sentences they quoted to make their point.

Here is what I said about the other areas of Asia: "Should such an attack occur--one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from--the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it, and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations, which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression."

That was the warning which I gave in January 1950.

That was the warning which the aggressor disregarded.

That was the warning which the United States and its allies of the United Nations backed up with deeds.

General Eisenhower's combination of paraphrase and quotation left out that warning, and thus enabled him to go ahead and discuss the Korean situation just as if no such utterance had occurred, and as if his own Government rather than the aggressor bore the guilt for Korea's tragedy.

Now all these innocent little dots in the General's quotation permitted another misrepresentation by omission. By this omission, General Eisenhower gives the impression that I was minimizing the importance of military considerations in these matters. My actual words, however, pointed out that the danger in these areas was not only a military one, but also one of penetration and subversion. I said: "But it is a mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and Far Eastern problems to become obsessed with military considerations. Important as they are, there are other problems that press, and these other problmes are not capable of solution through military means. These other problems arise out of the susceptibility of many areas, and many countries in the Pacific area, to subversion and penetration. That cannot be stopped by military means... "