Semi-Daily Journal

I stand by my story! And thanks for the link.

Now some wiseacre is going to point out this nugget from the Times source:

"In Washington, military officials said that of some 60,000 troops ordered over the weekend to begin moving toward the Persian Gulf region, 26,000 were from the First Armored Division, based at Fort Riley, Kan., and in Germany; 24,000 from the First Cavalry Division, based at Fort Hood, Tex.; and 10,000 from the Second Armored Cavalry, based at Fort Polk, La. "

Well, those would be the troops currently "MIA", so might one argue that we never actually got to the promised "magic number". Well, one might. But late in the story, the Seventh Cavalry appears, metaphorically at least:

"Senior officials said it was likely that those large forces, receiving their deployment orders late in the process, would form a later wave for any assault on Iraq or the spine of a postwar stabilization force.

In addition to assigning the 101st to a vanguard position in the offensive, officials described a range of options that included dropping forces into northern Iraq by helicopter or parachute to secure airfields that could serve as forward bases. Cargo planes could then ferry tanks and other armored vehicles, although not in the quantity that could dash overland from Turkey. "

So it really was all part of the plan. Whew.

I think a foreign-military policy of pre-emption is a mistake. Iraq could and should have been contained. We will win, but I have no idea what we will have won.

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/27/international/worldspecial/27CND-MARINE.html

March 27, 2003

Marines 'Contested Every Inch, Every Mile'
By JOHN KIFNER - NYTimes

WITH THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION, in Iraq, March 27 — Marine and other allied units pressing toward Baghdad are coming under nearly constant harassment and ambush by small bands of irregular Iraqi fighters and remnants of army units they bypassed in their rush, and officers fear the resistance will only stiffen as they get nearer the capital.

"We've been contested every inch, every mile on the way up," Col. Ben Saylor, the division's chief of staff said today....

I thought the First Armored Division was at Weisbaden? Is my visualization of the Cosmic All *that* much in error?

I think we have the First Marine in Iraq, the First Armored in transit, and the British First Armored in Iraq. Smile when you say "Who's on First?"

Secondly, just to clarify ny own muddled position, I am not saying that I am calm, just that I am trying to be. Success is our only option, failure's not.

Are we really that stretched thin?

To be honest, I don't believe that the situation is all that grim. Yes, there are some rear-guard actions going on by Iraqi left-behinds that is worrisome, but nothing that constitutes a real threat to our forces.

And seriously folks, what armor do we need here? Our airpower and the 3rd ID are already rolling over Iraqi heavy equipment. There have been no large scale tank battles that have seriously taxed the resources of the 3 ID, the 7th Cav Regiment, and the Brits. Supposing that we did have 2 extra heavy divisions, what exactly would they be doing right now? At best, we might need a smaller heavy force in the north to pin down a few Iraqi troop formations, but to imply that our progress down south or west leaves something to be desired is a bit erroneous.

Large numbers of troops may be needed if we engage in urban warfare, but as I posted earlier we have ample reserves of light infantry that can get into the combat zone quickly and effectively.

The point is not whether we will win; we will win. Rather, will winning mean needlessly harming Iraqi civilians and doing terrible damage to cities. The point is also whether American and British and Australian soldiers had to be harmed when Iraq was already contained.

Then again, did our intelligence properly prepare us for the extent of Iraqi resistance?

March 27, 2003

Urban Warfare: Long a Key Part of an Underdog's Down-to-Earth Arsenal
By ALAN COWELL - NYTimes

LONDON -— Each battered high-rise becomes a sniper's aerie, each deserted thoroughfare an ambush zone. In this kind of warfare, advances and retreats are measured in blocks or half-blocks, or even just houses. In the calculations of battle, the shield of technology gives way to human failings and human skills — speed and deception, close knowledge of streets and alleys.

Since Stalingrad and Berlin in World War II, to the American assault on Hue in Vietnam in 1968 and on to the war zones of Beirut or Nablus, Belfast or Mogadishu, urban warfare has become a central part of the underdog's arsenal — a fight without scruples for the high ground of propaganda that exploits civilian losses and denies the intruder's superior might.

It is precisely that messy, manipulative and murderous kind of fighting between conventional forces and elusive defenders that could confront the Americans and British as they try to enter Baghdad, despite their much-publicized reluctance to engage in a close urban brawl....

The Times piece mentioned above was interesting. Any guesses as to why they do not mention Grozny (Chechnya) as an example of urban warfare gone awry?

Hmm, that didn't work. What I meant was, why don't they mention Grozny in the early list of examples? It certainly gets featured later in the story.

Tom Maquire

Thanks for the thoughtful posts. Grozny could well have been mentioned. Quite an example....

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/27/international/worldspecial/27URBA.html

- Indeed, said Tom Clonan, a military analyst in Dublin, a more likely comparison for allied troops in Iraq would be the experience of Russian troops fighting Chechen separatist forces in Grozny. "There are striking similarities between Grozny and Baghdad," he said. "Low-tech weapons would form a formidable arsenal in the narrow alleys and back streets of Iraq's capital." -

Hmm, interesting still. An op-ed in the NY Times 3 days ago said exactly the opposite, that urban warfare in baghdad might NOT be that bad.

Several reasons: one being that urban warfare gets particularly difficult if there are tall buildings in the area, and in Baghdad most buildings are limited to 3 stories. Urban warfare is also difficult when you have narrow, winding roads. Fortunately Baghdad has large multi-lane roads running through it, giving us a tactical advantage.

Urban warfare need not be horrendous. Remember Mogadishu. 16 soldiers killed, in return we bagged somewhere between 500-1000 Somalis. All in all, a decent rate of exchange.

Our lack of heavies should not be a cause of much concern. Yes, it would be nice to pin down any Iraqi units in the northern reaches of Iraq, but sufficient air power could still prevent them from effectively manuevering. The cards are laid on the table when we hit Baghdad, and as I've been saying our lack of troops shouldnt seriously affect us there given our airlift capacities and the number of light infantry battalions we can call upon.

I speak only for myself on this point (ed: unlike other points?) but stuff like this really annoys me:

"Urban warfare need not be horrendous. Remember Mogadishu. 16 soldiers killed, in return we bagged somewhere between 500-1000 Somalis. All in all, a decent rate of exchange."

Fine, you support the war. Please don't embarass the folks who, by and large, agree with you.

Financial Times (news.ft.com) describes a very real problem - 270,000 GI's but only 20,000 are infantry grunts. Rumsfeld wanted this short victorious war to showcase his "InvasionLite" strategy. Instead it's showing that the professional soldiers were right all along. Rumsfeld, Cheney, Perle and Ullman (aka Mr. Shock And Awe) should be all lined up and shot for their stupidity and arrogance.
--------------------------------------------

When the lines of communication extend over 300km, as they do now, considerable numbers of troops, principally infantrymen, are needed for the task. The optimists, though, will answer that all this doesn't really matter.... It cannot affect the outcome of the imminent confrontation around Baghdad, where the philosophy of "shock and awe" will reach its culmination with the implosion of the regime and the mass surrender of the Republican Guard.... The continuing fight in Umm Qasr and around Basrah and TV shots of US prisoners being paraded in Baghdad, could give heart to the city's defenders - reputed to be up to 100,000 of Saddam's elite, never knowingly lacking commitment to the fight before.

If it does, then Tommy Franks has a problem. He has the wrong force structure for the job.... Franks' current force is no more configured for the long, bloody slog of battling it out, street by street, in Baghdad than it is for the largely static job of protecting extended lines of communication. Armour, air power and other sophisticated technologies lose their pre-eminence in both instances. "Grunts," in the US vernacular, 'PBI' - "poor bloody infantry" - to the British, become the vital commodity, and tens of thousands of them. It is a sobering thought, and one that must be exercising Franks' mind increasingly as his forces draw nearer to Baghdad, that of the 270,000 allied personnel currently deployed in theatre, only around 20,000 are infantrymen...

Contract3d,

To be fair to McGuire, he has argued elsewhere that simply counting soldiers designated "infantry" or even more restrictively, "light infantry" misses lots of US troops that are able to fight as infantry. The 20,000 tally is low when trying to figure out how many infantry soldiers we will have for the Baghdad battle. However, given the 9-to-1 ratio that has become common in discussions of urban warfare (9 attackers needed for every defender), and the high-end estimate that Iraq could have 100,000 defenders in Baghdad, the math still works out badly for the allies.

The Grozny example is problematic, no matter how one looks at it. I vaguely recall that 120 Russian tanks went in, 20 came out. Russia depended on tanks to offset the advantage of the defenders. We will, as well. The question that needs asking is whether M1As are as vulnerable to street-fighting tactics as Russian tanks. I don't know the answer, though I suspect the M1A is superior. How much superiority is needed to make tanks unassailable in urban fighting? I am not aware that M1As have been extensively tested in an urban setting. Bradleys either, but I'd bet Russian tanks can take a bigger hit than a Bradley.

Oops, amend that...

Russia lost 102 of 120 armored vehicles and 20 of 26 tanks in Grozny, according to the US Foreign Military Studies Office.

Last post, I promise (for now). The Foreign Military Studies Office review of the battle of Grozny is instructive.

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/issues/battle.htm

One huge difference between Russian troops in Grozny and US troops outside Baghdad is that Russian troops were just no good at what they had to do. There commanders knew it. In addition, the defenders were led by former members of the Russian military, so they had a good idea of the tactics and training they would face. These factors very likely distort the real difficulties faced by attackers. That said, the article wryly opens with a quote from Sun Tsu:

Best policy in war--thwart the enemy's strategy,

second best--disrupt his alliances through diplomacy,

third best--attack his army in the field,

worst strategy--attack walled cities.

Anyone interested in urban warfare might find this analysis from the Army Journal Parameters of the Russian attack on Grozny quite worthwhile:

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99summer/thomas.htm

The analysis is quite useful.