A few questions about Pentagon war planning:
Many of these are good questions -- and ones that I can't answer, due to a lack of military knowledge. But here's one that I think basic political and military common sense can answer:
" But why guarantee that your force will run into huge problems if it meets significant resistance by depriving it of its proper logistical tail? You don't plan for the best-case scenario..."
There are two answers to this. The first is that, at present, the US forces stretched out to Baghdad are not in a bad situation. They're bombing and attacking Republican Guard units, slowly wearing them down, so that they can take Baghdad. I have no idea about the reports that some planners thought we should have had more trucks -- there's a lot of incorrect information out there, such as Franks wanting more troops -- but this seems like something that the Pentagon believes it can solve with the supplies in the area.
The second answer is: even if this situation isn't ideal (ie: if we had known this was where we'd end up, we'd have brought more trucks/troops), it was worth the risk. Most reports now are emphasizing the fact that if we had done this attack with more troops, the supply lines REALLY wouldn't have been able to keep up. The benefit of this method was that it could possibly end the war in under a week, therefore minimizing American casualties and civilian deaths.
Your biggest point is your last one (why isn't the 1st Armored and 1st Cavalry in Iraq?), and I can honestly say that I accept your principle here, and simply don't have enough knowledge. I guess I'd like to throw back another question: How do you know that we don't have overwhelming force in the region? Tommy Franks has just said he has all the soldiers he asked for, and I don't believe any of us here know a) the actual situation on the ground b) the strength of the Iraqi military c) the strength of the Coalition military.
DBK
Posted by: David Kenner on March 30, 2003 08:17 AM
Analysis: Winning both war and peace
By Pamela Hess
Pentagon correspondent
From the International Desk
Published 3/26/2003 11:03 AM
WASHINGTON, March 26 (UPI) -- Pentagon officials contend that "armchair generals" criticizing conduct of the war in Iraq are failing to grasp the fundamental changes in strategy from earlier conflicts.
The changes include accepting more tactical risk to reduce long-term strategic risk; using air dominance to make the battlefield three dimensional; and selecting the least number of critical targets to get the maximum impact on the enemy's will to fight.
Five days into the war, armchair generals including retired warriors are calling military reporters to express their concerns there is only one heavy division committed to the battle; concerned only 250,000 personnel are undertaking the war when more than 500,000 were required to expel Iraq from tiny Kuwait in 1991; concerned there is not enough artillery; and concerned there is not yet a northern front to attack the Republican Guard divisions north of Baghdad.
Iraq has captured at least two prisoners of war and there may be five more.
The U.S. Army's Third Infantry Division is cutting a narrow swath at a breathtaking pace toward Baghdad, bypassing cities and eschewing firefights as it races to meet its quarry -- the Republican Guard division protecting the Iraqi capital.
As it moves, it is leaving its rear undefended -- or at least that's how it looks to those viewing the battlefield through historic lenses. Proof of that vulnerability: A convoy of supply vehicles was ambushed Sunday and 12 lightly defended soldiers went missing.
It is a puzzling strategy to former generals and to an increasingly military savvy public reared on traditional land warfare, where a line on the ground (referred to in the Pentagon as FLOT, or forward line own troops) is moved forward as the territory behind it is occupied and held.
But senior Pentagon officials explain there is a method to what some consider madness: accept more tactical risk to reduce the long-term strategic risk.
The tactical risk is that which troops accept on the battlefield. Certainly they would be safer with more heavy divisions than less, with more artillery than less, with more soldiers than less.
More important to Pentagon and Central Command planners is reducing the strategic risk. They do not want to win the war just to lose the peace afterward.
Bringing such firepower would run the risk of flattening the country, killing civilians and convincing the Arab world the United States does indeed intend to "own" Iraq for a long time to come, according to military officials.
That approach would undermine the strategic goal for the United States in Iraq, which is not just to topple Saddam Hussein's regime -- bombing alone would do that -- but to win the hearts of the Iraqi people. The United States has committed to rebuilding Iraq and the less it has to do, the better. And post-Saddam, it wants in place a government friendly to the United States, and to achieve this it needs to convince the Iraqis -- and the rest of the Arab world -- the American force is a liberating rather than a conquering one.
It plans to do this with the minimum amount of bombing and the minimum amount of civilian casualties. A U.S. Air Force officer described this a week ago as "effects-based targeting." This approach to bombing uses a hyper-intelligent and culturally sensitive examination of the battlefield to identify and bomb the least number of critical targets to get the maximum impact on the enemy's will to fight, rather than his ability to fight.
Leaving Baghdad largely intact is critical to the long-term peace, even if it ends up drawing out the near-term battle, Pentagon sources say.
There are sound tactical "effects-based" reasons for opting for a leaner force on the ground, Pentagon officials insist.
The relatively agile ground force assembled for this fight jumped into Iraq more than 24 hours before the original plan, in part because intelligence revealed the southern oil fields were rigged with explosives, a senior military official said Tuesday.
A larger ground force might have slowed down what the Pentagon hopes will be a lighting-fast strike on elite Iraqi units -- no less a part of "shock and awe" to undermine the regime than the deafening bombing of Baghdad.
"If I were in Baghdad and I was looking south and I saw a U.S. Army division that is on the outskirts of Baghdad, I think -- you know, I don't know that that would be shock, but I'd certainly be a little concerned," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard Myers said at a Pentagon news conference Tuesday.
With its rear exposed on the ground -- unheard of in traditional military planning -- the 3rd Infantry Division is relying on the Air Force and the Navy to provide cover from the air. A quick-moving land force just has to be faster than the enemy forces behind it. The 3rd Infantry may appear surrounded on the ground, but under a sky firmly controlled by U.S. aircraft, the enemy is actually the one surrounded, military officials suggested. What was once a two-dimensional battlefield is now a three-dimensional one, and one of those dimensions is firmly in American hands with the advent of precision munitions, laser-range finders and GPS-aided targeting.
"We've got total dominance of the air. It is not air superiority, it's dominance. They have not put an airplane up," U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said Tuesday.
He launched a spirited defense of the approach on Tuesday at the Pentagon, saying it has the full support of the men charged with carrying it out.
"The people who are involved in this... are very comfortable, as are the Joint Chiefs of Staff," he said.
Myers pronounced the plan "brilliant" at the same press conference.
War chief Gen. Tommy Franks plan employs a stunning, common-sense approach to the hairiest scenario of the battle: urban warfare. He doesn't want his people involved in bloody street fighting -- for their own sakes and for the civilians inevitably caught in the crossfire. So he directed the leading edge of the ground forces to largely skirt the cities, focusing their urban fighting on securing roads, bridges, waterways and airfields to allow food and water to be delivered to people increasingly at risk.
The plan envisions that any Iraqi fighters remaining in the bypassed cities after the demise of the regime would lose their motivation to fight.
The maneuver has been strained over the last two days, as irregular forces have taken up positions in the cities and harass U.S. Marines and British soldiers' positions on the edges. But coalition forces reiterated their intentions Tuesday: they will secure the cities for humanitarian aid without occupying them. They are banking on targeted raids to win the day. They refuse to be drawn into a fight not of their own choosing.
What remains unclear is what the coalition responsibility will be if humanitarian workers are victimized by Iraqi troops once in the cities.
Both Rumsfeld and Myers have a strong interest in seeing this work. Winning the war with a minimum of U.S. and Iraqi civilian casualties will be its own reward. But if the strategy works, it will also bear out a central theme of Rumsfeld's reign in the Pentagon.
Rumsfeld came into office promising transformation -- transitioning the services and especially the Army to lighter, faster tanks and weapons, but more importantly, changing the way the leading edge fights wars. What would be traditionally a lumbering, logistics-heavy forward march is now a speedy, agile sword -- all tooth, very little tail, in Pentagon parlance.
It is Rumsfeld's enthusiasm for transformation that has his critics grumbling, charging that his insistence on seeing it realized on this battlefield and his hubris in believing it can be successful puts troops in danger.
If the strategy works -- if Iraq is "liberated" from Saddam Hussein and a friendly government takes root --the success will be a stunning endorsement of Rumsfeld's leadership and of Franks' tactics. It will be perhaps the first instance of a ground force winning a war without capturing a square inch of enemy territory but moving through it toward its final engagement. Its success hinges on the belief that the Iraqi people don't really oppose the United States, and instead will just go peacefully about their business. If the forces encounter significant indigenous opposition, it will be a very different outcome, Pentagon officials recognize. The only way the U.S. force will be welcomed is if it inflicts no unnecesary damage, no unnecesary violence. It is a delicate balance and one never achieved by an invader before, Pentagon officials say. It will be made possible by excellent intelligence, precision targeting, and patience.
Rumsfeld is aware of the criticism leveled at him but he is unmoved by it.
"I can't manage what people -- civilians or retired military -- want to say. And if they go on and say it enough, people will begin to believe it. It may not be true, and it may reflect more of a misunderstanding of the situation than an analysis or an assessment of it, but there's no way anyone can affect what people say. We have a free country. In Iraq, they can affect what people say because you get shot if you say something they don't like," Rumsfeld said. "We don't do that."
Copyright © 2001-2003 United Press International
" - It would be very nice to have a tank corps in the Kuwaiti desert right now -"
Why??
"Your biggest point is your last one (why isn't the 1st Armored and 1st Cavalry in Iraq?), and I can honestly say that I accept your principle here.."
Why?? Would you use Armored Division and Cavalry to guard rearward supply lines against the skirmishers who have been the cause of this Dunk^^ "unexpected setback" we have suffered? That's really *not* what Armored and Cavalry are for, you know.
Or is this just the unthinking American reflex, "More firepower! More firepower makes things better!" As to that, as I noted previously, the 3rd Infantry has almost as many tanks as the 1st Armored, which has almost as much infantry as it. So that's really not the issue.
Referring to the real situation...
"The 3rd Infantry, leading the assault, has faced no serious conventional military opposition... Hussein's forces have lost every engagement, catastrophically ... The division's own casualty list stood at one killed in action, one killed in a vehicle accident...
"Instead, in the south of Iraq, the division has been plagued by a continued series of skirmishes and battles with irregular small and lightly armed paramilitary units that have mounted suicidal attacks ... to slow the American advance..."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45067-2003Mar28.html
So the armchair generals want an extra Armored Division and Cavalry available to remedy this problem by protecting the rear against skirmishers? Please explain this "biggest point".
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/30/opinion/30DOWD.html
Rummy was too busy shaking his fist at Syria and Iran to worry about the shortage of troops in Iraq.
As one administration official marveled: "Hasn't the guy bitten off enough this week?"
March 30, 2003
Back Off, Syria and Iran!
By MAUREEN DOWD - NYTimes
We're shocked that the enemy forces don't observe the rules of war. We're shocked that it's hard to tell civilians from combatants, and friends from foes. Adversaries use guerrilla tactics; they are irregulars; they take advantage of the hostile local weather and terrain; they refuse to stay in uniform. Golly, as our secretary of war likes to say, it's unfair.
Some of their soldiers are mere children. We know we have overwhelming, superior power, yet we can't use it all. We're stunned to discover that the local population treats our well-armed high-tech troops like invaders.
Why is all this a surprise again? I know our hawks avoided serving in Vietnam, but didn't they, like, read about it? ...
Posted by: bill on March 30, 2003 09:58 AMThe officers of our "undermanned" units at the front seem to have a rather different take on things than does our host, at least according to the same "embedded" report above...
~~
"As Col. William Grimsley, commander of the division's 1st Brigade, put it, the Iraqis have not so much attacked American positions as impaled themselves on them...
"'The trucks would just drive pell-mell down the road at us, 60 miles an hour, until they would get shot, and then any guys that were left would jump out of the trucks and rush at us with RPGs, trying to get in their shots,' [Major] Oliver recalled the day after the battle. 'They would fire their RPGs at the Bradleys. And we would kill them.' In its essence, this battle was typical of all those against the Iraqi irregulars...
"The only task that has proved genuinely trying to the division has been [dealing with the knowledge that most of] the hopelessly attacking Iraqis were just local men, forced into self-annihilation by threats of execution or the murder of their families. Judging from the talk, the knowledge that many of the Iraqi dead never even wanted to fight is depressing to at least some of the front-line officers and soldiers.
"The knowledge that many of the men responsible for this evil remain alive in cities, protected by the US determination to wage a sparing war, is infuriating.
"Thursday night, in the division's advance tactical headquarters, Grimsley was talking to Lt. Col. Peter Bayer, divisional operations officer. As they spoke, officers behind them prepared to bomb yet another Iraqi convoy. 'Just like lambs to the slaughter', said Bayer, with no hint of triumph.
"Said Grimsley, 'It is bizarre, bizarre, I cannot wait to get through this and go fight the Republican Guard.' ... Bayer said 'We are learning what happens when a principled nation goes up against an utterly unprincipled one'."
~~~
Now regarding this actual situation, for the life of me I don't see how any purported lack of armor or cavalry or artillery has *anything at all* to do with it.
In fact, to the extent the supply convoys are being slowed by the US reluctance to fire on fedayeen shielded by innocents, I don't see how even more trucks would help -- they'd still be slowed the same way by the exact same cause.
Perhaps someone else would like to add something to the Prof.'s laundry list of Pentagon planning deficiencies that addresses the one actual *real* problem described by these officers at the front?
Maureen Dowd:
"We're stunned to discover that the local population treats our well-armed high-tech troops like invaders."
Saddam's death squads are hardly representative of "the local population". But the Iraqi regime says it's so, and that's good enough for Maureen Dowd.
"We're stunned to discover that the local population treats our well-armed high-tech troops like invaders."
This is a surprising statement? Haven't we invaded Iraq? Is it surprising that citizens of a country aren't thrilled that heavily armed representatives of a hated enemy (surely you've seen the polls) are swarming over their country?
If memory serves, not wanting an invading army in your homeland is a very old tradition.
The following article from a Saudi newspaper sheds some light on the question of Iraq "resistance".
Arab News
SAUDI ARABIA'S FIRST ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exclusive: ‘Terrified of Saddam Hussein’
Essam Al-Ghalib, Arab News War Correspondent
Published on Sunday, March 30, 2003
UMM QASR/BASRA, 30 March 2003 — Four days ago my friend, Mohammed Al-Deleami and I were invited by Abdul Rahman Almotawa, a journalist at our sister publication Asharq Al-Awsat, to accompany him on a trip organized by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Information to report on the humanitarian relief effort at Safwan, an Iraqi town at the Kuwaiti border.
I jumped at the opportunity to get past the Kuwaiti Army checkpoint at Mutla’, which was the biggest obstacle keeping me from entering Iraq. As we raced to catch up to the convoy heading out of Kuwait, I told Almotawa that if the opportunity presented itself for us to break away from the ministry’s convoy once we got into Iraq, that we should, as such an opportunity may not present itself again.
When Mohammed and I left our hotel, we had no idea that that would be exactly what happened. We were ill-prepared for we had nothing but our gas masks, which we carried everywhere, the clothes on our backs, my cameras, a satellite phone, a Kuwaiti mobile and laptop.
After 75 minutes of driving in a manner likely to get me arrested in most countries, we were able to catch up to the convoy as it passed through the dreaded checkpoint at Mutla’, where we had been turned back several times in the days before.
When we finally made it to Safwan, Iraq, what we saw was utter chaos. Iraqi men, women and children were playing it up for the TV cameras, chanting: “With our blood, with our souls, we will die for you Saddam.”
I took a young Iraqi man, 19, away from the cameras and asked him why they were all chanting that particular slogan, especially when humanitarian aid trucks marked with the insignia of the Kuwaiti Red Crescent Society, were distributing some much-needed food.
His answer shouldn’t have surprised me, but it did.
He said: “There are people from Baath here reporting everything that goes on. There are cameras here recording our faces. If the Americans were to withdraw and everything were to return to the way it was before, we want to make sure that we survive the massacre that would follow as Baath go house to house killing anyone who voiced opposition to Saddam. In public, we always pledge our allegiance to Saddam, but in our hearts we feel something else.”
Different versions of that very quote, but with a common theme, I would come to hear several times over the next three days I spent in Iraq.
The people of Iraq are terrified of Saddam Hussein.
I broke away from the hundreds of people literally climbing over one another and fighting to get a box of the rations being distributed. What ended up happening is that the weak and the elderly who needed the food most were getting nothing, whereas the young and fit were getting up to six boxes each.
I broke away from this disgusting scene and wandered into the desert to take some pictures of the elderly and young children picking through the heaps of trash, having given up on getting any of the rations, searching for food. Out of the corner of my eye, I saw a British Army convoy driving through Safwan heading north being followed by one, then two, then three SUV’s marked “TV”.
I ran back to Arab News’ SUV and yelled at Abdul Rahman and Mohammed to get in. Of course, they asked why I was screaming at them like a mad man. I explained that the opportunity to get into Iraq was driving away from us.
I turned to Abdul Rahman and said: “Decide right now. Are you in or not?”
He thought of his wife and children and how volatile and unpredictable the situation in Iraq and working with me could be, and opted to stay.
My friend, Mohammed Al-Deleami, jumped right in without hesitation.
We caught up to the convoy of TV crews and army vehicles and just drove behind them. Within minutes we were on an Iraqi freeway, with signs directing us to Umm Qasr, Basra and Baghdad.
I was ecstatic. We were in Iraq.
I turned up the music and started dancing in my seat as I looked in the rear-view mirror for pursuing ministry vehicles, but could see none.
The TV vehicles broke away from the army convoy and started following the signs for Umm Qasr. Once we got to Umm Qasr, I really started to worry for the simple fact that we had absolutely nothing. I looked at the TV crews in front of me. They were a mountaineering and camping superstore on wheels. They had cookers, boxes of food, sleeping bags, tents, generators, warm clothing, flashlights, bulletproof vests, jerry-cans full of petrol, virtually everything they needed to live in the desert for weeks.
As we drove along the freeway approaching Umm Qasr, we could see several burned out Iraqi civilian and military trucks. There were people walking along the side of the road waving at us, some motioning with their hands for us to stop and some made gestures indicating they needed food and water. Being Muslims, Mohammed and I wanted so much to help them; but we had no food or water.
As I slowed down to speak to some of these children, my Kuwaiti mobile rang. It was my editor in chief, Khaled Al-Maeena. He couldn’t believe I was in Umm Qasr. I handed my phone over to a young Iraqi boy aged maybe nine, and asked him to yell into it where we were. He yelled, “Umm Qasr,” then asked me again for food and water.
I told him we would be camping in Umm Qasr and that if he found us I would get him some food and water from the other crews in our convoy. My editor was thrilled.
We decided to make camp in front of what used to be a hotel and rest stop just off the freeway, which was occupied by a Scottish brigade of the British Army. We spoke to the brigade commander in charge and he explained that Umm Qasr was relatively safe but had been encountering pockets of resistance from various individuals belonging to the Baath party.
He said that we were not allowed to stay in the camp as we were not “embedded” with the British troops, but we were welcome to set up camp a few yards outside the fence of the “hotel”. He promised that if we were in any danger, his troops would immediately come to the rescue.
Once in Umm Qasr, Mohammed and I made our way around to the TV crews that were there and introduced ourselves. We struck up an unspoken deal where I would provide them with English/Arabic translation for their interviews with the Iraqis and they would provide Mohammed and I with food, water and warm clothing to help sustain us.
As night fell, we set up camp, ate and tried to go to sleep. As we started to dose off, a loud explosion went off very near to us, and a lighting flare shot up into the sky bathing the area in a yellow-orange light. Apart from the bright light, nothing seemed out of the ordinary.
An hour later, several more explosions followed by flares lit up the area. One kilometer away, Mohammed spotted several people on foot running around with what appeared to be rifles. We were starting to get really worried, because we didn’t know what was going on. In the far distance we could see the occasional flash of a light and a loud bang. We assumed it was the battle for Basra.
(Part II tomorrow)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright © 2003 ArabNews All Rights Reserved.
Deja vu. It's Afghanistan all over again.
Posted by: Fred Boness on March 30, 2003 01:18 PMBrad, any reason in particular you're letting Joe spam your message board and (by the by) violate copyright on a forum you're responsible for?
Jim: if the reports are true, the Iraqi regime won't need to intimidate locals for suicide advances. They have plenty of people coming in to do it for them. And as for whether or not 1st Cav or Armored could protect supply lines... couldn't the role of the 3rd Infantry and the 1st Cav (or 1st Armored) simply be reversed, letting infantry do their traditional job of holding ground?
In any case, I'd plead "fog of war". David has a point: we aren't getting all the information we should in order to make these decisions. That doesn't invalidate civilian oversight (or public oversight over the civilian overseers)... but the distance from the action should be kept in mind.
Posted by: Demosthenes on March 30, 2003 01:35 PMThis afternoon one of the networks was showing some of these Iraqi exiles you've mentioned comming back to Iraq from Jordan to fight the Americans. They hate Saddam, but they hate the idea of occupation more. These exiles were educated professionals and I felt I was watching Dead Men Walking. Very sad.
Posted by: vachon on March 30, 2003 02:01 PMThe New York Times reported yesterday, in one of its "interactive pop-ups," that 20,000 soldiers at the front consumed as much as two tons of suplies every 24 hours.
This is the sort of typographical error you would expect the proof-reader to catch at the most backward weekly in Podunk, but then again one remembers that NASA sent a lander to Mars with its programmig half in metric and half in feet and inches. Could it be an official number?
I wonder whether the Times picked that number out of a press release somewhere -- which would imply that somebody somewhere in the Pentagon has slipped a couple of decimal places.
A similar pop-up shows the trucks in use, a five-tonner and a twelve. No forty foot containers or reefers. Seems odd.
I would like to echo the "fog of war" point, and restate a point made elsewhere. We are reacting to the "inkblots of war" - given how little we actually know, most people's reaction tells us more about their opinion of Bush, Rumsfeld and the war than it does about the war itself.
We need to attempt to remain informed citizens, but let's keep a bit of perspective, please - a person can become a brain surgeon or an Economic PhD more quickly than they can become a US Army General.
If Tommy Franks penned an op-ed piece for the NY Times criticizing Brad DeLong's economic forecasts, I suspect folks would, at a minimum, raise an eyebrow. If we then learned that the good General was basing his criticism on incomplete and inaccurate information, well...
Not to say we shouldn't try to follow this. But people should be open to the possibility that the Pentagon knows what it is doing.
Posted by: Tom Maguire on March 30, 2003 02:12 PM"Not to say we shouldn't try to follow this. But people should be open to the possibility that the Pentagon knows what it is doing"
A major concern is that while the Pentagon may know what it's doing, the political leadership does not, and the political leadership is telling the Pentagon what to do. There are a whole lotta reports that the adminstration disregarded or overruled the Pentagon's advice.
Posted by: richard on March 30, 2003 02:34 PM(1) copyright - Posting an article here is not necessarily a violation of copyright. Copying - even 100% copying - can be justified under fair use exemptions for purposes of analysis and discussion, which are fundamental to deliberative public debate in a people who would, as the Framers put it, "be their own Governors." Do not allow yourselves to be brainwashed by wealthy copyright holders and their lackeys in Congress.
(2) posting full articles here - is spam. Post the URL.
(3) strategy. A quote:
"It is a puzzling strategy [ to various people the author of this piece condescendingly regards to be relics of the Cold War ] where [sic] a line on the ground (referred to in the Pentagon as FLOT, or forward line own troops) is moved forward as the territory behind it is occupied and held."
It is indeed a puzzling strategy when the front, no matter what the hell you call it, is moved forward when the territory behind it is neither occupied nor held. The guys trying to defend our supply lines are getting their asses shot off.
"But senior Pentagon officials explain there is a method to what some consider madness: accept more tactical risk to reduce the long-term strategic risk. The tactical risk is that which troops accept on the battlefield. Certainly they would be safer with more heavy divisions than less, with more artillery than less, with more soldiers than less. More important to Pentagon and Central Command planners is reducing the strategic risk. They do not want to win the war just to lose the peace afterward."
Offered now as a justification for the Iraq strategy, I do believe this is the most offensive thing I have read lately, and for the following reason: The long-term strategic goal -- of not compromising the peace -- became moot the moment our troops set foot in the field. Why? The self-delusional assumptions made by Rumsfeld, et al. It does not take a military genius to realize that one does not go into battle assuming that the enemy will cooperate and aid your effort. An idiot can figure that out.
I concede that the strategy was motivated by good intent - that is, to take over the country quickly with a minimum loss of life. This war has proven that this strategy will not work. To try to justify this strategy now is the height of hypocrisy. If you will turn of Fox News for a moment and look around you, you will realize that we have already lost the peace. We may be in danger of losing the war, too.
The truth is that we are now in precisely the situation the Russians faced both times they invaded Chechnya (1994-6 and 1999). Both times, they deluded themselves into thinking that they would not be drawn into urban battle. The result was the destruction of Grozny, 160,000 human lives destroyed ... and they still failed to defeat the rebels.
As to the suggestion that the military must know what they are doing, I believe it is self-evident that the problems of this war arose out an badly handled attempt to reduce the influence of "Clinton-era" or "Cold War" leadership in the Pentagon. Diplomatically, Rumsfeld has handled this as poorly as the entire Bush administration has handled international diplomacy.
There is a single word that describes the problem.
Hubris.
On the parallels to Grozny, see this article.
Posted by: Bryan on March 30, 2003 03:02 PMDid I miss a Jane's article on the "smart" GPS/laser/psychic guided precision targeting artillery shell?
Let's take a legitimate target -- an artillery battery, say -- between a hospital and a posh hotel full of journalists. Now, with which should the U.S. forces engage to destroy this target: (a) one big bomb dropped by the Air Force and guided the the best of 2oth century technology (the 2-FIRST century stuff still being tested at White Sands or somewhere...) or
(b) a barrage of explosive cannon balls"walked" onto the target by trial and error? (Fire one for range. Overshot, Got the hospital behind... Fire two for range. Great! Got the hotel right beside. Fire three for direction. Oops, too far. Got the orphanage on the other side. Fire four for effect. Oops again. Wind has shifted. Got the evacuation from the hospital...)
You REALLY prefer that we haul all that artillery into this particular war?
(( Yes, I know I'm exaggerating! Modern artillery is no doubt quite a bit more accurate than I portray it above. But unless Brad knows some source implying that arty is MORE accurate than smart bombs, why would we want it? To follow upon a precision attack and "make the rubble bounce" ? ))
Posted by: Melcher on March 30, 2003 03:08 PMA concern I have heard/read is that the number of US soldiers is insufficient to simultaneously overrun all important Republican Guard units currently deployed in the suburbs. If the overrun is not simultaneous, a significant number may be able to retreat to Baghdad proper. Rumsfeld's gamble is that current strength is sufficient. If it is not, and enough of the RG survive to fight in the city, then analogies to Grozny/Stalingrad become more accurate.
While I personally am totally against this war, I hope Rumsfeld wins his gamble. I am not optimistic that we would not destroy Baghdad and its inhabitants in order to save it.
We will know soon, maybe a week.
Posted by: Russell L. Carter on March 30, 2003 04:05 PM"The knowledge that many of the men responsible for this evil remain alive in cities, protected by the US determination to wage a sparing war, is infuriating." - Col Grimsley
Yes, it is infuriating. The Iraqi leadership has crimes to answer for too.
Posted by: derrida derider on March 30, 2003 04:28 PM"The knowledge that many of the men responsible for this evil remain alive in cities, protected by the US determination to wage a sparing war, is infuriating." - Col Grimsley
Yes, it is infuriating. The Iraqi leadership has crimes to answer for too.
Posted by: derrida derider on March 30, 2003 04:29 PMBryan writes:
"(2) posting full articles here - is spam. Post the URL."
Point taken. In the future I will post only the URL and a summary of the article.
Posted by: Joe Willingham on March 30, 2003 05:01 PMBryan:
"I believe it is self-evident that the problems of this war arose out an badly handled attempt to reduce the influence of "Clinton-era" or "Cold War" leadership in the Pentagon."
Ironically, this is a very Clintonian war. The emphasis on human rights as an issue, the extraordinary effort being made to avoid civilian casualties, the attention to cultural sensitivities are all Clintonian. The US forces are not even allowed to fly the American flag.
Whether this war was a good idea or not, it has got to be the most politically correct war in history in the way the US is fighting it. Unfortunately our approach has had no influence on the fighting methods of Saddam's forces, which start with war crimes and go from there.
Posted by: Joe Willingham on March 30, 2003 05:31 PMAh, Joe, I can see that your last comment is the line we're going to hear a lot more of if things go badly. "We woulda won if those pinko liberals hadn't tied the army's hands". We have, of course, heard this before (remember Vietnam?).
And its not far from that to "the army was stabbed in the back" - a la Weimar Germany.
Posted by: derrida derider on March 30, 2003 09:39 PMAh, Joe, I can see that your last comment is the line we're going to hear a lot more of if things go badly. "We woulda won if those pinko liberals hadn't tied the army's hands". We have, of course, heard this before (remember Vietnam?).
And its not far from that to "the army was stabbed in the back" - a la Weimar Germany.
Posted by: derrida derider on March 30, 2003 09:40 PMFor a decent analysis from a Russian source, go here.
http://www.aeronautics.ru/news/news002/iraqwar_ru_014.htm
There isn't much question that the war hasn't gone as planned. In and of itself this isn't surprising - it's surprising when a war does go as planned. But Brad's questions are good ones and they have been asked by military professionals who aren't involved in the current clusterf*** as well. So saying "leave it to the professionals silly economist" doesn't cut it. The professionals who aren't "embedded" are asking the same questions.
I will answer one of the questions, however - once all the forces get there that are now heading to Iraq the US military is going to have half of its actual combat personel deployed (not just in Iraq, but in various places where they can't easily be pulled out.) What happens if something starts up elsewhere and forces are needed?
Like say Korea?
Hmmm?
Posted by: Ian Welsh on March 30, 2003 10:17 PMKuwait is closer to Korea than Germany is. Kuwait is closer to Korea than Ft. Hood is.
Posted by: Brad DeLong on March 30, 2003 10:43 PMUnits actually in-country with elements close to or engaged with the enemy and away from transport networks, ports and large airports are not in a position to be rapidly moved out. Those that are in Ft. Hood or Germany, on the other hand, are. Assuming, in the case of Germany, that the Germans cooperate.
Posted by: Ian Welsh on March 30, 2003 10:45 PMDoes anybody want to bet money that Saddam is going to win this war?
>Korea
Bush needs to lay off the tax cut nonsense and start re-building the US military.
Posted by: Joe Willingham on March 30, 2003 11:03 PMI would be very surprised if the US doesn't win this war - the questions are "how long?" and "at what cost to Americans and Iraqis?"
The tax cut nonsense does need to be dropped, but the US military is fine. State budgets, pensions, education and employment (among other things) are not, fine. The US has over half the military naval tonnage in the world and is stronger than any likely set of enemies. The problems in Iraq appear to be largely a result of overconfidence and the resultant bad planning. But the US has such superiority that they will win the invasion.
Winning the "peace" afterward, on the other hand - odds are they've already lost that.
Posted by: Ian Welsh on March 30, 2003 11:29 PMOne thing that pops to mind now is that FDR and Bush the Elder knew what they were doing in setting their own war timing.
Here the military took 80%+ of Iraq in less time than it took Grenada, with only 10 more combat deaths than in Grenada (and fewer than in Lebanon, or in the opening of Gulf War I which didn't even have a ground campaign, etc.). Also with *no* sign of the expected missiles flying into Israel, or of burning oil fields, or of blown dams flooding the country, or of the terrorist attacks that Saddam had so long to plan, or of the so many other awful things that many were worried about and expected, including people posting here not long ago.
So one might plausibly think: Hey, things are going pretty darn well!
But Saddam didn't surrender faster than Grenada did. And *then* the assault that carried 300+ miles in less than a week paused for three days. And suddenly the plan is in ruins! The invasion force isn't weighted enough towards "heavies"; towards "lights"; towards logisitic forces, though if there were more heavies that would further strain logisitics ... no, there's too little of *everything*: artillery, heavies, lights, trucks, why isn't the airborne doing anything?, *everything* is wrong. It's a fiasco of incompetence. After just three days of no movement to give a story to journalists, this becomes the story.
Which brings to mind how the first battle plan for Europe presented to FDR by Gen. Marshall and the army staff called for the most simple of ideas -- build a million-man army in Britain and then just punch in a straight line through France right to Berlin. A real American approach. FDR asked, how long will it take to get this army ready? Marshall said, maybe three years. FDR asked, where will we be fighting the Germans in the meantime? Marshall said, nowhere, why waste lives and material where they won't count? FDR said, because you can't have a war and not fight for three years, with the people and press that is not going to work. Which is why we spent two years fighting in "sideshow" fronts like North Africa, Italy and Southern France. (Though they proved to have their worth by pushing the army up the learning curve before the main event, the generals initially having immodestly underestimated how far up the curve they had to go).
Similarly, after Saddam invaded Kuwait, Colin Powell wanted to give sanctions a chance to work at getting him to withdraw. Bush I asked, how much time would you give? Gen. Powell said two years, if he doesn't pull out by then we can use force. Bush I said, no, that's no going to work, you can't say you have a reason to fight and not fight for two years and then fight.
Three years and two years of nothing -- the way a mere *three days* of no news apparently has turned what was a pretty impressive display into a fiasco in the mind of so many armchair general second guessers, I'd say those earlier presidents were right about getting things moving along!
Now, I don't think anyone will know what's going on right now in this war until after it is over. That includes me. But I'm willing to make a sporting public guess. My guess is that this "pause" has had nothing at all to do with any serious lack of forces or firepower of any sort. (Though it would have been very nice to have an extra division coming down from Turkey, no doubt.) I'll guess it is due to two things:
(1) Resupply needs, entirely routine after a 300 mile blitzkrieg but compounded by a one-in-50-years sandstorm that indeed was not in "the plan" and must have done nasty to the supply chain.
(2) A serious reconsideration of how to handle what probably is the unexpected degree to which Saddam has entwined his forces and fedayeen and Baathist thugs among civilians and civic installations and regular soldiers who don't want to fight.
I suspect our forces are making what is really the greatest effort *in military history* to minimize civilian casualties in enemy territory, while Saddam is trying to make that as difficult as possible. And if it wasn't for this never-before-seen-on-this-scale concern by our side, we'd blow through Baghdad in three days.
I take Barsa as the model for what's happening now. We were scheduled to already own it and easily would if we didn't care so much about civilian casualties. But Saddam stocked it with thugs holding the civilians hostage. So the British spent a lot of effort and patience (and bravery on somebody's part) arranging to have a single bomb drop on those 200 fedayeen in that room -- and a specially designed bomb too, so it didn't even scar the church next door.
Working that principle out for the whole rest of the war is what they are thinking on now, I wager. And a tribute it is to our side too, if so. With the whole Third Division having had only one combat death to date, it hardly seems like lack of firepower dominance is the issue -- we don't *have* to pause to work this out if we just want Saddam's head.
I also bet that things will begin moving again pretty soon, applying this model. More slowly perhaps than in the original plan -- but killing off the fedayeen and Baathists now will greatly ease the problem of de-Baathing the country later on. There's always a silver lining.
But I could be entirely wrong, and since I don't know any more than anyone else there's no point in arguing about it. So I'm now leaving sites like this where people do so much of it, until after the war. Pangloss.com is almost as nice as falling into the Nexus itself, so I'm going to stay there where everything is fine. I'll come back after the war is over, when we can all tally up how our observations and worries and laments and guesses about it all worked out. ;-)
(Unless I'm *really* wrong, in which case nobody here will ever see me again.)
What's the problem?
So far US casualties have been very light.
In time (probably this week) the 4th Infantry
division and much of the logistic support will
arrive.
You seem to be saying that the coalition should
have waited until all the pieces were in Kuwait
before attacking.
What is wrong with making strong advances with
light elite forces and then letting the
logistics train and other infantry catch up
a week or two later? This has the advantage
of establishing advanced positions very quickly
before the enemy can react. The downside was
that "going light" might mean that the coalition
would face casualties from encountering forces
it wasn't equipt to deal with.
Since the casualties have been light. It turned out that the advance quickly to capture strategic points and then bulk up was a good strategy.
Posted by: Jonathan Carmel on March 31, 2003 05:51 AM“accepting more tactical risk to reduce long-term strategic risk; using air dominance to make the battlefield three dimensional; and selecting the least number of critical targets to get the maximum impact on the enemy’s will to fight.”
Wow! I’m breathless. Any chance this is mostly gobbledygook? How exactly would the public be able to identify a situation in which tactical risk was being traded against strategic risk? (I realize this question cuts both ways.) Apple picking is three dimensional. Typing is three dimentional. All human activity is three dimentional. In war, I’d guess the first time Ug threw a rock straight at an opponent 20 yards away and it fell short, he got the idea that he’d better start thinking in three dimensions or get thumped. Least number of targets? “Less is more…”
We just don’t know if the risks being taken are reflected in such platitudes. In all likelihood, we will find out in time. DBK’s objection that we don’t know whether General Franks has all the soldiers he asked for is true, but there is considerable consistency among reports from various press agencies that he did, in fact, ask for more troops. We know what Ari Fliescher said about having Franks in the room with Bush for war planning. The public cannot be complacent during war. If civilian bosses know they have taken the best advice available, they are likely to stand up to criticism. If they have a deep dark concern that they have ignored good advice, we need to help bring that doubt to the surface.
The discussion over whether war planning has been a shambles and what to do about it, way down deep, probably comes down to ones view of whether public interference in the prosecution of war is a good idea. We know that politicians and the Pentagon play us, trying to round up political support for their views on the war. That, I think, makes them fair game. We should respond with all the intelligence (both senses of the word) that we can muster. We also know that politicians and soldiers often differ over the right tactics and strategies. Since the criticism seems mostly to be coming from military professionals (though lots of outsiders are jumping in), we need to wonder whether the rift represents more than just the usual call from soldiers for more troops and stuff. Giving an ear to criticism from professionals may encourage them to speak up.
For another take on all this, please read the opinion of Ralph Peters, military analyst extraordinaire, entitled "Winning Big."
http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/71625.htm
His message is partly that you can't leave analysis of the war to the media, which has no perspective and no expertise. He has a point.
A couple of other issues sparked by posts above:
We didn't "need" a half million troops in Desert Storm. We had them, but it isn't clear we used them all. We probably would have won the same victory with a much smaller force.
There isn't any need to "take the towns" of Southern Iraq, except insofar as it is necessary to secure critical roads and bridges. The force is not meant to occupy these cities.
Remember that the press was very negative two weeks into the Gulf War air campaign. The manic press treatment of the war this time around hardly inspires confidence.
Posted by: Jim Harris on March 31, 2003 08:01 AMLots of reasons to be grim at this point. The key though is, we've got to convince the Iraqui people that Saddam is not going to win. Crushing the Republican Guard around Baghdad and "debatheing" the south will go a long way to doing that. If for no other reason, we should do that since the only other option, an assault on Baghdad is not a good option. Politically, this war has been a disaster, but I hold out hope that the military can save W's political life.
Posted by: John mckinzey on March 31, 2003 09:17 AMPolitically, if W makes a hash of the war, international relations necessary to fighting terrorism and to the progress of liberalism (little l, folks) and in the process helps bring on more recession, then he deserves to lose his job. I woundn't want his political life saved if his political life isn't doing the country any good.
By the way, the military has put out another call for reflection among Washington war planners. A "senior Cental Command military official" is quoted on MSNBC as saying things like:
"We're prepared to pay a very high price" to take Baghdad. "If it means a lot of casualties, then it means a lot of casualties. We"re going to take them out."
Note to reporters: Please ask Secretary Rumsfeld about the likely allied cost of taking Baghdad.
richard wrote:
>If memory serves, not wanting an invading army in your homeland is a very old tradition.
No, no. Everyone loves to welcome American troops. What cave have you been living in? We're the good guys. The ordinary Iraqis would have to be very misinformed not to trust us. I'm sure they've seen enough movies and news archives to understand that Americans aren't like those other invading armies. The only opposition is coming from Saddam's Evil Minions.
Remember that old cartoon from the 60s, The Mighty Hercules. It's a lot like that theme song:
Hercules, people are safe when near him!
Hercules, only the evil fear him!
Softness in his eyes, iron in his thighs;
Virtue in his heart, fire in every part of
The Mighty Hercules!
Yup, that about sums it up.
Posted by: Paul Callahan on March 31, 2003 12:31 PMFrom K Harris: "We know what Ari Fliescher said about having Franks in the room with Bush for war planning. "
I have the gloomy feeling that you are referring to an earlier post here, which said:
"Those of us who read the Agonist remember that it was not all that many months ago that Ari Fleischer was... boasting, I guess... that Ari Fleischer actually said that "[General Tommy] Franks wasn't invited to the next strategy meeting because 'the president doesn't have time to listen to what the president doesn't want to hear,'"
Link: http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/movable_type/2003_archives/001250.html
I pointed out in the comments of that post that the quote was not available on Google. Some intrepid Agonist readers rallied and found this quote:
"Franks was asked to brief. The president doesn't have time to bother what with he doesn't want to hear." However, the source was an unnamed Pentagon source, not Fleischer, discussing a briefing on Iraq plans that WAS given by Franks to Bush, not a briefing that excluded Franks. More excerpts:
"United Press International August 8, 2002
Bush given Iraq invasion plan
By RICHARD SALE
U.S. Central Command head Gen. Tommy Franks briefed President Bush this week about a scaled-down contingency plan to strike Iraq that calls for an invasion force of some 80,000 to 100,000 personnel including only 50,000 ground troops, administration officials said...
A spokesman for the National Security Council at the White House said they had no information on the meeting and could neither confirm nor deny that it had taken place.
But a well-placed Pentagon official said, "Franks was asked to brief. The president doesn't have time to bother what with he doesn't want to hear." This official asked not to be quoted by name or assignment. Recent pressure from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith to try and mount a scaled back invasion by October was turned back by staunch resistance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these sources said. "
www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020808-iraq6.htm
Now, it may be that some Lexis-Nexis jockey has found something closer to the version that brings Fleischer in and kicks Franks out, but I have not seen it in the comments here or at Agonist. Two other folks chime in that they saw Flesicher say it live at a press conference, although normally transcripts are quickly available on line.
Anyway, at this point I am sure that I know what a person means when they say "We know what Ari Fliescher said about having Franks in the room with Bush for war planning. "
Agonist link: http://www.agonist.org/cgi-bin/mt/mt-comments.cgi?entry_id=897
Posted by: Tom Maguire on March 31, 2003 01:28 PMFrom K Harris: "We know what Ari Fliescher said about having Franks in the room with Bush for war planning. "
I have the gloomy feeling that you are referring to an earlier post here, which said:
"Those of us who read the Agonist remember that it was not all that many months ago that Ari Fleischer was... boasting, I guess... that Ari Fleischer actually said that "[General Tommy] Franks wasn't invited to the next strategy meeting because 'the president doesn't have time to listen to what the president doesn't want to hear,'"
Link: http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/movable_type/2003_archives/001250.html
I pointed out in the comments of that post that the quote was not available on Google. Some intrepid Agonist readers rallied and found this quote:
"Franks was asked to brief. The president doesn't have time to bother what with he doesn't want to hear." However, the source was an unnamed Pentagon source, not Fleischer, discussing a briefing on Iraq plans that WAS given by Franks to Bush, not a briefing that excluded Franks. More excerpts:
"United Press International August 8, 2002
Bush given Iraq invasion plan
By RICHARD SALE
U.S. Central Command head Gen. Tommy Franks briefed President Bush this week about a scaled-down contingency plan to strike Iraq that calls for an invasion force of some 80,000 to 100,000 personnel including only 50,000 ground troops, administration officials said...
A spokesman for the National Security Council at the White House said they had no information on the meeting and could neither confirm nor deny that it had taken place.
But a well-placed Pentagon official said, "Franks was asked to brief. The president doesn't have time to bother what with he doesn't want to hear." This official asked not to be quoted by name or assignment. Recent pressure from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith to try and mount a scaled back invasion by October was turned back by staunch resistance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these sources said. "
www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020808-iraq6.htm
Now, it may be that some Lexis-Nexis jockey has found something closer to the version that brings Fleischer in and kicks Franks out, but I have not seen it in the comments here or at Agonist. Two other folks chime in that they saw Flesicher say it live at a press conference, although normally transcripts are quickly available on line.
Anyway, at this point I am sure that I know what a person means when they say "We know what Ari Fliescher said about having Franks in the room with Bush for war planning. "
Agonist link: http://www.agonist.org/cgi-bin/mt/mt-comments.cgi?entry_id=897
Posted by: Tom Maguire on March 31, 2003 01:34 PMA couple of comments:
Artillery: Contrary to one post above, the artillery would not be beneficial in urban situations, but in attacking dug in Republican Guard tanks - something they have been trying to do with Apaches and not having much success.
101st - the Screaming Chickens, dopes on ropes, the hundred-and-worst... (can you tell I was airborne, not air-mobile?) They have even less armor than the 3rd. Their specialty is leapfrogging ahead and securing territory that might not be heavily defended. They certainly are not going to gain much ground on entreanched RG heavies. My guess is that they were being held for targets of opportunity and none arose.
Trucks: Good question, where are they? Part of Rumsfeld's cuts in the plan? To the poster above: the army does not use semis in combat because you might need to drive off pavement, thus, no container trucks. And why in the heck would you need a reefer - keep the ammo cold? Those boys (and girls) are eating nothing but MREs and T-rats (when they can get them) for the duration.
Why not wait for the 4th? - Can't do that now - then Rummy would have to admit he might have been wrong in not letting Gen. Franks delay the invasion until they made it to Kuwait.
Where's the 1st AD & 1st Cav? - I would think that if you wanted to invade a country, you might want to make sure they felt like resistance was futile. Having even more firepower would have done that. It isn't that armored divisions have that many more tanks than mech infantry divisions, it is that a whole 'nother division would have been that much more manpower at the commander's disposal as the assumptions of quick and easy victory fell on their face.
Plenty of people are saying that "the war has just started," or, "we are moving along just fine." B.S.! With every extra day there is another chance for a cruise missle to malfunction and land in a population center. Every extra hour gives Saddam's irregulars time to get into civilian populations and force them to go Don Quixote against an M1A2, which then gets every single grunt very trigger happy. Then some Iraqi civilians get killed and there goes what little international good-will we once had. In fact, it is turning into plain old hatred among some of the other arab states. Having the right force to do the job quickly would have minimized the opportunity for mistakes and allowed them to accomplish their objectives. The US might not be losing the war militarily, but it certainly is psychologically.
Posted by: jfwells on March 31, 2003 02:23 PMMs. Hess article basically says that we aren't relying on battleships any longer. Imagine that? Times change!
Saddam may well be dead. Franks sees no indication that there is any central control by the Iraqi regime. Our boys are hardly threatened by starvation. In short, the sky isn't falling and it has only been two weeks.
Whatever anyone's opinion about this campaign, leaving Saddam at this point has only bad implications worldwide. These armchair critiques are really early and likely off target. Why not wait until we know a little more?
Posted by: Stan on March 31, 2003 08:09 PMWhat kind of paranoid, National Review-fantasy dreamworld do you live in if you think _anyone_ in this country, liberal or not, wants to save Saddam Hussein? Grow up.
Posted by: andres on April 1, 2003 09:21 AMHmmm. Apparently, either Brad deleted that last comment of Willingham's or it was a figment of my overactive imagination. Please ignore that last post.
Posted by: andres on April 1, 2003 12:13 PMjfwells, you forgot to include "the Puking Eagles".
Anyhow, you are otherwise corect in you assessment.
Airborne!
Posted by: E. A. on April 1, 2003 09:57 PM