Semi-Daily Journal

Brad,

Surely you don't really mean that Rumsfield should consider all possible scenarios in making war plans. There is chance that Russia, enraged by U.S. action outside of a Secuirty Council mandate, will decide to champion the Iraqi cause and send their long range bombers to drop bombs on U.S. forces. Of course, that's about as likely as the pope converting to Jainism, but hey, as long as we're considering all of the possibilities...

You're right that Rumsfield shouldn't just consider the most likely scenario (and doubly right that he shouldn't just consider the best case scenario) when making war plans, but good scenario planning doesn't mean drawing up decision trees and mapping out responses to all of the possible, non-redundant branches. The world is impossibly complex, so its pretty much impossible to do a good job of planning for every contingency, cliches to the contrary.

Rather, good scenario planning involves assesing and understanding all of the major (not minor) sources of uncertainty confronting you, mapping out how those sources of uncertainty interact, and then looking for the three to five big picture scenarios that paint meaningful, significantly different pictures of how events will unfold. You then use those scenarios as a roadmap to help you understand the rapidly changing landscape (e.g. We're encountering suicide bombers at checkpoints, and there are paramilitary thugs in the southern cities keeping the populace from rising up. That looks a lot like the "Isolated Fervent Fanaticism" scenario that we identified. How does that affect our actions going forward?).

Perhaps Rumsfield & Co. haven't done a good job of that, but to say that they obviously haven't because right now we could use more troops and equipment than we have is overly simplistic.

But even if you're considering disaster scenarios, its not entirely clear that you'd want to move a larger force to the Persian Gulf theater. Two very unlikely, but plausible, scenarios come to mind. First, suppose there were a more serious military flare-up elsewhere in the world, like China invading Taiwan, or North Korea moving on the South. We would need to be able to respond militarily, and its probably much easier to do so if our troops and equipment are sitting in their well-ordered permanent bases in the U.S. and elsewhere than if they are deployed in a forward area in a hostile part of the world. If North Korea invades the South, we would need to deploy forces with lightning speed to have a hope of saving Seoul. I feel better about our chances of doing that if our heavy equipment and many of our troops are in Texas and Germany than if they are in Kuwait. Second, suppose Iraq really did have some significant WMDs. By placing more troops than is neccessary in the Persian Gulf theater we would be placing those troops in harm's way without significantly increasing our chances of victory.

Now of course either of these scnearios is highly unlikely, say, on the order of 1-5% probability. But if your argument is that Rumsfield needs to prepare not just for likely scenarios but for all scenarios, then surely he would need to take the threat of a rapidly-developing war in another part of the world or the threat of Iraqi use of anthrax or radiological bombs into account when deciding on how many troops to send to Iraq. His mandate as SecDef is not just to win this war, but to protect American security globally.

Now again, I don't think this means that Rumsfield was right. But I agree with Matthew in that there is such thing as having too many troops committed to Iraq, just as there is such thing as having too few.

And finally, we'd be in better shape if all of our troops in the theater were on the ground. Unfortunately, our "friends" the Turks haven't played ball, so it will be a while before all of our force is ready to fight. But that doesn't mean that we should have waited. Its getting hotter in Iraq by the day, and those weather conditions endanger our troops' lives too.

SD

Aha! Someone else has appreciated the value of Science Fiction. Perhaps one should also read "The Tactics of Mistake" by Gordon R. Dickenson. One of my favorite quotes from this part of the Dorsai series (which may not have been original) is "The map is not the territory".

This is from a memory which may have grown rusty with age.

Sam

"the cakewalk scenario, though wrong in retrospect, was the best reading of the available evidence"

Now this is completely untrue, and I and many others said so BEFORE the invasion. It's one of the many reasons the 'old Europeans' were opposed to the war - their intelligence agencies told them to expect high civilian casualties because the invasion would be bitterly resisted. They knew that, however horrible he is, Saddam's support was by no means as narrowly based as the propaganda claimed and that an invasion of the country must bolster rather than reduce it - and I can't believe the CIA wasn't saying the same thing.

There were repeated press reports (though not, of course, in the US press - but the post 9/11 conversion of the mainstream US media into a propaganda arm of the administration is another story) that Saddam was handing out arms to large segments of his population. This is something that might reasonably have been considered MILITARILY unimportant (though Rumsfeld's pig-headedness could yet prove it so), but it was not at all consistent with the "cheering crowds throwing flowers before the liberators' feet" scenario, let alone the "his own people will rise up against him at the first shot" fantasy.

If you don't believe me, just go back through the archives of this and other blogs. Even - perhaps especially - those who support the administration's aims in Iraq ought to be furious at the stunning incompetence they've displayed.

At the risk of overposting, I enclose below a brief e-mail I just sent to the esteemed Joshua Micah. The subject was "Trust the US and Great Britain?":

"Given the history of British and US involvement in the Middle East including the establishment and support of Israel ($70 Billion in US aid this year?), would any Arabic Muslim, no matter how educated, secularized and religiously tolerant, trust the motives behind this invasion or believe the promises that this time we really mean to be humane and fair?

Indeed, it seems to me the more secularized and educated any Arab might be, the more cynical he or she might become. As bad a Saddam is, it is not unreasonable for him to be viewed as a relatively short term problem compared to a permanent US client state.

And this comes as a surprise? It must, because this administration has done nothing but exacerbate the negative perception."

Sam Taylor

Hmm? $70 billion for Israel in U.S. aid? How do you arrive at that figure? Are you including some kind of indirect aid to Israel by including the fraction of the Iraq war costs multiplied by the portion of the benefit from Saddam's removal that Israel will get or something?

Though in general principle, I think you're right that Israel is a bigger wall between good relations between most Arab countries and the U.S. than Saddam Hussein. Solving just the problem of the West Bank occupation will take exceptional leadership on the part of the Americans, the Israelis, and the Palestinians; from there, we can hope that Arabs will be willing to tolerate Israel, but who knows? It's possible that they will find other reasons, as they did before the 1967 war.

Well, for now, we don't have any leadership in the U.S., Israel, OR the PA, so let's not put the cart before the horse...

I've never read the science fiction work Brad was talking about; my knowledge of science fiction is rather anemic, I fear, though perhaps I can rectify that.

Say, anyone read "Venus on the Halfshell," by Philip José Farmer, a.k.a. Kilgore Trout? It isn't a good book by any stretch of the imagination, but I recommend it anyway!

"The map is not the territory" seems to belong to Alfred Korzybski, about whom we learn something at the second link. [BRING BACK THE HTML!]

Quote:

http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/a/q108333.html

As much as you want to know in thirty seconds:
http://www.rodange.freeserve.co.uk/general-semantics/frontpage.html

Now, as to the original post, I would pay extra if, at a Rumsfeld press briefing, some reporter would explain that Rummy needs to read more science fiction and then read that quote. Must See TV, indeed.

All *I* know about Count Korzybski I learned from reading _The World of Null-A_

I think the point is that the military planning should have included all reasonable possibilities and excluded neocon dreams. I think an equally important discussion is why Don Rumsfeld feels he and other DOD people are qualified to perform military planning. The DOD is a largely bureaucratic organization that runs Defense policy and administers the funds. The military is "hired" by the DOD to perform the work. It is very similar to DOE. No one would ever argue that Spencer Abraham should be working on nuclear weapons design. They hire DOE contractors to do such things (Not that DOE doesn't meddle too much as it is).
I know this is a massive generalization, but I think it is an important point. As we heard over and over again in the campaign, a good CEO hires smart people and takes their advice. I guess we know what kind of CEO Don Rumsfeld must have been.

Need to avoid confusing making business decisions with making military ones. Business decisions commit a reasonable level of resources, with the understanding that sometimes you win, sometimes you lose, so hoarding resources to keep them available for winning situations makes sense. In military decision making, winning is paramount. There is certainly some level of resource committment that is too much in a military setting, but it is far beyond what would be committed in a business setting. Once war is engaged, winning is everything.

On economy of resources and the military:

While it is true that military equipment is "highly specialized" and that it's no great loss to divert trucks and tanks from sitting idle at a base in the U.S., the money that it takes to get them to the theater and keep them there and working is another story. With the military, economy of resources still works when you're talking about money.

On economy of resources and the military:

While it is true that military equipment is "highly specialized" and that it's no great loss to divert trucks and tanks from sitting idle at a base in the U.S., the money that it takes to get them to the theater and keep them there and working is another story. With the military, economy of resources still works when you're talking about money.

On economy of resources and the military:

While it is true that military equipment is "highly specialized" and that it's no great loss to divert trucks and tanks from sitting idle at a base in the U.S., the money that it takes to get them to the theater and keep them there and working is another story. With the military, economy of resources still works when you're talking about money.

Interesting, to quote with admiration the villian and loser of the novel. Particularly so in a context critical of reliance on pychological warfare.

The hero and winner in that particlar fiction (full disclosure, Brad and I both can and have gotten MUCH deeper into Bujold's work than this -- here we merely skin the surface for the non-fans)
is considered most dangerous because of his ability to persuade. " You arrived in Tau Verde space with a staff of four. Six months later you were dictating terms. "

Cavillo, on the other hand, begins with one simple plan, switches to new plan of simple betrayal, and switches AGAIN to a newer plan of extreme and elaborate betrayal. This flexibility, our narrator summarizes for us, does not make her strong, but like grass in the wind.

ANYHOW, the military has any number of "specialized" assets. Should Rummy be criticized for not having in theater troops with skis, parkas, and electrically heated socks just in case? Ridiculous. There are forces trained and
equipped to lay and repair railroads. Should
they have been deployed to stand by? Almost certainly a waste. These are more extremes examples than the decision of what to deploy from within the Table of Equipment (ToE) of a single
division - but how different in principle? Opportunity costs again. Better to lift another twenty tons of rations; or one spare tank? Artillery with a range of 20 miles that can sustain a barrage -- tons of explosive per minute -- over acres for hours; or missiles with ranges of 200+ miles that puts less force, on a smaller target, for just a few seconds? A pallet of toilet paper; or a pallet of snacks and crackers?

You can't wipe your ass with a soda cracker nor eat a roll of toilet paper. But those at least can be abandoned --- to the enrichment of the local economy -- at the end of the fight. Any major weapons systems carried into the theater -- and not destroyed in the fight -- have to be carried back out again. For that matter, they have to sit in garrison, (guarded and dusted by troops who require their own palletloads of crackers and toilet paper. Then you must build the garrison -- so many pounds of tent, of barbed wire, of reserve fuel... another field kitchen, porta-potties, clinic... ) throughout the fight, waiting for the moment they might be useful.

You might like to draft up a mathematical model of this, Brad. A "P" variable for the probability a widgit will be used -- Military Snowmobiles having value 0.01 (might have some parts that could be cannabalized for more useful vehicles) while the 7-ton general purpose cargo truck given value 0.95 (almost always useful for SOMETHING) A "V" variable for the combat value or effectiveness -- an artillery piece being more valuable in combat than a field kitchen. A "W" weight or cost of transport. (which depends on a "D" distance from depot) A "T" value -- time sensitivity. An "E" value -- elasticity or substitutes -- can a "Hummer" do the job of a "deuce and a half" ? A "G" value -- how much "active" garrisoning does the item need, can you park it and ignore it or must you dust it every ten minutes? You could, on the evidence of other similar projects you've posted here, amuse yourself for hours.

Or you might google for existing art. Look for papers at Carlisle, Annapolis, West Point, and other military specialization sites to see who these sorts of models have already been constructed and studied. (The logisticians at Fort Eustis have some interesting macros in Excel ... but I'm not sure of the underlying and theoretical algorithims. )

You certainly know how mid-level staffers contribute to -- and are thwarted by -- top-level policies in economics. Isn't it likely that similar staffers with real expertise in logistics make similar contributions to, and have similar frustrations with, military policy?

Whoops! Julian is correct. Rather than 70 billion in aid, the number should have been 7, the $3 billion in "normal" aid plus an extra $4 that appears to be in the works. I believe there is also a loan of some $8 million or so in the works, the kind of zero coupon 10 year note that often is forgiven.

As long as we're doing SF today...

"Paleo-conservative" SF author Jerry Pournelle suggests that, like Bujold's villain Cavillo, we've become grass in the wind and NOT stuck (or struck) with the original plan at all. He suggests that everything since 20 March has been
improvised.

http://www.jerrypournelle.com/view/view251.html#MMQ

(Isn't it interesting how the paleo-right and the extreme left share distain for pre-emption?)

Back to Bujold -- there's her remark/quote in a companion novel _Barrayar_ . Something about considering the wisdom of following a commander whose plans depend upon an assassination which he fails to accomplish.

Good to see the correction. But I think it is still a big over-estimate of the true aid package for Israel. I believe it is about $2 billion in aid and $7 billion in loans. I have not heard of anything supplemental in the works and I am confident that no loans to Israel have ever been forgiven.

In fact, they are not loans but loan guarantees.
Israel issues the bonds on the public market with
a US guarantee. I'm rather sure the US has never had to bail Israel out on any of these bonds.

So the added subsidy from the bonds is just the diference between the interest rate Israel would have had to pay without the subsidy and the US agency rate that it ends up paying times the principal. This is probably about 3% of the $7
billion principal which is peanuts.

On the question of whether the initial plan
had too few troops:
It seems to me to be a non-issue. Resistance
was tougher than expected. Nonetheless, the US
has managed to bottle Iraqi regular forces up
around Baghdad while suffering very low casualties.

If we had suffered large casualties because our
force was too small and unable to cope with
Iraqi attacks, this would have been a cost of
being too light. Or if a heavily force would
have easily taken Baghdad by now that would be
a cost of having been too light. But neither has
been the case: Casualties have been low. No one
thinks a larger forces could have costlessly
cracked open Baghdad by now.

So going light and hoping the regime self-destructs while simultaneously using the light
force to seize the oil wells and the Scud
box and forcing the Republican Guard to guard
Baghdad has not resulted in any costs for the coalition.

It's true that they now have to bring in more forces. But what would have been the advantage
of holding the light force back until the heavy
force arrived? It seems to me the cost of starting
light and then beefing up has been the loss of
a week or half a week. This is not a big deal.

One of the problems with putting a large force
in Kuwait from the outset is that it makes a
tempting WMD target for Saddam. Now that there is
more operating real estate for the troops (Kuwait plus Southern Iraq plus Northern Iraq via airlift), we can have more troops on the group without having the concentration in any one area
that invites chemical attack.

Good to see the correction. But I think it is still a big over-estimate of the true aid package for Israel. I believe it is about $2 billion in aid and $7 billion in loans. I have not heard of anything supplemental in the works and I am confident that no loans to Israel have ever been forgiven.

In fact, they are not loans but loan guarantees.
Israel issues the bonds on the public market with
a US guarantee. I'm rather sure the US has never had to bail Israel out on any of these bonds.

So the added subsidy from the bonds is just the diference between the interest rate Israel would have had to pay without the subsidy and the US agency rate that it ends up paying times the principal. This is probably about 3% of the $7
billion principal which is peanuts.

On the question of whether the initial plan
had too few troops:
It seems to me to be a non-issue. Resistance
was tougher than expected. Nonetheless, the US
has managed to bottle Iraqi regular forces up
around Baghdad while suffering very low casualties.

If we had suffered large casualties because our
force was too small and unable to cope with
Iraqi attacks, this would have been a cost of
being too light. Or if a heavily force would
have easily taken Baghdad by now that would be
a cost of having been too light. But neither has
been the case: Casualties have been low. No one
thinks a larger forces could have costlessly
cracked open Baghdad by now.

So going light and hoping the regime self-destructs while simultaneously using the light
force to seize the oil wells and the Scud
box and forcing the Republican Guard to guard
Baghdad has not resulted in any costs for the coalition.

It's true that they now have to bring in more forces. But what would have been the advantage
of holding the light force back until the heavy
force arrived? It seems to me the cost of starting
light and then beefing up has been the loss of
a week or half a week. This is not a big deal.

One of the problems with putting a large force
in Kuwait from the outset is that it makes a
tempting WMD target for Saddam. Now that there is
more operating real estate for the troops (Kuwait plus Southern Iraq plus Northern Iraq via airlift), we can have more troops on the group without having the concentration in any one area
that invites chemical attack.

Good to see the correction. But I think it is still a big over-estimate of the true aid package for Israel. I believe it is about $2 billion in aid and $7 billion in loans. I have not heard of anything supplemental in the works and I am confident that no loans to Israel have ever been forgiven.

In fact, they are not loans but loan guarantees.
Israel issues the bonds on the public market with
a US guarantee. I'm rather sure the US has never had to bail Israel out on any of these bonds.

So the added subsidy from the bonds is just the diference between the interest rate Israel would have had to pay without the subsidy and the US agency rate that it ends up paying times the principal. This is probably about 3% of the $7
billion principal which is peanuts.

On the question of whether the initial plan
had too few troops:
It seems to me to be a non-issue. Resistance
was tougher than expected. Nonetheless, the US
has managed to bottle Iraqi regular forces up
around Baghdad while suffering very low casualties.

If we had suffered large casualties because our
force was too small and unable to cope with
Iraqi attacks, this would have been a cost of
being too light. Or if a heavily force would
have easily taken Baghdad by now that would be
a cost of having been too light. But neither has
been the case: Casualties have been low. No one
thinks a larger forces could have costlessly
cracked open Baghdad by now.

So going light and hoping the regime self-destructs while simultaneously using the light
force to seize the oil wells and the Scud
box and forcing the Republican Guard to guard
Baghdad has not resulted in any costs for the coalition.

It's true that they now have to bring in more forces. But what would have been the advantage
of holding the light force back until the heavy
force arrived? It seems to me the cost of starting
light and then beefing up has been the loss of
a week or half a week. This is not a big deal.

One of the problems with putting a large force
in Kuwait from the outset is that it makes a
tempting WMD target for Saddam. Now that there is
more operating real estate for the troops (Kuwait plus Southern Iraq plus Northern Iraq via airlift), we can have more troops on the group without having the concentration in any one area
that invites chemical attack.

Good to see the correction. But I think it is still a big over-estimate of the true aid package for Israel. I believe it is about $2 billion in aid and $7 billion in loans. I have not heard of anything supplemental in the works and I am confident that no loans to Israel have ever been forgiven.

In fact, they are not loans but loan guarantees.
Israel issues the bonds on the public market with
a US guarantee. I'm rather sure the US has never had to bail Israel out on any of these bonds.

So the added subsidy from the bonds is just the diference between the interest rate Israel would have had to pay without the subsidy and the US agency rate that it ends up paying times the principal. This is probably about 3% of the $7
billion principal which is peanuts.

On the question of whether the initial plan
had too few troops:
It seems to me to be a non-issue. Resistance
was tougher than expected. Nonetheless, the US
has managed to bottle Iraqi regular forces up
around Baghdad while suffering very low casualties.

If we had suffered large casualties because our
force was too small and unable to cope with
Iraqi attacks, this would have been a cost of
being too light. Or if a heavily force would
have easily taken Baghdad by now that would be
a cost of having been too light. But neither has
been the case: Casualties have been low. No one
thinks a larger forces could have costlessly
cracked open Baghdad by now.

So going light and hoping the regime self-destructs while simultaneously using the light
force to seize the oil wells and the Scud
box and forcing the Republican Guard to guard
Baghdad has not resulted in any costs for the coalition.

It's true that they now have to bring in more forces. But what would have been the advantage
of holding the light force back until the heavy
force arrived? It seems to me the cost of starting
light and then beefing up has been the loss of
a week or half a week. This is not a big deal.

One of the problems with putting a large force
in Kuwait from the outset is that it makes a
tempting WMD target for Saddam. Now that there is
more operating real estate for the troops (Kuwait plus Southern Iraq plus Northern Iraq via airlift), we can have more troops on the group without having the concentration in any one area
that invites chemical attack.

My apologizes for the multiple posts.
After hitting "post", my progress bar stalled
out less than halfway to completion and I assumed
that the post had been unsuccessful.

I also had checked back to the web site to see
if my post appeared under the comments and it
hadn't... I guess there was a substantial
delay.

Once again, my apologizes to all.

Militarily, there is an "opportunity cost" to having 1st armored, et al, "in theatre". After we attack Baghdad, we will need to replace the troops currently there, with a fresh garrison. The marines, 1st and 3rd Infantry will be too tired, and need to go home to see their families, necessitating a replacement force which probably will be the 1st armored and (now) the 4th Infantry, along with an ACR. Keeping 1st and the ACR in their home bases, with families, is much better for morale than having them parked in an already overcrowded and volatile Kuwait.

Probably the 4th should have been moved to theatre earlier, but hindsight is 20-20, and the politicals thought Turkey would finally allow us in, if for no other reason than to preserve their clout on the Kurdish question. They didn't, so we went in a little short-handed.

I suspect we wouldn't have moved on the ground in the last few days, anyway. Even had everything gone absolutely perfectly (which in this context is complete surrender by the regular Army - the Republican Guary and Fedayeen were always expected to fight it out), we still would be doing what we are doing now - pushing supplies up to the battlefront, moving in air assets, and bombing defensive positions.

"It seems to me the cost of starting
light and then beefing up has been the loss of
a week or half a week."

I suspect you are grossly underestimating the amount of time it takes to deploy heavy equipment, which has to be sent by ship. Shipping capacity may also be a constraint. For example, it's entirely possible that if we want to deploy another heavy division from the States to the Gulf, we have to offload the 4th Division's equipment, send those ships back to the East Coast of the US, reload them, and send them back to the Gulf. A lot maore time is involved in that that a week and a half. You will recall that we spent 6 months building up troops in Saudi Arabia in preparation for Gulf War I. Let's hope, incidently, that we keep Egypt happy with us--it would be a pain if resupply had to go around the tip of Africa rather than through the Suez Canal.

This is pretty trivial in the big scheme of things, but perhaps will, in some small way, help refine perspectives.

It is not entirely valid to assess to the intensity of the Iraqi resistance based on the number of Coalition KIAs; which several seem to be doing on the various relevant threads of this blog.

There have been several hundred WIAs - some of these young men and women will be maimed for life - and this fact indicates two points. 1) there has been some truly fierce fighting. 2) the kevlar body armor with ceramic plates in the center of mass, both front and back, have been a godsend for coalition forces.

I suspect that without the kevlar the KIA figure would be considerably higher. Much of the Iraqi resistance is coming from lightly armed troops/miltia. The AK 47 round (also fired by the RPK light machine gun) will not punch through the body armor and will only penetrate the kevlar helmet with a direct hit (close to 90 degree angle of approach) from relatively close range.

Kevlar saved lives in Somalia and it has also done so in Afghanistan. One of the best investments our miltary has made.

On the same tangent, the 5.56mm "m855 ball" round fired by the M16 and the M249 SAW light machine gun (used by coalition forces) will penetrate the Kevlar helmet out to 1,200 yards. It will also go through the Kevlar vest, ceramic plates and all, out to around three hundred yards.

Heck, maybe I just wanted to tout the virtues of kevlar.

Oops, wrong thread. Sorry.

I take your point.
I was mainly referring to the 4th infantry
that originally was planned to head in from
Turkey and the new infantry divisions coming
in this week.

I don't have any military training
and don't know how much heavy equipment
is required to support and outfit infantry.

My guess is that they aren't planning to
bring in more armor but instead plan
to bring in infantry to protect supply lines
and conduct anti-insurgency activities and
that this will continue to be supplemented
in a big way by airpower when facing the
Iraqi regular army/Republican Guard.

I don't have any training to judge whether
more armor and heavy divisions are required.
To the extent they are, I agree with you.

But fundamentally, the cost is in terms of
time, not lives or lost objectives. In the
grand scale of what can go wrong with a military
plan, this seems quite acceptable.
-Jonathan

This may not be the best place for this question, but how exactly would Turkey permitting the Northern front have changed the situation in the South? Yes, more pressure around the entirety of Baghdad, forcing the Iraqi defense to spread itself more evenly (and thus thinner). But how does that change the situation in the South? A thinner force/ resistance in the South would ultimately be an easier foe- but would that be the case right now? Maybe I'm missing something here?

Another excellent thread. Smart sounding article by Yglesias. Smart critique by Brad. Good counter critique by among others Carmel (and very nice to apologise for the multiple post hope I don't end up doing the same).

So enough nicey nicey.

By the time I write US forces are rapidly advancing again, so Rumsfield looks better, but I still think Rummy (full name correctly spelled George Bush) made a very bad choice.

They decided that the attack had to come soon. The argument was weather, but the guys in uniform leaked that they weren't worried. I think the issue was partly political (they were losing ground in the debate) and partly pure impatience.

This was costly when they lost a vote in the Turkish parliament by 3 votes after pushing the Turkish cabinet to press for a vote as soon as possible. I'm going to guess that this wasn't a Turkish trick and was a vote meant to be won. I me good grief aren't the Bushies supposed to be good at politics.

The thread relevant mistake was going ahead with the attack before the 4th (I think) had time to get to the Persian gulf from just outside Turkish ports. Why ? They are not more available to go to Korea.

I think the only plausible military argument is the weather. I think the real reasons were emotional and political.

Now recall the other reasons for delay. Hans Blix was asking for more time months not weeks or years. Something compelled the Bush administration to suddenly question his honesty and attack his motives.

Tony Blair was publicly begging for a brief delay (weeks not days or months) partly, at least, in order to convince his countrymen that he had tried as hard as possible to achieve peaceful disarmament. The UK political pundit word (maybe wrong) was that unless the war was very quick he is toast (and very quick meant Baghdad quick not Basra). So it seems Tony Blair was expendable.

And this to force something on the generals.