A UPI story from last August that gives our entire "Plan A" war plan for the attack on Iraq--the plan that hinged on the ability of psychological warfare to keep the Iraqi army from fighting. The plan that also needed us to have the "big hammer" ready in case the appearance of the 101st Airborne and 3rd Infantry did not cause Saddam Hussein's regime to collapse.
United Press International: Bush given Iraq invasion plan: Bush given Iraq invasion plan
By Richard Sale
UPI Terrorism Correspondent
From the Washington Politics & Policy Desk
Published 8/8/2002 5:24 PM
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 (UPI) -- U.S. Central Command head Gen. Tommy Franks briefed President Bush this week about a scaled-down contingency plan to strike Iraq that calls for an invasion force of some 80,000 to 100,000 personnel including only 50,000 ground troops, administration officials said.
In this new proposal, an invasion would take place during November and December, administration officials, who asked not to be identified by name, told United Press International.
A spokesman for the National Security Council at the White House said they had no information on the meeting and could neither confirm nor deny that it had taken place.
But a well-placed Pentagon official said, "Franks was asked to brief. The president doesn't have time to bother what with he doesn't want to hear." This official asked not to be quoted by name or assignment.
Recent pressure from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith to try and mount a scaled back invasion by October was turned back by staunch resistance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these sources said.
"The generals didn't like the Feith option," said Washington Institute for Near East Policy expert Patrick Clawson. "The Joint Chiefs were wishy-washy, and the Army was strongly opposed. The Marines liked the option and the timing, but didn't want to go against the Army, which is rapidly proving itself irrelevant to modern warfare."
In Franks' proposal the United States would launch initial air attacks by aircraft carrier-based aircraft and cruise missiles designed to paralyze Iraq's air defenses and command and control, the Pentagon official said.
A day later, he said, ground forces based in Kuwait would make an incursion into south Iraq to create a safe zone called "an air head," similar to a "beach head," the Pentagon official said.
Franks heads Central Command in Tampa, Fla., and is responsible for the U.S.-led offensive in Afghanistan. Central Command would also mount any attack on Iraq.
The source said once the "air head" was established, airstrips would quickly be built and U.S. ground force with armor would move in from Kuwait.
According to a former senior Pentagon official, who advised Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz on the plan, U.S. forces would use sophisticated psychological warfare operations to keep Iraq's conscript army in its barracks, while simultaneously, the U.S. ground forces would drive hard west of the Euphrates River.
"The Iraqi army would be urged to stay in barracks where it would be safe. If it came out, it would be slaughtered -- that would be the message," an administration official said.
The enemy may listen to this advice, the planners believe, since Defense Intelligence Agency analysts estimate that 450,000 Iraqi troops were killed in Operation Desert Storm, a former DIA analyst told UPI.
"This whole plan hinges on the ability to frighten the Iraqi military into staying neutral or switching sides," the former DIA official said.
This official, who asked not to be identified by name, said the ground forces, reinforced by an airdrop of the XVIII Airborne Corps, would appear in the suburbs of Baghad to entice into the open six key divisions of Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard and a half dozen formidable Iraqi armored divisions which would then be destroyed by heavy air strikes by U.S.-based B-52s and B-1 heavy bombers.
The psychological warfare operation can only succeed, the sources agreed, if the United States first destroyed Iraq's communications. This would be done by using highly sophisticated electromagnetic pulse weapons that would jam or paralyze Saddam's command and control and also wipe out his communications so that the only broadcasts to be accessed by Iraqi troops would be U.S. propaganda programs.
Electromagnetic waves are like radio waves, only many thousand of times stronger. Usually produced by nuclear explosions, the new U.S. weapon uses chemicals detonated by a shaped charge, according to John Pike, military expert and president of Globalsecurity.com, an Internet Web site.
"The EMP weapon is also called a high-powered microwave weapon," Pike said.
These weapons are also expected to damage or paralyze the controls of installations that store or manufacture chemical or biological weapons, forestalling air attacks that could cause the release of harmful agents, Pentagon sources said.
But Pentagon officials said they expect "some degree of incessant chemical attacks" once the Iraqis find themselves under fire.
According to administration sources, the main reason for the November, December time frame is that weather in Iraq would be cool enough for U.S. troops be able to wear suits protecting them from chemical and biological weapons.
John Pike said initial U.S. ground forces personnel in Iraq are expected to be the 101st Airborne Division, the Third Mechanized Infantry Division, a brigade of U.S. Marines and a brigade of British troops. The total would be less than 50,000 ground troops.
"We have no word on any of that," a Pentagon official said.
An earlier Franks proposal, OpPlan 1003, which called for 250,000 ground troops and 15 air wings, has been put on a back burner because it was "basically a plan to defeat the Iraqi army, not cause a change in regime," Pike said.
In the new plan, the center of gravity is not the Iraqi military but Saddam himself, he said.
"He's right," said a Pentagon official. "This newer plan is designed to cause a coup, not cause a full-scale war."
But even advocates of the new proposal said that the United States must be ready to have large follow-on forces ready for deployment if needed.
"You are gambling that the appearance of the XVIII Airborne will cause the regime to collapse," said one U.S. government official. "If it doesn't you have to have the big hammer ready."
Copyright © 2001-2003 United Press International
I am somewhat bemused by the fact that UPI had our war plan last August--almost down to brigade level.
Posted by DeLong at March 31, 2003 07:49 PM | TrackBack
Sometimes the transparency of our government is amazing...
Posted by: Stan on March 31, 2003 08:26 PMIt's scary that this came out through Reverend Moon's apparatus.
Posted by: Jon h on March 31, 2003 09:13 PMI suppose it's a case of it being easier to spot the winning horse after the race is over.
I'm afraid I don't know much about military matters (no, correct that, I'm glad I don't...) but I did have the impression that it was a matter of fundamentals that a soldier always fights differently defending the home turf than defending conquest. So any conclusions drawn from the earlier Gulf War do seem, at least, to have been hopelessly naieve (the kind of thinking that brought us the dollar-peso hard peg in Argentina perhaps?).
What looks to be out front over the next month or so (particularly in and around Baghdad) seems scary enough (and anyone who's read a little about the 'battle of Grozny' knows the kinds of problem that a lot of underground tunnels and bunkers can present if things get really nasty), but what really worries me is what comes after the war.
Being old enough to remember Vietnam has its advantages. That controversial newspaper the Financial Times got into ruminating on the Têt offensive the other day: you know the stuff about military victory but losing the 'hearts and minds'. This now seems a distinct possibility.
I don't buy the simplistic nation-building stuff. Inter-communal hatreds and desires for revenge are likely to run too high, at least for this generation (Belfast and Kosovo could give us some pointers). It's difficult not to notice, for example, that in the North the Iraqui soldiers don't exactly hang around to have a chat with the oncoming Kurds.
So a break-up of Iraq does seem a distinct possibility. Looking at the map, this could mean that the people in the middle end up without much oil. If I can see this, then presumably so can they. This could provide a bit more of the explanation as to why they appear to be so motivated to resist.
Posted by: Edward Hugh on March 31, 2003 09:33 PMWell no wonder! I had been shocked (and awed) at folks who began complaining that this action had dragged on "too long" after 10 days. But now it makes sense. Comparing the actual position of troops on 28 March to the PLANNED position will show us FIVE MONTHS (November, December, January, February, and most of March) behind schedule.
And this is Bush and Rummy's fault rather than Chirac's, of course.
Posted by: Melcher on April 1, 2003 05:16 AMEdward Hugh's first paragraph has it right. We humans may not even have a choice about defending the home turf. In every territorial species of which I am aware, the holder of the territory fights ever more fiercely, even against a much larger intruder, as the intruder encroaches further into the defenders territory. Some amazing mismatches can go to the little defender if the intruder doesn't have an overwhelming motive to keep fighting. Does anybody think we have an overwhelming motive to keep fighting?
Not fair. We are going to win the war, in all probability. The point is, Iraqis won't necessarily make the logical choice in the face of this near certainty. They may behave like any territorial critter, which makes a war strategy based on their giving up quickly highly suspect. They may fight like the devil, some of them, anyway.
Posted by: K Harris on April 1, 2003 06:09 AMMelcher, I am mostly shocked, awed, and saddened by the Chicken Little critiques after only two weeks.
Edward, your trip through memory lane is not historically accurate. It has to do with belief systems. Iran after the Shah would have been a better regional comparison to Vietnam. A more recent example would have been Afghanistan under the Taliban.
Communism still seemed like a viable ism to the Vietnamese in the 1960s and 1970s. In the same way fanaticism was a viable ism to the Iranians and Afghanis. (Note: none are as enamored with their isms today).
Unlike these radical utopian belief systems, Saddam stays in power through terror. As such. Rumsfeld and company are likely correct in concluding that the regime will end as soon as people know it cannot come back. The Iraqis may very well tire of us quickly, but your comparison is off target.
Posted by: Stan on April 1, 2003 06:30 AMEdward, I meant to attribute the memory lane thing to the Financial Times. Your points on the possible impacts of nationalism and a break up are well taken.
I don't get the impression that Iraqis believe we are planning to stay. In fact, that really does appear to be part of the problem. They aren't even sure we will see the campaign through. As such, the resistance does appear to be entirely terror related. Those behind it (Baath party officials, etc.) are probably willing to fight to the death because they fear retribution equals death for them anyhow. Thus, the tipping point theory would hold.
Posted by: Stan on April 1, 2003 06:53 AMAt least they got the "airhead" part right.
Posted by: Chuck Nolan on April 1, 2003 09:09 AM
"...ground forces based in Kuwait would make an incursion into south Iraq to create a safe zone called "an air head,";
which highlights the importance of bringing democracy to Iraq. Here in America, we don't need invasions to get airheads, we have elections.
Oh, darn it. If I had hit the post button instead of answering the phone, it would be Chuck Nolan that was stewing right now.
Posted by: Tom Maguire on April 1, 2003 10:06 AMThe thing people are complaining about is not that we haven't won the war already, but that the war was sold to the public with a lot of giddy statements that didn't turn out to be true. I didn't believe any of them, but they weren't directed at me. They were directed at stupid people (the same people who belive that Saddam was responsible for 9/11). Politically, it worked. I would be interested in seeing a survey plotting support for the war against accurate understanding of the relevant facts.
Most of rest of the anti-Bush buzz these days comes from military men, retired or not, who feel that Rumsfeld's micromanagement screwed things up (mostly by making the transition to Plan B, after the failure of the giddy Plan A, more difficult).
Theoretically thus should not be a Left/Right issue, but the mad dogs of the right are so hysterical that to them Gen Wesley Clark is a dope-crazed Commie multiculturalist transexual by now.
Posted by: zizka on April 1, 2003 10:58 AMhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/specialReports/pollSummaries/sr030224.asp
According to Gallup, Americans continue to support or reject the war with the same tenacity that they did at the outset of the war, though they feel much differently about how successfully the war is being fought.
I recall that before the war Gallup asked people if they would support the war if 100, 1000, or 2000 Americans died. At 100 support/rejection was unchanged, but at 1000 and beyond support fell quickly.
It seems to me that although expectations of a lighting victory are not panning out (assuming that many expected a lighting victory - which I believe to be the case), this is not the factor upon which support was ultimately hinged. If expectations of low body count are not vindicated I expect that support may wane.
Obviously I would much rather see the war concluded with minimal bloodshed and overwhelming support than vice versa. **
Cheers!
Saam Barrager
(**obligatory comment for goofballs that confuse speculation with sinister optimism.)
Posted by: Saam Barrager on April 1, 2003 02:05 PM====
Saam Barrager wrote "I recall that before the war Gallup asked people if they would support the war if 100, 1000, or 2000 Americans died. At 100 support/rejection was unchanged, but at 1000 and beyond support fell quickly."
----
Interestingly there have been studies which show that combat losses increase dramatically past a certain point (can't recall technical term off-hand). So far despite the hue and cry, losses are mainly attritional (57 @ 26-Mar see http://www.aeronautics.ru/news/news002/iraqwar_ru_017.htm) but US/UK forces still retain cohesiveness and thus combat efficiency. The point is if you extrapolate linearly (a bad technique but absent any other other model) you hit the 1,000 mark in ~120 days (well within the 90day wrapup commentators expect). However, a Weibull distribution may be more suitable if you consider the combat forces to be an interdependent system which fails as soon as a crticial support function is eliminated (potential for rear area disruption). The danger is that a Beiruit bomb attack on any other base would be counted as a war-related and thus create political shock.
Sam andLL, that's an interesting line of thought. One that no doubt has been considered by the administration and that figured into their strategic planning.
As stated by many on this blog the war plan seems to have been predicated on a quick surrender by Iraqi forces. This would have kept causalties to a minimum and public approval to a maximum.
This would explain the bypassed pockets of resistance. Totally eliminating such resistance - not to mention the clearing of Baghdad - will raise hell with your linear assumption.
Posted by: EA on April 1, 2003 09:21 PM