Semi-Daily Journal

Any analyses of what the U.S. needs to do in Iraq is meaningless unless you can establish a) what GWB actually knows about it from his objective news sources, and b) what motivation is handed to him by his handlers.

What the U.S. SHOULD do is not going to get done with the Republicans in charge of the White House and both houses of congress. The interests of those in power are simply not the interets of the U.S., and they have shown themselves to be utterly ruthless in the pursuit of their goals.

So we can search the blogs for all sorts of great ideas from both conservatives and progressives, but none of them will be implemented. The power structure within the U.S. must change first, and I don't see that happening easily before election 2004.

Brad,
Isn't your faith in the Iraqi guerilla fighters just a little strong? Even if the Bush team is as dumb as you think they are, it is not clear that we will lose.

You're building up a huge wager on the "Bush lies, his appointees are bozos" square. You're already treating those bets as won, without considering some of the difficulties you may have in winning them.

Arnold - what is the alternative? The "Bush is honest, his appointees are smart" line has very little supporting evidence after 3 years of presidency. Also, being aware that US support for the war is quickly falling apart and having "faith in the Iraqi guerilla fighters" are not the same.

Wow. Got this article from Josh Marshall's site.

http://slate.msn.com/id/2090852

It's short, but describes exactly the dynamic between the neocons and the CIC. I have never thought of them as Trotskyists before, but it makes sense.

Jacob Weisberg does not draw the same conclusion I do that nothing will change until there is a major power structure shakeup, but I think his thesis supports that idea.

Faith in which Iraqi guerrilla fighters? The Baathist/Sunni fighters working to restore the Sunni's status as Iraq's Master Class, or the Shi'ite and Kurdish fighters who have so far mostly stayed out of the fracas, but are eyeing their estwhile Sunni overlords and sharpening their knives in a contemplative manner? Strategypage.com reports that Shi'ite revenge killings against the Sunni are building at a fair clip.

The most likely result of American failure in Iraq is not the triumphant restoration of Saddam Hussein, but a bloodbath of near-Rwandan proportions.

We lost in June. The rest is history.

Arnold, the faith that prof delong has is in the mendacious and ideologically blinkered policymaking of the backbone administration. After seeing them in action for 34 months, can you deny this characterization?

It doesn't really matter why george bush and the key decision-makers within his administration are this way (although it will serve as fodder for generations of historians to come); it only matters that we have sufficient empirical demonstration of this reality to count on it continuing to unfold, however long they stay in office.

Sooner or later, the dwindling band of honest conservatives will wake up to the reality of this administration (i had brief hopes for mccain actually mounting a challenge, but for the moment he has contented himself with calling them incompetent on iraq) and withdraw their support; in the meantime, we can only point to the backbone administration track record....

Arnold, didn't you write something decrying the use of so-called "type-M" arguments by a noted liberal columnist not long ago? I'm at a loss to find the a passage that evinces Brad's supposed "faith" in the Iraqi guerrillas. If you want to counter Brad's post, you really should be causally linking successes in Iraq to the decisions of the administration's foreign policy team (and -- no cheating -- not to the pre-existing strength of the U.S. armed forces).

>>You're building up a huge wager on the "Bush lies, his appointees are bozos" square. You're already treating those bets as won<<

Well, yes. They are won. Bush lies. His appointees are bozos.

That said, we are enormously powerful. Tacitus fears that even so we may lose in Iraq--because Bush lies and his appointees are bozos. I fear it too: that's the reason I want Bush and his bozos out of power, and want it now.

Howard --

What does "withdraw their support" mean? Actually, let me ask a related question, which I think is the really important one: Given the current state of affairs, and stipulating that your description of the policymaking of the administration is true, what should American citizens and politicians do now? Bush will be president for at least another year. We are in Iraq. If we leave Iraq now, there's little doubt that the consequences will be disastrous for Iraq and for the U.S. It would have the impact that our decision to pull out of Somalia did, only a hundredfold. So I can't see how any responsible person could advocate us simply pulling out. So what do we do? And what is it that the ceaseless criticisms of how the administration got us into the war or how it failed to plan adequately for the postwar period -- as opposed to, say, practical criticisms of how the war is being conducted now -- are meant to accomplish? That's actually not a rhetorical question. I don't fully understand what their function is.

James, those are fantastic questions that require more attention and care to answer fully than i can devote now, so please forgive me for the surface skim of an answer.

The elephant in the room of discussion of Iraq policy is the backbone administration's continued unwillingness to admit the obvious: they overstated the threat and they understated the difficulty of the mission. George Bush would have helped himself - and the quality of discourse and range of options available - had he simply admitted, at the time of the "niger" story, these simple realities. Indeed, joined with the kind of speech he gave on thursday, he could have revitalized (in my estimation) support for - and the possibilities of - our iraqi adventure.

If we were governed by a parlimentary system, the kind of failure of case for war and conception and execution of postwar that we've seen from the backbone administration (and the associated unwillingness to acknowledge any error) would be cause for a vote of no confidence, or at least for a major reshuffle at the top.

Since, as you note, we don't live under that system, and need to wait for november, 2004, i picture the "withdraw(al) of support" by honorable conservatives as an end to enabling. In a better world, honorable conservatives would urge Bush to step down altogether, but that's too much to hope for; hoping that honorable conservatives will urge Bush to tell the truth, admit error, and point to a better tomorrow isn't.

So, to me, the problem of Bush qua Bush is inseparable from the problem of iraq qua iraq: he and his administration have been tried and found wanting on the question of ability to formulate effective policy. Whether there is an effective policy to be had right now is something that i wonder about all the time.

There are days when I think that we are throwing good lives and dollars after bad in a situation that can have no good outcome, and days that I think that a better policy mix could at least prevent a total disaster from occurring.

The problem is that the heart of a better policy mix is more international support in terms of boots on the ground and dollars, and i don't believe there is any chance of that occuring under bush. I think there is a chance of that occurring under a president who re-committed to multilaterilism and acknoweldged the limits of strategic pre-emption that have been revealed in iraq, but that can't possibly be bush.

Sadly, bush has demonstrated throughout his life, as i am hardly the first to say, problems with judgement, maturity, and acceptance of responsibility. It doesn't surprise me that cutting and running - while pretending not to be - is now the policy of the backbone administration.

It was, after all, the policy of their model in so many things, the nixon administration.

I don't see how to stop that without honorable conservatives "withdraw(ing) their support," and i don't see how to improve the situation in iraq under george bush, so broadly, i hope honest conservatives step up and do what they know in their hearts they should be doing (positive signs from mccain and kristol lately) while looking forward as i never have to voting next november and trying to throw the bum out.

So sorry to be so cursory - maybe i can say something better tomorrow.

It can outsource peacekeeping functions to the United Nations or close allies, at the cost of some constraints on foreign policy implementation.

Gee I wonder what he met by "constraints on foreign policy implementation."

It's good to see some conservatives voice complaints lately (besides tacitus) - Clark did some good with his post in the paper the other day-as it did made a lot of conservatives think about the war and how to redirect it.

I know Clark got in the race late but it's good that he is running since he gives conservatives a motivation to question Bush's approach Iraq.

It can outsource peacekeeping functions to the United Nations or close allies, at the cost of some constraints on foreign policy implementation.

Gee I wonder what he met by "constraints on foreign policy implementation."

It's good to see some conservatives voice complaints lately (besides tacitus) - Clark did some good with his post in the paper the other day-as it did made a lot of conservatives think about the war and how to redirect it.

I know Clark got in the race late but it's good that he is running since he gives conservatives a motivation to question Bush's approach Iraq.

James S. -- "And what is it that the ceaseless criticisms of how the administration got us into the war or how it failed to plan adequately for the postwar period -- as opposed to, say, practical criticisms of how the war is being conducted now -- are meant to accomplish? That's actually not a rhetorical question. I don't fully understand what their function is."

The function of these statements is to tell us that we are in a bad place, that Bush got us there by his incompetence, and that we fear that he is capable of making things worse if he stays in power.

In other words, they state a problem without offering a solution to the problem. It's a harsh and depressing thing to say, but there's nothing irrational or problematic about it.

Someone who points out a problem is not required to simultaneously offer a solution to it. Recognizing a problem is the first step toward solving it, though.

The "accountability and results" Republicans want to put Bush above criticism. What a crock. The ingenuousness of your question is distressing.

Watching ideologues stumble blindly into the snares reality lays for them and thrash about can be a source of considerable amusement. Unless, of course, they happen to be in charge of the most powerful military and economy in history and you have to both live with the results and pay for the damages...

The Bush Administration has sent a clear signal, in at least three different ways, to Muqtada al Sadr that an elected Islamic republic will be acceptable to the U.S., and he has ameliorated his rhetoric. Meanwhile we are training an Iraqi force to do the guerilla mop-up, and so failures can be pinned on them. The downsized U.S. forces that will remain--and we could be there for decades--will circle their wagons onto small defensible bases, such as the large permanent intelligence installation in the north, and only foray out for real dirty work (or to give an occasional hand to the Iraqi forces), just like the Roman legions of old. This appears to be the "exit strategy"...

Zizka --

You didn't describe the function of the criticisms of Bush. You just described their content. I apologize for the ingenuousness of the question, but I still don't think you've answered it. One obvious answer would be: "The function is to ensure that Bush is not re-elected." But I may now be going from ingenuous to cynical.

In any case, the point -- at least my point -- isn't to put Bush above criticism. The point is to say that talking about how Bush will make things worse if he "stays in power" does nothing to improve American policy right now. Bush is in power and will be in power for the next year. Americans cannot write off an entire year, with American troops on the ground in Iraq, as a lost cause. What are the "problems" that you think these continuing criticisms are allowing to be recognized? That things are not going well in Iraq? That at least in part that's because the Bushies did a bad job of non-planning for what would happen after the war? That the administration has been deceptive? At this point, I think these things are self-evident. We know what the problems are. We also know that, regardless, we cannot leave Iraq. So re-stating the problems is no longer enough. I think you're wrong: it is now incumbent on critics of the administration to offer, if not solutions, then at least ways of improving American policy. (Howard's suggestion of internationalization is just that, even if he thinks it's hopeless.)

I suppose my real concern is that most of the critics don't have any solutions, that they don't know what to do, not just about Iraq but about Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, and so their fallback position is to talk about what a terrible job Bush is doing, which is true but doesn't really help America right now, nor does it make it likely that Bush will be defeated in November. People are not going to vote Bush out unless they believe that his opponent has a plan to fix Iraq and, more important, a plan to keep them safe. Tax policy, trade policy, the environment, civil liberties: on all these issues Bush's critics (of which I'm often one) offer substantive criticisms and substantive alternatives. But on Iraq, I've heard little, aside from the opposition to the $87 billion to reconstruct Iraq (which would have left Iraq where, exactly?), the insane proposal to force Iraq to borrow the money for its own reconstruction and, of course, the chorus from ANSWER about helping the Baathists resist the colonial occupation. This doesn't cut it.

Howard:

What about the case of Tony Blair?

James Surowiecki:

I fear we are already in a situation of positive-feedback escalation, but without the military resources, nor plan to deal with it. (I was, it might not surprise you, fervently against the war.) The best "solution" earlier on would have been internationalization/arabization, though there was not a chance that our current malefactors of great wealth would have grabbed for that brass ring. The "present danger" is that whether we clamp down militarily, or withdraw under a fig leaf, we are in serious danger of provoking an Iraqi civil war. And to add to the problem further, our antagonists, of whom we have poor intelligence, since, among other things, "Arabists" were excluded from the operation as suspect, are both Saddam-recidivists and Islamic-nationalist anti-Saddamists. What indigenous basis we can rally to oppose them with a possible legitimate/nonviolent outcome is now the question. Ironically, we are now entirely dependent on the resources of Iraqi society for our prospects, and, given all that they have endured from us and the fact that the neo-cons picked on Iraq precisely because it was so weak, I don't think we should overestimate what those resources are.

C'mon, can we be honest here and say it was Bill Clinton's armed and secret services that won decisive victories in Afghanistan and Iraq?

Mr. Halasz,

I generally agree with your post, but I quibble with your assertion that the USA is provoking the civil war. Civil war in Iraq was and is inevitable once Saddam Hussein was removed from power. In fact, I would argue that the war has already begun as Shi'a retribution killings against Sunni are increasing at a fair clip. The US government is not to blame for this, as the groundwork was laid by the Sunni's themselves in their treatment of of Kurds and Sunnis over the last few centuries. It is, however, at fault for not taking stronger steps to avoid the looming conflagration that, in my view, any damn fool could see looming on the horizon.

C'mon, can we be honest here and say it was Bill Clinton's armed and secret services that won decisive victories in Afghanistan and Iraq?

James S. Making these criticisms of Bush so that he doesn't get re-elected is not necessarily cyncical. Surely it isimportant that he pays a political price for getting things so badly wrong. It is by no means clear that the majority of people have accepted that Bush got it wrong and many arguments against the war in the first place that were dismissed have proved correct and htose lessons need ot be learned.

What should be done now? Unfortunately turning the clock back is not an option. Ideally we just get on with it and Bush is forced to roll back some tax cuts and eat humble pie with the UN and Axis of Weasels to get a multilateral solution and realise the implications of the price paid for the war but that doesn't look like happening any time soon.

Still why do bloggers have to have all the answers? A government should have better arguments for its policies than "Well, what would you do?".

It seems to me Jack that noting the absence of concrete suggestions, is a pretty strong argument. It's just too facile to say, "It's screwed up, it's not perfect, you made the mess, so you fix it."

Most times one tries to do anything in this world, it screws up. You can't measure results against perfection, but by what the alternative might reasonably have been.

With Vietnam the alternative was, "Get our boys out of there." For America at least it worked (I don't know enough to say whether it worked for Vietnam).

Would the same alternative work in Iraq? I don't think so, and I don't think many people think so. The fact is, given the war and the way the war was fought, America is a bit stuck. As someone already mentioned, Bush should pay a political price for having got the U.S. stuck. However, what that price will and should be, will be determined by how the Iraqi occupation goes and whether the American opposition can find concrete suggestions as to how this can be improved. If all it can do is throw raspberries, then Bush might very well escape any serious political fallout.

Jack --

I don't actually think that any of the arguments against the war have proved "correct," if by that you mean it's been proved that the war was a mistake. I think what's been proved -- or at least convincingly demonstrated to my taste -- is that many of the reasons Bush offered for going to war with Iraq were false or ill-conceived. But the two most convincing (if realpolitik-y) rationales for war -- removing an oppressive tyrant who was an avowed enemy of the U.S. and providing an overpowering demonstration of American strength to counter Islamic fundamentalists' repeated assertions that the U.S. was weak and cowardly -- have not been proved incorrect, although whether the war will actually accomplish the second goal remains very much up in the air.

In any case, I wasn't really suggesting that bloggers should have all the answers. But I do think Democratic politicians in general and Democratic candidates in particular need to come up with some, both for political and for policy reasons. It's possible to get a lot of mileage out of Bush's myriad tactical mistakes. But he has the great advantage, politically, that in the eyes of most Americans he's right on the big question: unremitting and single-minded opposition to terrorism. Ultimately, I don't think just enumerating Bush's many faults is going to be enough to counter that, no matter how messy it gets in Iraq. Remember that American support for the war in Vietnam stayed strong for at least four years, and that was for a war whose connection to American security was even more tenuous than the Iraqi war is, and where casualties were massively higher. So Democrats need to offer a convincing and realistic alternative, and I think it has to be a plan for how we're going to win in Iraq, though I may be wrong about that.

As far as your answer goes, though, what does a "multilateral solution" look like? Given the fact that European countries are unwilling even to cancel Iraq's debts, is it realistic to think they'll put troops on the ground? And is there any reason to think that the Iraqis who are anti-American will be more welcoming of Europeans? They did, after all, blow up that U.N. building.

I'm not entirely certain that all hope is lost in Iraq, but then again, all my optimistic scenarios don't factor in that the Bush Administration is criminally incompetent.

The basic problem to me is, Iraq is probably not a country that can remain whole unless it is done so by a ruthless dictator. It'd be great to think that the various ethnic groups could hammer out some power-sharing (i.e. oil revenues)arrangement , but all the evidence I've seen makes me suspect this is wishful thinking.

The one bit of possible good news in Iraq, besides Saddam getting a bit of his just desserts, is that the Shiite and Kurd areas have been relatively quiet, but I fear they are just biding their time and are content to let Americans ands Sunnis fight it out for as long as Americans stay in Iraq.

If I'm right, and I pray that I'm not, then the best worst option is a UN-sanctioned breaking up of Iraq into three countries that reflect the ethnic territories. (easier said than done) There's about a snowballs chance in hell of this happening, but you don't want to know what I think are the other likely scenarios are. Its actually just one scenario, but with various degrees of horrorific results.

Unfortunately, the Bush Administration appears intent on insisting that they are making splendid progress, and hope and pray that they can keep this illusion going until next year's election.

James Surowieki:

Removing Saddam, if that was the primary reason for the war- and in a sense, despite official disavowals, it was-, could have been accomplished at any number of times in any number of possible ways. The Saddam regime was weak, staying in power only by a highly leveraged system of state terror, ironically reinforced by the sanctions regime that weakened Iraqi society far more than it did Saddam's grip on power. It was the very weakness of his regime that made it such a tempting target to the neo-cons. The problem always was not removing Saddam from power, or neutralizing any threat he might have posed, but whether the aftermath would have suited American preferences or interests. Hans Blix, if you'll recall, clearly stated last May that, if the Saddam regime had failed to comply with the U.N. disarmament/inspections requirements by the fall, (i.e., now, when the climactic conditions for warfare would have been optimal), he would have had no compunction in going along with forcible action. Had Saddam been revealed thereby as the toothless tiger he apparently, in fact, was, then with some further stipulations in international agreements, he either would have been a mere braying ass or removed from power by his own people. Or there would have been real international legitimacy for the Bush administration's preferred policy and much better prospects for its outcome.

As for the second reason, the "war on terror" requiring a demostration of U.S. military resolve, it is doubtful that a sheer response by military means is what would have been called for. "Terror" is not a singularly substantial, nor locatable aspect of international power politics. Would that we had actually followed through and completed the job in Afganistan, if not by producing the corpse of Osama bin Laden, then by bringing some measure of peace, stability, and civilizational progress to that tragically and brutally war-torn land. But if any measure of rationality can be attributed to Osama bin Laden and his ilk,- (a big if)-, then it was precisely to provoke such an over-reaction as we see in the Iraq adventure. (One could guess that his "strategic" goal was not to destroy the U.S.A., but to de-stablize the Mid-east and strengthen Islamic fundamentalism as a political force against the regimes of the region.) If I may be permitted a frivolous analogy, it is like deconstructionist "critiques"/attacks upon reason, which are designed to provoke a sense of dismay and thereby the re-assertion of the most fundamentalistic/dogmatic- and thus weakest- forms of rationality- a quest for pyrrhic victory, indeed. That other alternatives were available, not the least in planning for the post-war contingencies of Iraq with the full resources of the U.S. government, as has already been revealed in many media reports, is not a trivial political point, no matter how much one may choose to despise that average intelligence or information level of the American electorate. And to insist on providing a formula, regardless of the dire contingencies we face, for the unmaking of this omelet is to re-enforce the "legitimating" discourse that made the omelet in the first place. We may, indeed, be facing a no exit situation in Iraq, with respect to the best interests of the U.S.A. But that can be a basis for developing a program of ideas and policies for re-orienting the consideration of those best interests, rather than failing to acknowledge the gross "mistakes" that led us into the quandary in the first place. At least, this would be the case, if those best interests do not involve a quest for pyrrhic victories.

(If I recall correctly, I think you would be an advocate of "checks and balances" as a procedural guarantee of rational political deliberations. Perhaps you should recall and reflect upon how little a part such checks and balances have played in the "deliberations" of the current administration.)

Incompetence and the lack of a road map for afterwards already evident in Afghanistan are what Bush is being beaten about the head with at the moment, are true and were given before the war.

As for removing tyrants as a reason for going to war, it is only really a reason if that was sufficient reason and there are so many other tyrants not being deposed that it is clear that it is not. The cost of this expedition is enough to show that it is worth picking your fights.

Maybe the problems most Democratic candidates face is having gone along with it in the first place and with treating the fate of another nation as little more than a political football, ripe for cheap point scoring as with the changing grants to loans.

Bush certainly has the advantages you describe but not with the description of his failures as tactical. It is a failed strategy that is manifesting itself in situations that are difficult to handle and failures that look tactical.

I don't think that too much should be read into the refusal to write off debts. Despite the fuss, European debtors are a relatively small part of Iraq's problems (less than 10 per cent I believe), so action on their part would just be giving money to the likes of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. (Russia is a bigger creditor and probably too poor just to wave goodbye to the country. Really I don't know why the US didn't buy up as much of the debt as it could when it was really cheap.) In any case the US hasn't done so yet and Iraq isn't as good a case for special pleading as all that. There are many places far worse off where there is no policy of debt forgiveness where the numbers are far smaller.

The purpose of a multi lateral policy wouldn't be to provide a magic bullet but it expertise in peacekeeping, extra manpower, possibly a more rapid route to self-determination and at least the hope of short circuiting those who currently can get away with blaming things on the US.

At the moment the terrorists have not the slightest incentive to try to make things work. If the UN would be able to shift that burden even slightly more on to the Iraqis that would be a good thing. It might also allow a wider choice of potential political outcomes than a US solo effort because of less vested interest and greater perceived impartiality.

"Most times one tries to do anything in this world, it screws up. You can't measure results against perfection, but by what the alternative might reasonably have been.

With Vietnam the alternative was, "Get our boys out of there." For America at least it worked (I don't know enough to say whether it worked for Vietnam).

Would the same alternative work in Iraq? I don't think so, and I don't think many people think so. The fact is, given the war and the way the war was fought, America is a bit stuck. As someone already mentioned, Bush should pay a political price for having got the U.S. stuck. However, what that price will and should be, will be determined by how the Iraqi occupation goes and whether the American opposition can find concrete suggestions as to how this can be improved. If all it can do is throw raspberries, then Bush might very well escape any serious political fallout."

Posted by Andrew Boucher at November 10, 2003 01:52 AM

Let's see - what would have worked better than our existing policy? Perhaps not going in in the first place.

"I don't actually think that any of the arguments against the war have proved "correct," if by that you mean it's been proved that the war was a mistake."

Well, the 'rice and flowers' scenario, where we would be down to 30K troops by now has been decisively disproven.

"I think what's been proved -- or at least convincingly demonstrated to my taste -- is that many of the reasons Bush offered for going to war with Iraq were false or ill-conceived."

Posted by James Surowiecki

Which, to some people matters. That the administration lied to the American people about this war is, IMHO, very serious. And it casts doubt on the future decisions of the administration.

" But the two most convincing (if realpolitik-y) rationales for war -- removing an oppressive tyrant who was an avowed enemy of the U.S. and providing an overpowering demonstration of American strength to counter Islamic fundamentalists' repeated assertions that the U.S. was weak and cowardly -- have not been proved incorrect, although whether the war will actually accomplish the second goal remains very much up in the air."

Posted by James Surowiecki

They were not the most convincing reasons for the war, at least, in the minds of the Bush administration. The administration, if you remember, was trumping chemical, biological and nuclear weapons as the reason. Human rights were tossed in as a garnish, as well as the 'domino theory of democracy'. The reasons that you are now giving as most convincing are reasons emphasized after the WMD's turned out to be 100% non-existant.

And the 'overpowering demonstration of American strength' has failed, conclusively. Nobody outside of Saddam's propaganda ministry expected anything short of a quick conventional open battlefield victory. What was in doubt was urban combat and guerrilla warfare. The second has been effective to a degree which I heard no advocate of the war predict.

James S.
Perhaps the second, "demonstration of strength", reason you give for the war should be called the Marty McFly reason. Whatever happened to speaking softly and carrying a big stick? In any case, aside from the wonderful, Lord Farquaad-like "Bring it on" momemt, I never heard Bush make this argument anyway.

Did invading Afghanistan count for nothing? Nobody in power in the middle east, least of all Saddam, thought any such thing unless it is meant as a cover for submitting to one of Osama bin Laden's main demands and withdrawing from Saudi Arabia.

The problem with Realpolitik solutions is that the compromise as a means to a higher end is too often assumed to be effective just because it is a compromise. In reality it is often as much in your interests as, say, steel tariffs.

That said I don't think I made it clear that I agree wholeheartedly that good ideas about what to do now would be a really good idea.

"Pitiful helpless giant" anybody?

Friends,

Let's make one huge leap of conjecture and for just a moment not assume that we Americans (especially government and corporate) are not essentially decent, humane, and generous people. Now, take a look at history, domestic and overseas, and see the brutality, selfishness, and militarism (open as well as secretive) that has been a large part of the whole story.

This is very hard to do; we all want to love our country, be proud of it, and feel that it is by and large a good entity. But if we can try taking a truly strong and prolonged look at the record, and then look at the U.S.'s actions in Iraq, much that has happened will become much clearer. It will hurt, it will humble, it will shock, much like living in a family can do the same when we discover harmful dysfunction and admit it.

"Pitiful helpless giant" anybody?

Friends,

Let's make one huge leap of conjecture and for just a moment not assume that we Americans (especially government and corporate) are not essentially decent, humane, and generous people. Now, take a look at history, domestic and overseas, and see the brutality, selfishness, and militarism (open as well as secretive) that has been a large part of the whole story.

This is very hard to do; we all want to love our country, be proud of it, and feel that it is by and large a good entity. But if we can try taking a truly strong and prolonged look at the record, and then look at the U.S.'s actions in Iraq, much that has happened will become much clearer. It will hurt, it will humble, it will shock, much like living in a family can do the same when we discover harmful dysfunction and admit it.

I'd like to second Barry and Jack's responses to James S. And I'd also like to point out that the idea that "americans" or "anti-war" people, or even "democrats in high places" need to advance counter proposals, though laudable, is quite difficult under the current scheme of things as understood by the Bush government. When 100's of thousands of ordinary people demonstrated in the streets before the war we were dismissed as some kind of lunatic fringe, anti-american agitators, weirdos and traitors. Democrats with spines, like byrd, were pilloried in the press. Today, Democrats trying to get answers on 9-11 are accused of "playing politics" and the very framework through which questions get asked and answered within the administrative and political sphere is being dismantled. We were told before the war that we (the people) didn't and couldn't know enough about the conditions on the ground, or the poltics of it all, to make any decisions. We had to trust Bush co. Tell me how things have changed since then? Are democratic congresspeople free to fly into iraq and check things out? (No), Are democratic leaders free to ask questions of Bush and co (No), are the FBI and the Justice Department being used to shape electoral politics (Yes).

I too, think that the democrats and all people opposed to this war at this time should suck it up and get out there and fight (metaphorically speaking) but I don't think its incumbent upon us to make this last year of the Bush disaster "work" or help Bush out of the quagmire he created for us. And I don't even think we *can*--Bush isn't interested in fixing what is wrong with his Iraq policy, he's interested in getting re-elected despite its failures. And I am interested in un-selecting him and getting on with the messy task of creating a safer world without him. This year is a lost cause for fixing the world, but not for fighting the election. And that is where our energies should be put.

Kate Gilbert

James S.

We have two problems.

The first and foremost is a president and administration which lies and is incompetent. In order to elect a better government, it is necessary to point this out.

Second is Iraq. The difficulty in finding a good solution is, of coure, additional evidence of the first problem. Solutions might include making a real effort to get the UN or other nations involved, including by ceding economic or political power, and acting to ameliorate, or at least acknowledge, the problems in the Arab world. Bush's speech last week might have been a start, if he had any credibility.

Interesting story in yesterday's NYT Week in Review by Milt Bearden, an ex-CIA agent.

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/09/weekinreview/09BEAR.html

He compares the Iraqi insurgents to the Afgan mujahadeen that opposed the Soviets in the 80s. He also provides this tidbit:

"There were two stark lessons in the history of the 20th century: no nation that launched a war against another sovereign nation ever won. And every nationalist-based insurgency against a foreign occupation ultimately succeeded. This is not to say anything about whether or not the United States should have gone into Iraq or whether the insurgency there is a lasting one. But it indicates how difficult the situation may become."

Do our leaders not read their history? It seems that the lesson of the 20th Century is that CHOSING war is NEVER the answer.

James Surowiecki states:

"I don't actually think that any of the arguments against the war have proved "correct," if by that you mean it's been proved that the war was a mistake."

I can't even begin to count the ways that statement is wrong.

Let's start here. The print version of December 2003 issue of Atlantic Monthly contains an excellent piece by George Soros on this very matter. Entitled "The Bubble of American Supremacy," Soros argues:

"The very first sentence of the September 2002 National Security Strategy...reads, 'The great struggles of the twentieth centurty between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom - and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.'
The assumptions behind this statement are false on two counts. First, there is no single sustainable model for national success. Second, the American model, which has indeed been successful, is not available to others, because our success depends greatly on our dominant position at the center of the global capitalist system, and we are not willing to yield it.
The Bush doctrine, first enunciated in a presidential speech at West Point in June of 2002, and incorporated into the National Security Policy three months later, is built on two pillars: the United States will do everything in its power to maintain its unquesitoned military supremacy; and the United States arrogates the right to pre-emptive action. In effect, the doctrine establishes two classes of sovereignty: the sovereignty of the United States, which takes precedence over international treaties and obligations, and the sovereignty of all other nations, which is subject to the will of the United States. This is reminiscent of George Orwell's Animal Farm: all animals are equal, but some are more equal than theirs.
To be sure, the Bush doctrine is not stated so starkly; it is shrouded in doublespeak. The doublespeak is needed because of the contradiction between the Bush Administration's concept of freedom and democracy amd the actual principles and requirements of freedom and democracy. Talk of spreading deomcracy looms large in the National Security Strategy. But when President Bush says, as he does frequently, that freedom will prevail, he means that American freedom will prevail. In a free and open society, people are supposed to decide for themselves what they mean by freedom and democracy, and not simply follow America's lead."

Following Soros' analysis, which expresses the same objections to the war that many of us who have opposed the Bush policies had since well before the start of bombing on March 19, I think Soros reveals the fundamental flaw in all efforts in "democratization." Since democracy is, by our own definition, rule 'of, by and for the people' how can we really export democracy, OUR democracy, created in our image, to people who, if left to their own devices, would choose something else? While our guns are pointed at them, they may say anything to please us. But what will they do if and when the power dynamic changes in some less obvious manner? When given the chance will they relish the chance to see us fall in either small or large ways?
It's rather like the Seinfeld episode where Elaine reveals what goes through the minds of so many men: she faked orgasms every time with Jerry. She was only going through the motions. Although there was no overt coercion, it was easier for Elaine to fake it. He may have thought differently. But The Real Thing wasn't happening. And Jerry was devastated - he resorted to calling other old girlfriends to see it they experienced The Real Thing.
That is why James' point, whether the war has been proven to be a mistake, is in itself wrong. Our essential premise is, on its face, false. It is a repudiation of our own basic notions and ideals. That's what pissed of the rest of the world. They all understand that we're the top dog. What they don't like is our assumption that, essentially, might makes right - that there's something essentially right about our success.
We insist that everyone else TOTALLY agree with EVERYTHING about our worldview. If anyone doesn't they are then "either with us or with the evildoers." Period. Exclamation point. We've not allowed even a second of self-reflection or contemplation about whether we have ANY shit on our shoes on this one. It simply Cannot Be.
The rest of the world sees through the essential amorality of that idea. They also don't like the fact that we insist that all others agree that we have The Real Thing. And, like Elaine, they are quite pleased to reveal their real feelings about it at the most inopportune moment.
The war was wrong because it violated our own notions of democracy. It elevated a paranoid doctrine - that "pre-emption" (I kick you before you kick me) is good - to global status. We speak repeatedly about our actions being "defensive" when everyone else can see they're "offensive." Our international neighbors see through this easily. It's no more difficult than watching Monday Night Football with the volume turned down and trying to figure out who's playing offense and who's playing defense. Unfortunately, we are like the team that loses that game and then sends out the QB to explain how the "loss" was a "victory".

It's just not The Real Thing.

Where do we go from here? There have been alternatives to the administration policies voiced very publicly but not heeded. Among those whose suggestions have been ignored include GOP Senators like Lugar and Democrats such as Wesley Clark.

At this point, the US needs to recall the Iraqi military and police force immediately. They can be used in the Sunni areas to restore order and collect and secure weapons. It was a huge mistake not to pay the Iraqis to do these minor things before the insurgency got rolling. Now it will be harder, but better late than sorry.

Some forces cannot be used in Shiite areas, but there are conscripts that are Shiites that can be recalled. They can be allowed to elect their own officers. They have a stake in providing security and a future for their families. Let them have a hand in restoring order The US forces should withdraw from interaction and use the threat of force from a distance to keep their mercenaries in line. Give them supplies and a free hand but let it know that retaliations and disorder could result in punishments.

Allow civilian rule to take hold and have the military respect civilian rule.Iraqis need to be given real control over their economy including control of oil resources and deciding how to use the revenue. The situation cannot be micro-managed. By leaving the lowest levels up to the Iraqis to manage and influencing the "big" decisions, the US can let Iraq build itself while continuing to withdraw. Remember that the educated class consists of religious leaders. There will have to be some leeway given as long as there is respect for other views. In a counter insurgency, the tighter you grip, the more the conflict will slip from your grasp.

The axiom for any conflict: It is far easier to prevent a conflict than to stop one.

The administration let Iraq spin out of control by allowing looting and other disorder from the beginning. Allowing disorder crippled civilian functions with people afraid to report to work and go about their daily business. They have to get the security situation under control and the best equipped to accomplish that are the Iraqis themselves.

The James/Howard/Zizka/Halasz exchange puts us right in the middle of the problem of living with consequences. I don’t have a complete answer to James’ question about the purpose of criticizing earlier decisions, but I do have one thought. The only thing I know about the future is what I have seen in the past. Rumsfeld and his supporters have made careers of saying just the opposite, that what I and people like me lack is “imagination”, but what I think they are doing is trying to substitute wishes for analysis. Bush’s recently attempted “good news” campaign is, I think, an effort to get us to ignore the utter failure of everything his administration has done in Iraq but the initial invasion. Events have conspired against him, but that is no reason to allow his version of the “facts” to pass unmolested.

If Bush has been wrong at every turn, the odds that he will suddenly be right seem pretty low. So we ought not have much confidence in his next policy initiative. That Bush employed a rotating series of justifications for war, often supported by distortions of fact, outright fabrications, wild speculation passed off as fact, certainly has bearing on how much we trust we the motives for his next initiative. Given that well-earaned lack of confidence and trust, his future policy decisions ought to be constrained. He very much needs the counsel of wiser heads, non-zealots and non-ideologues, in tidying up the mess. The notion that we have but two choices, stupidly stay or recklessly leave, is too simple. We shouldn’t leave Iraq to a blood-bath, nor should we continue to ignore nearly everyone who has any serious understanding of the situation in favor of zealots and ideologues. If Bush is unwilling to take better advice, that is terrible, but it is hardly the fault of his critics if he refuses to do so. The objective of criticism ought to be to force Bush to take better advice, in service of making better decisions.

I don’t think that the lack of a concrete proposal from the folks here (though some posts have included proposals here and in response to other of Brad's comments) at all undercuts the argument that Bush needs to be held to account for prior failures. There is no reason to believe that advice offered here will ever be heard or followed by the White House. The point is to make clear that Bush has failed routinely in picking policies and predicting outcomes, largely by refusing to listen to anyone who might have a clue about actual circumstances and results, and that he needs to listen to better advice. Let Dick Lugar propose alternatives. Let State do it. There is no crime in seeing a problem, and a method for solving it, without knowing what that method will ultimately produce. (In fact, the insistence that critics have a solution edges a little too close to the problem Bush has – pretending to know answers that one does not, in fact, know.) The first step is to get the Bush administration, in its own internal thinking, to understand that it must turn to other sources of information and policy formation than those it has relied on till now, or face serious consequences. That requires making lots and lots of noise.

Accusations of Bush's dismal failure in Iraq are standard currency on these boards, so I have to ask a question about realistic outcomes. What would count as success in this situation (in which we go in militarily to depose a tyrant), and how realistic would such an outcome be? I am thinking in terms of probabilitic expectation, conditional on the event of us going militarily into Iraq. I for one have a suspicion that what we have there is pretty much what could be expected. Which doesn't make a ringing success, but doesn't make it an utter failure, either.

Accusations of Bush's dismal failure in Iraq are standard currency on these boards, so I have to ask a question about realistic outcomes. What would count as success in this situation (in which we go in militarily to depose a tyrant), and how realistic would such an outcome be? I am thinking in terms of probabilitic expectation, conditional on the event of us going militarily into Iraq. I for one have a suspicion that what we have there is pretty much what could be expected. Which doesn't make a ringing success, but doesn't make it an utter failure, either.

"And what is it that the ceaseless criticisms of how the administration got us into the war or how it failed to plan adequately for the postwar period -- as opposed to, say, practical criticisms of how the war is being conducted now -- are meant to accomplish? That's actually not a rhetorical question. I don't fully understand what their function is."

It's what it always is for the usual suspects here, to display their moral and intellectual vanity. And the question that arises with this Ramadan Offensive, is; will the Children of Woodstock get away with it again, as they did with the Tet Offensive? That is, rally enough public support to turn victory into defeat.

I know of a country that is multi-lingual, multi-mentality, no dominant religion. The people really have nothing inherently in common and yet it survives… Switzerland. (Perhaps a better model for Iraq and Afghanistan, for that matter.)

Another:

"And what is it that the ceaseless criticisms of how the administration got us into the war or how it failed to plan adequately for the postwar period -- as opposed to, say, practical criticisms of how the war is being conducted now -- are meant to accomplish? That's actually not a rhetorical question. I don't fully understand what their function is."

Patrick:

"It's what it always is for the usual suspects here, to display their moral and intellectual vanity. And the question that arises with this Ramadan Offensive, is; will the Children of Woodstock get away with it again, as they did with the Tet Offensive? That is, rally enough public support to turn victory into defeat."

Posted by Patrick R. Sullivan at November 10, 2003 08:44 AM

Well, no, Patrick. It's to point out that we can't trust the administration's word or competancy.

I know of a country that is multi-lingual, multi-mentality, no dominant religion. The people really have nothing inherently in common and yet it survives… Switzerland. (Perhaps a better model for Iraq and Afghanistan, for that matter.)

Fatalities

American soldiers 255
British soldiers 20
Coalition soldiers 6
---
281 Since May 2

American 394
British 53
Coalition 6
---
453 Since March 20

Wounded

American soldiers ~2237 Since March 20

Note: American forces have fallen to 130,000
British forces have risen to 11,000

I think John's point (a few posts back) about the lack of checks and balances on the deliberations of this administration is an important one, and is, to my mind, one of the more offensive things about the way the war was started and has been waged. And K's clearly right that it's not anyone else's fault if Bush won't take advice. But if the objective of criticism is "to force Bush to take better advice, in the service of making better decisions," then that advice needs to be out there. Bakho's post, for example, is exactly what I was talking about, and exactly the kind of stuff I haven't read enough of -- from politicians, pundits, or bloggers.

But I do think that the real problem here hasn't fully been acknowledged, although Kate comes closest to it. Kate argues that Bush opponents should write off this year as a lost cause and devote all their attention to stopping his re-election. Well, okay, if your criteria for judging events over the next year is therefore whether or not it makes it more or less likely that Bush will be re-elected, what does that mean? It means that if things go badly in Iraq, that will be good, and if things go well, that will be bad. The more American soldiers who are killed, the more Iraqi civilians who are blown up, the more effective the Saddamists and the revanchists become, the worse it will be for Bush. In the absence of a meaningful alternative strategy for improving American performance in Iraq, that means Bush's opponents are basically left hoping -- and will appear to be left hoping -- for American defeat. I think this is bad in lots of ways, not the least of them political.

Michael Tomasky, the new editor of the American Prospect, actually has a short piece making this point in the new New York magazine: http://www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/people/columns/intelligencer/n_9498/. Michael writes, "A Dow Jones slump is one thing; one can quietly chortle over that without ever being tapped on the shoulder by one’s pesky conscience. But loss of life and catastrophic policy failure with potential consequences reaching deep into the future are, you know, serious things." Michael goes on to argue that it's still okay, because Bush got us into this mess. But I don't think that solves the problem. Being pissed off at how we ended up in trouble isn't really a good reason to be satisfied with the trouble getting worse.

James Surowiecki: The cynicism is your, not mine. There's nothing cynical about wanting to get Bush out of there by democratic means. That's the normal functioning of our system at its best. That's what elections are for. How much more simply can I explain this?

You seem to be buying the spin that if anyone has any political stake here, that they're just evil political hacks, but in a democratic system such as ours, that kind of insinuation is traitorous. (How's that for rhetorical escalation? But in Saudi Arabia for example, the zero-party state, a leader like Bush would be publicly unchallenged.)

Or, for example, Bush could be allowed to limp on, without the help of Rumsfeld, Cheney, Wolfowitz, Perle, and their lackies. Another functional outcome.

Your demand for "function" -- "OK, we're here; what do we do NOW?" -- was, as I said, rewarding Bush for failure. It caved in to Bush's "facts on the ground" strategy (learned from Ariel Sharon): change the objective situation enough to make all alternatives to your strategy difficult. Getting rid of the perps on simple grounds of accountability would, to me, be in and of itself a good outcome, though it would still leave us the mess they made to clean up.

Maciej -- what we have in Iraq is exactly what I expected, which is why I didn't support the war. People who supported the war, except for those who were playing a deceptive insider game, did NOT expect this.

At the moment my fear is that Bush will seek to regain the electoral initiative by military action -- possibly air attacks on Syria, which we are still capable of. Presumably this would be accompanied with renewed accusations of disloyalty and treason.

I believe that, like everything else Bush does, the Middle East war is being gamed by Rove for political effect. Accusations against Democrats in that regard ring pretty hollow. The hard right seems to be willing to use any methods whatsoever in achieving its ends, apparently including praying for God to falsify the counting of Presidential ballots (general Boykin).

BTW, a cynical air war against Syria does not preclude a cynical withdrawal of ground troops from Iraq.

One clear point that has come out of this discussion is that it is time for the opposition to Bush to begin to articulate alternative policies. If we keep bashing Bush (much as it is well-deserved) without offering some positive "what-could-bes", we begin to be in the position of wishing for things to go badly to prove ourselves right. I hope that the Democratic contenders will start moving the conversation in a more future-oriented direction.

In the interim, I'd like to offer one suggestion that hasn't gotten much airtime (maybe because it is a bad idea for reasons I don't see?): Let's start issuing oil dividends to every Iraqi man, woman and child. Give them an incentive to advocate peace and stability. Give them some widely distributed capital so that that they can begin to get on with their lives. Make it very clear to the world that the US is not after their oil.

Zizka --

You've been spending too much time arguing with right-wing nuts. You're not arguing with me. You're arguing with a specter of your own imagining. I didn't say anything about people being "political hacks," nor did I say that criticism of Bush is out-of-bounds. And I don't buy the argument that you don't change leaders in the middle of a war. This is not an argument about supporting the president no matter what. It's an argument about the question Brad used as a headline for his entry: "What is to be done?"

You suggest that asking this question -- and looking for an answer more substantive, and more beneficial to American interests than "remove the perps" -- is rewarding Bush for failure. What I don't understand about this is that it isn't just Bush who "failed" (if we have). We all did. This war was overwhelmingly supported by Congress and by the American people. It was a democratic war. So it's our responsibility to figure out what to do now. You say that even if we get rid of Bush --I don't know if you mean by impeachment or election -- we'd still have a mess to clean up. Exactly. So how do we clean it up? There are undeniable facts on the ground in Iraq. We have to deal with them. So what is to be done?

fareed zakaria sums it up brilliantly in my view:

http://www.msnbc.com/news/991191.asp

---
I think that the president—and many of his advisers—find it easy to embrace democracy but not the means to get there. Actually, they like one method. Let’s call it the “silver bullet” theory of democratization. It holds that every country is ready for democracy. It’s just evil tyrants who stand in its way. Kill the tyrant, hold elections and the people will embrace democracy and live happily ever after. This theory is particularly seductive to neoconservatives because it means that the one government agency they love—the military—is the principal force for democratization around the world.

The second theory of democratization could be called the “long, hard slog” (thanks, Mr. Rumsfeld). It holds that genuine democracy requires the building of strong political institutions, a market economy and a civil society. In order to promote democracy, in this vision, you need economic reform, trade, exchange programs, legal and educational advances, and hundreds of such small-bore efforts. The agencies crucial to this process are the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, even, God forbid, the European Union and the United Nations. After all, the EU provides almost twice as much foreign aid as the United States. And it is the United Nations that produces the much-heralded Arab Development Reports, which President Bush quoted in his speech.

The president must see that the first strategy has reached its limits. We have used military force in Afghanistan and Iraq, and while it has rid those countries of evil dictatorships, it has not brought them democracy. That goal remains fully dependent on the second strategy. And beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, unless Washington is going to invade all the countries of the Middle East, democracy will come only through a process of reform and modernization. But the administration cannot bring itself to fully support this softer strategy of democratization or call for more of it. (Real men don’t do foreign aid.) American efforts to promote democracy, for example, take up about 6 percent of our aid budget, just over $700 million. Why not double this?

For many of the administration’s ideologues, the long, hard slog toward liberal democracy is boring and unsexy. It means constant engagement, aid, multilateral efforts and a world not of black and white but of grays...

fareed zakaria sums it up brilliantly in my view:

http://www.msnbc.com/news/991191.asp

---
I think that the president—and many of his advisers—find it easy to embrace democracy but not the means to get there. Actually, they like one method. Let’s call it the “silver bullet” theory of democratization. It holds that every country is ready for democracy. It’s just evil tyrants who stand in its way. Kill the tyrant, hold elections and the people will embrace democracy and live happily ever after. This theory is particularly seductive to neoconservatives because it means that the one government agency they love—the military—is the principal force for democratization around the world.

The second theory of democratization could be called the “long, hard slog” (thanks, Mr. Rumsfeld). It holds that genuine democracy requires the building of strong political institutions, a market economy and a civil society. In order to promote democracy, in this vision, you need economic reform, trade, exchange programs, legal and educational advances, and hundreds of such small-bore efforts. The agencies crucial to this process are the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, even, God forbid, the European Union and the United Nations. After all, the EU provides almost twice as much foreign aid as the United States. And it is the United Nations that produces the much-heralded Arab Development Reports, which President Bush quoted in his speech.

The president must see that the first strategy has reached its limits. We have used military force in Afghanistan and Iraq, and while it has rid those countries of evil dictatorships, it has not brought them democracy. That goal remains fully dependent on the second strategy. And beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, unless Washington is going to invade all the countries of the Middle East, democracy will come only through a process of reform and modernization. But the administration cannot bring itself to fully support this softer strategy of democratization or call for more of it. (Real men don’t do foreign aid.) American efforts to promote democracy, for example, take up about 6 percent of our aid budget, just over $700 million. Why not double this?

For many of the administration’s ideologues, the long, hard slog toward liberal democracy is boring and unsexy. It means constant engagement, aid, multilateral efforts and a world not of black and white but of grays...

Following is partial text of US President Bill Clinton's statement on raids against Iraq launched by the United States and Britain on 16 December 1998
------
…Clear and Present Danger
In short, the inspectors are saying that even if they could stay in Iraq, their work would be a sham. Saddam's deception has defeated their effectiveness. Instead of the inspectors disarming Saddam, Saddam has disarmed the inspectors.
This situation presents a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere. The international community gave Saddam one last chance to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. Saddam has failed to seize the chance. And so we had to act and act now. Let me explain why:
• First, without a strong inspection system, Iraq would be free to retain and begin to rebuild its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes in months, not years.
• Second, if Saddam can crippled the weapons inspection system and get away with it, he would conclude that the international community - led by the United States - has simply lost its will. He will surmise that he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction, and someday - make no mistake - he will use it again as he has in the past.
• Third, in halting our air strikes in November, I gave Saddam a chance, not a license. If we turn our backs on his defiance, the credibility of US power as a check against Saddam will be destroyed. We will not only have allowed Saddam to shatter the inspection system that controls his weapons of mass destruction program; we also will have fatally undercut the fear of force that stops Saddam from acting to gain domination in the region.
That is why, on the unanimous recommendation of my national security team - including the vice president, the secretary of defence, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the secretary of state and the national security adviser - I have ordered a strong, sustained series of air strikes against Iraq.
They are designed to degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbours. At the same time, we are delivering a powerful message to Saddam. If you act recklessly, you will pay a heavy price. We acted today because, in the judgment of my military advisers, a swift response would provide the most surprise and the least opportunity for Saddam to prepare.
If we had delayed for even a matter of days from Chairman Butler's report, we would have given Saddam more time to disperse his forces and protect his weapons. Also, the Muslim holy month of Ramadan begins this weekend. For us to initiate military action during Ramadan would be profoundly offensive to the Moslem world and, therefore, would damage our relations with Arab countries and the progress we have made in the Middle East….

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/crisis_in_the_gulf/texts_and_transcripts/236858.stm

Wow! Sounds a lot like some of Bush's speeches.

What is to be done?

I suggest we quickly organize national elections for a temporary government and leave Iraq. We won the war, Iraq is not threat to us, leave.

In the 2000 election I voted for McCain in the primary, and Bush in the general election. Given all that has occurred in the past few years I am happy with some of Bush’s actions, but specifically feel the Iraq invasion not worth the risks/resources. Given where we are, I am open to voting for another candidate.

If you want to defeat Bush people like me are needed to vote for another candidate. Unfortunately, the Dem primary is a joke, and I fear a sign of the campaign to come. Every debate seems to be a contest to see who hates Bush the most, with the exception of Lieberman who I like very much (and who in my opinion has more detailed plans on post-war Iraq than all of the other candidates, and willing to debate them). My next point is that venomous Bush haters calling him dumb, and anyone that supports him dumb is NOT going to win you needed votes. Though this might make many feel good, let me remind everyone that hating Clinton did not defeat him.

My hope is that Lieberman can pull off a miracle. He is my preference and his policies more appealing to swing voters (and some conservatives). Unfortunately, hatred of Bush seems to be clouding the whole process.

In the 2000 election I voted for McCain in the primary, and Bush in the general election. Given all that has occurred in the past few years I am happy with some of Bush’s actions, but specifically feel the Iraq invasion not worth the risks/resources. Given where we are, I am open to voting for another candidate.

If you want to defeat Bush people like me are needed to vote for another candidate. Unfortunately, the Dem primary is a joke, and I fear a sign of the campaign to come. Every debate seems to be a contest to see who hates Bush the most, with the exception of Lieberman who I like very much (and who in my opinion has more detailed plans on post-war Iraq than all of the other candidates, and willing to debate them). My next point is that venomous Bush haters calling him dumb, and anyone that supports him dumb is NOT going to win you needed votes. Though this might make many feel good, let me remind everyone that hating Clinton did not defeat him.

My hope is that Lieberman can pull off a miracle. He is my preference and his policies more appealing to swing voters (and some conservatives). Unfortunately, hatred of Bush seems to be clouding the whole process.

Alternative Iraq Plans:

Wesley Clark:
http://www.clark04.com/issues/nationalsecurity/

Howard Dean:
http://www.deanforamerica.com/site/PageServer?pagename=policy_policy_foreign_iraq_7pointplan

John Kerry:
http://www.johnkerry.com/issues/iraq/

Dennis Kucinich
http://www.kucinich.us/statements.htm#100903

There are others. The alternatives are out there. The details are not reported. You have to look for them. It may seem that all the candidates do is Bash Bush because that is all the media cover. Then again, 9 candidates and 10 minutes of national news leaves about 1 minute per candidate. Hardly enough time to detail a coherent alternative.

As for Clinton, he definately said that he knew that his successor would have to deal with the Saddam/Iraq problem. However, Clinton was not stupid enough to launch an invasion. The success rate of US military intervention followed by stable government/democracy is very low. One would have to look at the odds of accomplishing that goal in Iraq to be very marginal based entirely on past histories of military intervention. The best we could hope is a stable Iraq with a relatively progressive government that uses its oil reserves to build its infrastructure intead of wasting it on the military. In other words, do what the US says and not what we do.

If we leave Iraq with relations no worse than we had with Iran after the Shah was deposed, that is about as good as we will get.

I don't know "what is to be done?" about the situation, the big, too-many-details, situation in Iraq. But, as I suggested in my earlier comment, it is important to get ourselves on a path that fits with what we know about the world. Once on that path, what is possible to be achieved may be clearer.

I have a pretty strong sense that big, too-many-details situation is made up of a bunch of smaller decision, each of which needs to be made in the best way possible. When people familiar with post-war situations said criminality would be a big problem, we should have listened. When we find that Iraqi Ba'athists have their hands on a big stash of surface-to-air missiles and are practicing up with them (http://slate.msn.com/id/2091002/), we should figure out quickly how to address that problem, specifically, rather than just treat it as another facet of the war or a sign the "dead-enders are getting desparate."

"What is to be done?" is not a political question, at the micro-level. It is a question of the best response to any given opportunity or risk, unclouded by preconception or prior stance. At the micro-level, making a lot of noise means focusing attention on bad decisions and bad decision making, in hopes that each decision along the way will be kicked back toward the best response as early as possible. At the macro-level, it is both a question of politics and policy. We cannot afford to ignore either. Kicking the bums out is only a solution if you manage to kick them out. As James S. notes, there was a tremendous failure by the public to supervise its employees. We hired them, them took their self-serving reports as the truth. What if we continue to fail in our duty to oversee our employees, neglect to fire them when they abjectly refuse to do the job according to our best interests and the law? Then we need at least to make them think it is in their interest to do better. I admit, once November of next year comes and goes, we are mostly out of luck, but there is a long period in which more terrible mistakes can be made, if we don't behave as if decisions in the White House have consequences for the occupants. That means holding up the example of prior failure, not just to fry their electoral backsides, but to make the point that they ain't getting it right and need to do better. That requires making lots of noise, as well. So to my mind, much of this argument about "what is to be done" is about angels dancing on the head of a pin. We don't need to decide whether to object loudly and pointedly to the next stupid decision to come down the pike. Every stupid decision ought to be objected to, even by those who intend to vote for Bush. That is what is to be done. Whether such objections move Bush nearer retirement from politics is a separate issue.

In the end, government is not supposed to be all about winning and losing. It is meant to be about serving the interest of the US public.

K --

That sounds about right to me. The only thing I'd add is that if we're trying to find "the best response to any given opportunity or risk, unclouded by preconception or prior stance," it helps to have some sense of what that best response is, or at least some sense of who might know what the best response is. This gets to maciej's point, which I think was a good one: we have to have a clear definition of what success --conditional on our invasion of Iraq -- would realistically look like. In other words, we can't just look at the casualties we're taking and say, "We're failing." We have to be able to say we are taking more casualties than we would under a different and better strategy. (Not because we should assume that the Bushies are right, but because otherwise we're not really evaluating strategies "unclouded by perception or prior stance.")

I have a different question that comes out of this discussion: Assume, for the sake of argument, that Bush had a change of heart and decided to try to multilateralize the conflict. How likely do you think it is that other major countries would agree to send troops into Iraq? And would it make a difference in terms of combating the guerrillas?

K --

That sounds about right to me. The only thing I'd add is that if we're trying to find "the best response to any given opportunity or risk, unclouded by preconception or prior stance," it helps to have some sense of what that best response is, or at least some sense of who might know what the best response is. This gets to maciej's point, which I think was a good one: we have to have a clear definition of what success --conditional on our invasion of Iraq -- would realistically look like. In other words, we can't just look at the casualties we're taking and say, "We're failing." We have to be able to say we are taking more casualties than we would under a different and better strategy. (Not because we should assume that the Bushies are right, but because otherwise we're not really evaluating strategies "unclouded by perception or prior stance.")

I have a different question that comes out of this discussion: Assume, for the sake of argument, that Bush had a change of heart and decided to try to multilateralize the conflict. How likely do you think it is that other major countries would agree to send troops into Iraq? And would it make a difference in terms of combating the guerrillas?

James Surowiecki asks: >And what is it that the ceaseless criticisms of how the administration got us into the war or how it failed to plan adequately for the postwar period -- as opposed to, say, practical criticisms of how the war is being conducted now -- are meant to accomplish? <

This is a bit late- but frankly, James, if I'd gone to a doctor and he had misdiagnosed my cancer as anaemia, I would- how can I say this- not be too keen on having him in charge of treating the said cancer.
Rumsfeld, Rice and Wolfowitz got it horrendously wrong on the likely consequences of an invasion of Iraq, on the trustworthiness of intelligence provided by Ahmed Chalabi, and on the US trooop strength and operational procedures necessary to keep the peace in post-Saddam Iraq. They've been incompetent up until now on Iraq, and must be assumed to be incompetent in the future on Iraq.

They should be fired and replaced with intelligent men or women with good records of military and diplomatic achievement: how about retired General Eric Shinseki? That's right, the guy whose prediction that it would take several thousand US troops to keep the peace in Iraq was publicly ridiculed by Paul Wolfowitz. Or John McCain, Richard Holbrooke, General Anthony Zinni- you Americans have so many brilliant public servants, I am surprised at the dead wood you put in charge of the NSC and the Pentagon.

James Surowiecki asks: >And what is it that the ceaseless criticisms of how the administration got us into the war or how it failed to plan adequately for the postwar period -- as opposed to, say, practical criticisms of how the war is being conducted now -- are meant to accomplish? <

This is a bit late- but frankly, James, if I'd gone to a doctor and he had misdiagnosed my cancer as anaemia, I would- how can I say this- not be too keen on having him in charge of treating the said cancer.
Rumsfeld, Rice and Wolfowitz got it horrendously wrong on the likely consequences of an invasion of Iraq, on the trustworthiness of intelligence provided by Ahmed Chalabi, and on the US trooop strength and operational procedures necessary to keep the peace in post-Saddam Iraq. They've been incompetent up until now on Iraq, and must be assumed to be incompetent in the future on Iraq.

They should be fired and replaced with intelligent men or women with good records of military and diplomatic achievement: how about retired General Eric Shinseki? That's right, the guy whose prediction that it would take several thousand US troops to keep the peace in Iraq was publicly ridiculed by Paul Wolfowitz. Or John McCain, Richard Holbrooke, General Anthony Zinni- you Americans have so many brilliant public servants, I am surprised at the dead wood you put in charge of the NSC and the Pentagon.

>Several thousand US troops< should of course read 'several hundred thousand'.

James S.

Don't know the answer to that one. My guess is that, like most things, for the right price, we could have a reasonably broad international coalition involved in bringing peace to Iraq. The spectacle of a death-a-day (more, in recent weeks) among US troops, and clear evidence that our opponents in Iraq don't care much whose flag they attack, surely has driven that price much higher for many potential coalition members. However, if we don't have the military and other resources to do the job, and pulling out is the wrong thing to do, the obvious conclusion is that we must enlist assistance. Once that realization is arrived at, it is time to stop messing around and start figure out how much its going to cost. I'm sure there is a certain amount of gamesmanship involved here. Once it is clear we are determined to pay the price for it, the price for cooperation may be high. "Pay any price" has such a nice ring to it, till the guy across the table decides you really mean it. Even so, Iraqis and coalition soldiers are dying every day. That is a fairly high price for our unwilllingness to share authority. For Iraqis who weren't asked if they were willing to pay that price, it strikes me as particularly unethical to delay. The argument that we are doing this for Iraqis starts to wear thin when we won't go the whole mile to make their lives better.

>Several thousand US troops< should of course read 'several hundred thousand'.

Bakho suggests a revival of the Iraqi army. Yes, I made the same point elsewhere last June. It was a huge, though symptomatic, mistake, dissolving the army forthwith in the first place. The non-Baathist majority of the Iraqi army, which had fought the Iran war and borne the brunt of the Kuwait counter-attack, and had been marginalized by Saddam since, was anything but pro-Saddam and for that matter would have been majority Shia in officers as well as men, like the nation itself. Had there been a genuine international/multilateral coalition for dealing with Iraq, (as there was for the first Gulf War, on which I was neutral), then bringing in some other Arab troops, such as Egypt, and some Arab League mediation- (though by no means turning things over to the Arab League, which would not have set well with the Kurds)- could have provided a cooperative basis for securing and pacifying Iraq. Otherwise, one simply can not do the job with an army that does not speak the language and has no understanding of the culture and mentality of the people. But this means ceding some significant responsibility to others, whom one can not control directly, but whose viewpoints need to be taken to account. And building an international/multilateral coalition for dealing with Iraq would have taken time, patience and self-restraint in accepting alternative outcomes- an orientation not in evidence among the current ideologues in power. Taking account of the actual otherness of others, whatever its value as a moral principle, is certainly a prudential maxim in navigating in any real world. Multilateralism may have its drawbacks and frustrations, but, like Churchillian democracy, it is the worst system of governance, except for all the others. Yes, multilateralism is "like" democracy in international affairs. Taking that message to the American people out of the debacle we are now facing, rather than re-enforcing the xenophobic paranoia of the "War on Terror" and "preventative war", is where the real "war" on terror begins.

But it is already far too late for such a constructive proposal in Iraq. In case anyone missed this, taking down an American helicopter with an outmoded Soviet-era shoulder-mounted SAM requires trained skill and disciplined tactics to have any chance of success; this was the work of professional soldiers, not a random gang. There may have been missing electronic countermeasures as well as arrogantly sloppy tactics on the American side, but on the other side, there was organization, tactical discipline and careful observation. We are probably now facing a slowly escalating period of "low-intensity" warfare, in which the "Coalition" is undermanned and ill-informed. Overreacting will inflame the situation further and play into the hands of the most extreme elements, but stamping out the brush fires will simply maintain the current paralysis and disorganization. Probably this stalemate can and will go on for quite a while, with casualties slowly and steadily mounting, but not to a catastrophic level, and with the insurgents incapable of landing a knockout blow, nor of organizing an alternative regime, even at an underground level. What needs to be brought home henceforth both to the American people and to the political elites is the immense task that awaits in repairing and restoring the international standing of the U.S.A.

And, by the way, Patrick R. Sullivan, I want to thank you for having immunized yourself against "moral and intellectual vanity": that is what I so much admire about you.

James S:

1. "We all agreed to this war". First, I didn't. Second, those who were were misled. Bush and his crew were responsible.

2. I was proposing electing Bush out of office, not impeachment. Immediately, he could be divested of his hawkish advisers, including Cheney. But the Dems don't have the oomph even to ask for that, the media still are enabling Bush, and a hefty chunk of the electorate is supporting Bush blindly, so my expectations are low.

3. In a practical sense, getting the international community involved would be possible with a change of regime, or MAYBE with only a massive change of personnel. That would take off some of the immediate pressure. But frankly I not have a good idea of what to do in Iraq in the long term. Giving Clark a shot at it (whether as President or as S.of State) strikes me as superior to what we're doing now.

4. My biggest worry, as I said, is that Bush will try to save himself by some sort of escalation. My practical alternative to this is just not to do that. We should forget about the PNAC multi-regime-change program and fire those who support it.

James asks a good question. If you were in a responsible position -- if you were President -- what changes would you make to US policy?

First, I think there's a more fundamental question. What US interests are at stake? Why is the US occupying Iraq? Without knowing what interests are at stake, you can't say whether the occupation is worth it or not.

Back in 1958, William Polk suggested that the interests of the US in the Middle East were "sufficient peace to prevent a world war and a sufficient flow of oil to maintain the European economy." I'd modify this a bit today: I'd say sufficient peace to prevent (a) another large-scale war or (b) another major terrorist attack on the US, and a sufficient flow of oil to maintain the world economy.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the subsequent Gulf War, demonstrated (a) Saddam Hussein's ambition and recklessness, and (b) that he'd come very close to developing nuclear weapons. Sanctions were put in place to contain Saddam, but they turned into a humanitarian disaster for the people of Iraq and a political disaster for the United States.

Prior to the war, the two most important grievances in the Arab world were (a) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and (b) the suffering of the Iraqi people under sanctions. Dealing with anti-American anger in the Arab world -- the September 11 attacks being the most visible manifestation -- will require dealing with these grievances. The United States therefore has an interest in (a) resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and (b) returning Iraq to normality.

(Besides these fairly concrete interests, there's other interests at stake which are less tangible. There's the humanitarian interest in the people of Iraq. Morally, the US bears responsibility for destroying the previous regime, and therefore for establishing a new regime. Ideologically, the US would like to establish a working democracy.)

I think it's clear that the US would very much like to return Iraq to normality. But this raises a second fundamental question: does the US have the means to do so?

I think you'd need to be an expert on Iraq to answer this question, which I'm certainly not. I'll just raise a few issues.

Security. Edward Luttwak pointed out recently that the US occupying force sounds large, but can really only have 28,000 soldiers on the street at any one time. This isn't enough to provide security in a country the size of Iraq. This means that the US must either persuade other countries to send additional troops (and there aren't that many candidates), or reconstitute Iraqi army units. Even if the US brought back the draft, it would take too long to train draftees.

The opponents. It's unclear who's responsible for the attacks. Zeyad (healingiraq.blogspot.com) guesses that there's four different groups: (1) Saddam loyalists, probably the largest group; (2) local Islamists; (3) foreign Islamists, responsible for the suicide bombings; (4) individuals seeking revenge.

Iraqi public opinion. My understanding is that most Iraqis are themselves desperate for a return to normality. This is hopeful, since guerrillas need popular support in order to operate.

Iraqi politics. In a democracy like the United States, the distribution of power resembles a level plain -- everyone is equal -- with only one peak rising above the plain, namely the federal government. An aristocratic or feudal society, on the other hand, is more like a mountainous country, with multiple competing centers of power corresponding to individual leaders and their followers. Winning over Iraq isn't just about winning over public opinion; it's about understanding the different players and what their interests are.

Financing reconstruction. Reconstruction is going to take significant amounts of money. (There's insufficient electrical capacity, for example, which is going to be a huge problem when next summar arrives -- last summer was hellish.) In this respect, foreign and domestic policy are interlinked -- the huge deficits that Bush is running will make it extremely difficult for the US to pay for Iraqi reconstruction.

I'm not an expert (and I can't predict the future!), so I don't know what the answer is. My guess is that it's mostly going to depend on the Iraqis themselves: in particular, on the Iraqi police and army, and on the degree of popular support for the guerrillas.

If I were responsible for US policy, I'd make the following changes:

1. Work harder at diplomacy, which in practice means more support for Powell (at the expense of Rumsfeld), and consulting with allies before announcing decisions. Work very hard to try to persuade other countries to send troops. (Some candidates with significant military forces: Turkey, India, France. Given France's opposition to the war, it seems like an unlikely candidate, but on the other hand, France may want to rebuild its relationship with the US.)

2. Start reconstituting units of the Iraqi army, eliminating commanding officers who are Saddam loyalists.

3. More training for the occupying forces -- how to deal with the population, who the enemy is, some basic Arabic, some basic information about Islam. Winning hearts and minds (or losing them) happens at ground level.

4. Get the people involved in the "Future of Iraq" project (the State Department pre-war planning effort, headed by Thomas Warrick) back into the planning.

5. Make a speech about the need for sacrifices during wartime, and roll back the tax cuts. Put together a solid plan for reconstructing Iraq and how to finance it, and publicize the hell out of it, especially in the Arab world.

6. On the Israeli-Palestinian issue (the other big grievance in the Arab world), back the Geneva plan (as Powell has already done publicly) -- i.e. a two-state solution based on the pre-1967 borders. Put considerably more pressure on Sharon to halt and then dismantle settlements. Make it clear that Israel does not have a blank check. Again, give these moves wide publicity in the Arab world -- but be very careful not to raise expectations dramatically. Try to get a neutral country to mediate the conflict (as Norway has done already).

7. Put in place a program to encourage more Americans to learn Arabic.

William Polk on US interests in the Middle East:
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/58dec/polk.htm

Edward Luttwak on the strength of the US occupying forces:
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/04/opinion/04LUTT.html

Zeyad on the Iraqi resistance:
http://healingiraq.blogspot.com/archives/2003_11_01_healingiraq_archive.html#106845303454005137

William Nordhaus estimates the costs of occupation and rebuilding (October 2002):
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/iraq.pdf

Some more concrete suggestions from Georgie Anne Geyer:
http://www.uexpress.com/georgieannegeyer/?uc_full_date=20031106

Zizka --

Whether or not you personally supported the war is not important. The way a democracy works is that once a majority of people agree to do something (as long as that something is constitutional), we're all responsible for it. (We can work to change the law or the policy, but we're bound to accept responsibility for it in the meantime. You can't refuse to accept the decisions of a majority you disagree with if you expect everyone else to go along with the decisions you make when you're in the majority.) That's why the idea of a loyal opposition is so important and so valuable. So we all agreed to this war. Now we have to figure out what to do about it.

Were Americans misled to the point that their support for the war can be disregarded? I have no doubt that the Bushies were mendacious, but I'm more skeptical that if they hadn't been, Americans would have opposed the war. But I'm not in a good position to make that judgment, since I always thought the supposed threat from WMD was an illusion, and that everyone understood that it was being overstated.

Anyway, I'd like to give Clark a shot at the problem, too. If you check out the links that Bakho provided to the candidates' strategy recommendations, I think Clark's are the only ones that seem substantive, do-able, and potentially productive of success. (Kucinich is out in the gamma quadrant, Dean is cursory, and Kerry begins his discussion by talking about how $87 billion is too much for the American middle class to pay. It's pandering at its worst.)

I do think the most important point is K's about being willing to go the whole mile -- even if we don't quite know entirely what that will entail. To me, the most appalling part of what's happening is Bush's unwillingness to expend political capital in order to be honest about what success in Iraq will entail and in order to expand the size of the troop force there. At the same time, I don't think that the Democrats have distinguished themselves in this area, either (with obvious exceptions, like Clark and Lieberman). To me, the signal example of this was the attempt to make some of the money for Iraq loans instead of outright spending. You should not bomb a country to pieces in order to remove a tyrant and then ask the formerly tyrannized people to pay for their own rebuilding, and the fact that anyone tried to convince Americans that we should was utterly dismaying.

Anyway, to me a lot of the policy ideas floated in this discussion seem serious and worth pursuing (as does exerting more pressure on the White House to shake up the policymaking leadership). Kerry's and Dean's people should be taking notes.

At this late date, a multinational coalition cannot do much more than the US is already doing. Without the Iraqis themselves buying into the plan and doing the policing and the resoration of order the fight will be taken to a multinational force in the same way it is taken to the US unilateral force. A multinational force is not as important as the establishment of Iraqi led forces.

To understand Iraq, you have to put yourself in the mindset of the occupied Iraqis, not the occupying force. The Iraqis are annoyed by the checkpoints, frustrated by the lack of security, outraged at the killings of innocents and the atrocities on both sides. They resent that their somewhat stable life has now gone to hell. They resent not having jobs and work to support their families. They are frustrated that the Americans insist on controlling everything and treating the Iraqis as mentally deficient.

If the anger and outrage cannot be channeled into a positive constructive outlet, it will be channeled into a destructive resistance. The US cannot do the reconstruction for them. Giving billions to Halliburton for reconstruction projects while leaving Iraqis outside looking in is a humiliating slap in the face. If you were an Iraqi, you would want the Americans to leave and let things get sorted by Iraqis.

Mr. Bush has never learned American History. What was the result of the British occupation of Boston in the 1770s? The British troops were harassed. The troops killed innocent (stone throwing) civilians. The troops could control the city but dared venture into the countryside under threat of ambush. Evenetually, the Americans trapped them in the city and threatened the destruction of their fleet and eliminated of their supply lines.

The British left. They retreated from the city and resorted to blockade. They were defeated by rag tag group of men with little military training or soldiering skills. They were defeated because they could not get enough of the people to support them against the insurgents. Could the British have maintained control of Boston? Maybe. But not with the heavy handed use of troops that annoyed the people and built sympathy for their cause elsewhere in the colonies.

James Surowiecki asks: >And what is it that the ceaseless criticisms of how the administration got us into the war or how it failed to plan adequately for the postwar period -- as opposed to, say, practical criticisms of how the war is being conducted now -- are meant to accomplish? <

Dan replies: "This is a bit late- but frankly, James, if I'd gone to a doctor and he had misdiagnosed my cancer as anaemia, I would- how can I say this- not be too keen on having him in charge of treating the said cancer.
Rumsfeld, Rice and Wolfowitz got it horrendously wrong on the likely consequences of an invasion of Iraq, on the trustworthiness of intelligence provided by Ahmed Chalabi, and on the US trooop strength and operational procedures necessary to keep the peace in post-Saddam Iraq. They've been incompetent up until now on Iraq, and must be assumed to be incompetent in the future on Iraq."

And it's worse than simple misdiagnosis. The equivalent medical malpractice case might be where the doctor had to sort through several sets of test results to get the diagnosis that he/she had clearly decided on before examining the patient. And had set up a special diagnostic lab when the existing lab hadn't given the desired results.

My one-point plan: more carrot, less stick.

We seem to be spurning opportunities to engage the average Iraqi meaningfully (ie with jobs and decision-making power) in the reconstruction of his own country. Meanwhile our security efforts are slipping into a no-win revenge culture vortex.

Exhibit A: Success, Traced in Cement [Washington Post]
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A20273-2003Nov9.html

I would like to challenge one of the assumptions here, which is that we are headed for disaster in Iraq.

I agree that the definition of disaster would be a civil war between Sunnis and Shi'ites. That would be a legitimate disaster, and that is why leaving right now would be a mistake.

It seems to me that the current situation is unlikely to escalate into a broad war of Iraqis against Americans. The guerillas have no popular leader and no program, and their biggest success was a hit on the Red Cross. My guess is that the guerillas need to come up with a better plan in order to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people.

I think that the biggest risk we face in Iraq is that a democratic government will be too splintered and weak to control the country. Although experts may be able to predict this outcome with confidence, I myself have no basis for forecasting. I feel like we have to wait several months and see how it turns out.

Brad DeLong asks "What should be done in Iraq?"

His answers are:

1) To fire "Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Rice, Card, and company," and to hire "a Howard Baker-like figure." (Possibly a life-size cardboard cutout of Mr. Baker? ;-)) Or better yet,

2) "I want Bush and his bozos out of power, and want it now."

The first is unlikely, and the second is flat-out impossible.

Here are some suggestions that are actually possible:

1) Begin reducing U.S. troop strength by roughly 5000 per month, and redeploy the remaining troops to protecting borders, rather than patrolling in cities.

2) Announce, via a speech to the U.N., that all non-Iraqis who are captured in Iraq for suspected crimes against U.S. or Iraqi civilians will be considered "unlawful combatants," and will be tried in U.S. military courts in Iraq. If convicted, they will be held in U.S. custody, until such time as an Iraqi government is elected, when they will be turned over to the Iraqi government.

3) Immediately begin training and putting more Iraqi police on the streets. The rate should be no less than 10,000 per month. Special emphasis should be given on putting Iraqi women into the police force. (A reasonable goal would be 20%+ of all personnel.)

4) Begin training Iraqi military, at a rate of approximately 3,000 per month.

5) Within 30 days, the U.S. should draft an Iraqi constitution, in consultation with Iraqi constitutional advisors. Then, for 3 months, the constitution should be promoted to the Iraqi people.

6) After 3 months of promotion, a referendum should be held. The Iraqi people should be told that, if the Constitution is ratified, elections will be held within 9 months of the ratification.

7) The Iraqi people should also be told that, simultaneous with the election, there will be a referendum in each governate on whether U.S. troops should remain stationed within that governate. (There are 18 governates in Iraq.) If the referendum vote is "no," U.S. troops should pull out of that governate immediately.

8) If the constitution is not ratified, it should be revised, and resubmitted to a second nationwide referendum within 4 more months.

9) If not ratified the second time, it should be revised and resubmitted a third and final time, within 4 months. Simultaneously with that third and final referendum on the constitution, elections should be held according to the proposed constitution, and each governate should vote on whether U.S. troops should remain within that governate.

Within a little more than 1 year, this plan of action would:

1) Cut U.S. troop strength in Iraq by half or more, and produce an even greater reduction in the danger to U.S. troops (since they will be redeployed outside cities).

2) Result in an Iraqi constitution that is either ratified or thrice rejected.

3) Result in democratic elections in Iraq.

To come: What the Iraqi constitution should look like. (Answer, the U.S. constitution, except with important improvements, and adopted to Iraq's situation.)

The reason to talk about the failures of the Bush administration in Iraq is that they are the boundaries of reasonable suggestions about what must be done to cure the problems. If the problem is the arrogance of the administration, then the possible solutions must somehow solve that problem as well as the problems that face us. If the problem is screwed-up theories about the likely response of the Iraqis to the invasion, then we need to get the administration to see that as a problem, get past it, and start trying to deal with reality.

Non-crazy pundits like Kristof, Friedman and Krugman have offered their views. The administration pays no attention.

What should we do if the dominant problem is ideological blinders? How can we make suggestions that fit the preconceptions of these committed revolutionaries, and thus have some reasonable chance of being accepted?

I have read every one of these posts. They are really interesting.

" My understanding is that most Iraqis are themselves desperate for a return to normality.'

Oh, when was this period of "normality", and what did it look like?

Having semi-launched this entire thread by writing the post that prompted james s.'s post that prompted 50 more posts (including another of mine), i don't have a lot more to say here that hasn't been well-covered other than some minor considerations: a.) despite what someone up there said, i think it's perfectly possible and appropriate to fire the entire rumsfeld/wolfowitz/feith/rice/hadley/powell apparatus and bring in people who might actually be interested in what to do in iraq (as opposed to resisting admitting error at all costs); b.) i mentioned that in a parliamentary system, this would have happened already, and someone asked about blair, to which my answer is that blair isn't the one who botched the postwar (to make my position clear, by the way, i opposed the war, but on day one, i turned my attention to the postwar, and even war supporters are starting to recognize what a botch it has been); c.) the iraqi people will be the ones who ultimately determine whether this is a SNAFU or a FUBAR scenario. Sadly, given that most of the media (and virtually all of our people) don't speak the language, knowing what the people think isn't easy to ascertain, but when i read the reporting of Anthony Shadid in the WaPo, who does, after all, know the language, i am not at all heartened.

I'd also like to note that it's encouraging that Patrick Sullivan fulfills his role and delivers a moronic right-wing distortion of reality yet again, this time about the Tet Offensive.

For your information, Patrick, the Woodstock generation (which, of course, occured a year after Tet) didn't have any control over the media in 1968, any more than it does now. What Tet demonstrated is that lbj and mcnamara and westmoreland and all the rest, with their confident assertions about how well everything was going, were full of it.

And, of course, honest liberals, recognizing the truth about vietnam, split with johnson over it, setting a number of mostly unhappy events into motion, but at least they can claim to have been correct about the conditions on the ground. Where are the comparable honest conservatives (for whom, as i noted way back at the beginning of this thread, are whom i'm looking for?) who are willing to point out the truth about the backbone administration on iraq? Thus far, we have hints from mccain, kristol, kagan, hagel, leach, and lugar, but no more than that.

"When was this period of 'normality'?"

More than 20 years ago, before Iraq invaded Iran.

"What did it look like?"

A radical secular dictatorship, fairly prosperous, middle class, Sunni-dominated. Before the 1958 coup, it looked more like Jordan (i.e. it was a Hashemite monarchy with close links to Britain).

All this talk of disaster in Iraq makes my head spin. In Baltimore we average 300 murders per year for a city of 500,000. Do people honestly think things are going to turn around and be 100% peaceful? It took officials here 5 years to finally have a year with less than 300 murders. Heck when you think of all the murders in the U.S. each year, it even puts 9/11 into an interesting perspective.

Y'know, it's just not that complicated.

Iraq is not a military problem; it can't be. (You can't fight a nice, neat, decisive war with people you can't talk to. You can commit genocide, but you can't actually have a war.)

The very simple difficulty is that _the policy of the United States in Iraq does not benefit Iraqis_.

They're not idiots; they can see this, it's obvious, and the only thing that will change their minds about the US is for the policy to change to something which does benefit them.

That's all there is to it. It's not even hard to do, in practical terms -- let contracts locally, return local control first, so political stability comes bottom up intead of top down, invest obviously and actively and agressively in local infrastructure.

If this had been in place from the start, the situation in Iraq would be much different. It's the absence of such an effort, or any preparation for it, which condemns the United States as a conqueror, rather than a liberator.

Y'know, it's just not that complicated.

Iraq is not a military problem; it can't be. (You can't fight a nice, neat, decisive war with people you can't talk to. You can commit genocide, but you can't actually have a war.)

The very simple difficulty is that _the policy of the United States in Iraq does not benefit Iraqis_.

They're not idiots; they can see this, it's obvious, and the only thing that will change their minds about the US is for the policy to change to something which does benefit them.

That's all there is to it. It's not even hard to do, in practical terms -- let contracts locally, return local control first, so political stability comes bottom up intead of top down, invest obviously and actively and agressively in local infrastructure.

If this had been in place from the start, the situation in Iraq would be much different. It's the absence of such an effort, or any preparation for it, which condemns the United States as a conqueror, rather than a liberator.

Bakho writes:
"Mr. Bush has never learned American History. What was the result of the British occupation of Boston in the 1770s? The British troops were harassed. The troops killed innocent (stone throwing) civilians. The troops could control the city but dared venture into the countryside under threat of ambush. Evenetually, the Americans trapped them in the city and threatened the destruction of their fleet and eliminated of their supply lines."

"The British left. They retreated from the city and resorted to blockade. They were defeated by rag tag group of men with little military training or soldiering skills. They were defeated because they could not get enough of the people to support them against the insurgents. Could the British have maintained control of Boston? Maybe. But not with the heavy handed use of troops that annoyed the people and built sympathy for their cause elsewhere in the colonies."

The situations are not analogous. Where is the Iraqi resistance equivalent of the Continental Army, replete with ex-British Army artillery from Fort Ticonderoga? Without large conventional formations in the field, the current guerrilla attacks are savage nuisances, but nothing more. Furthermore, where are the modern equivalents of the AmRev support from France, Spain and The Netherlands? Not just talking about money or a stream of volunteers, who is going to step up to the plate and go to war with the US using the pretext of supporting the resistance to further other goals of their own?

In the abscense of large scale support from outside, which will require Syria and Iran to allow their territory to be used as sanctuaries for resistance units - this falls under the Not loody Likely category - The US will eventually win. I suspect that Bush will win next November. I further respect that he will not waver in his determination to secure Iraq.

Graydon touches upon an interesting point. What has to happen to convince the Iraqi resistance that the war is no longer worth fighting?

Depends on which component of the resistance, of course.

The Baathists are mostly thugs, when they decide the risk of getting whacked is no longer worth the gain of regaining power, they will go to ground.

The Sunni, hmmm, "nationalists" for want of a better word, need to be convinced that the Kurds and Shiites won't lynch them in revenge for centuries of repression.

The Kurds and Shiites need to be convinced that there is no need to butcher the Sunnis to prevent them from regaining power.

The Islamists will be the toughest, but they are also probably the smallest in number. If they get bloody-minded enough, and their track records supports the idea that they will, popular support for them will whither as happended for the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt.

"When was this period of 'normality'?"

----------------quote----------------
More than 20 years ago, before Iraq invaded Iran.

"What did it look like?"

A radical secular dictatorship, fairly prosperous, middle class, Sunni-dominated. Before the 1958 coup, it looked more like Jordan (i.e. it was a Hashemite monarchy with close links to Britain).
--------------endquote-------------

Russil, that's a low bar for "normality", repressive dictatorship with intermittent bloody coups. I guess Bush doesn't have much problem improving on it.

Mcwop wrote:
"All this talk of disaster in Iraq makes my head spin. In Baltimore we average 300 murders per year for a city of 500,000. Do people honestly think things are going to turn around and be 100% peaceful? It took officials here 5 years to finally have a year with less than 300 murders. Heck when you think of all the murders in the U.S. each year, it even puts 9/11 into an interesting perspective."

This is part of the reason why the whole concept of a "War on Terror" was sort of pointless. Terrorism is a tactic that causes little risk to Americans. It is horrible to see the tragic deaths attributed to terrorists, but I think it is no different than seeing the senseless deaths attributed to poverty or black market drug trade. Furthermore, it is an enemy without a focus. It can be any policy direction the people in power chose to make it - thus the "War on Terror" became the war to overthrow Saddam Hussein.

We need to acknowledge that this war had nothing at all to do with any of the public rationales stated by the people in power. Replacing Saddam Hussein has been a goal of the United States since Saddam threatened our oil trade with Kuwait before Gulf War I. Wolfowitz, Perle, and others were members of think tanks that advocated Clinton's policy stance toward Iraq, and they are the people that are most responsible for our present situation. They advocated securing strategic control of Iraq's oil and geographical location to maintain American preeminence as China and the EU began to rise. In this sense, the invasion of Iraq has been a success.

The only thing left to worry about visa vie Iraq are the public relations problems associated with continued attacks on Americans. I think that the administration policy will be to replace the American troops with Iraqi conscripts while replacing the civilian leaders with an American puppet dictator. The media can be controlled and the news can be spun to convince the electorate that this is just an intermediary stage before Democracy takes bloom. They can then stage elections for the cameras, and appoint people to office that will maintain our grasp of Iraq. The liberals the point out the truth will be labeled "traitors" and the details will disappear down the memory hole.

We would not allow a democratic Iraq to foment democratic revolutions in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, etc. The results would be too unpredictable, and since we support the people that currently maintain their power in these nations, the outcomes may not be favorable to us. Democracy is a ruse to fool the rubes - nothing more.

This is why Internationalization is not an option. Giving control of Iraq to the rest of the world basically removes our entire reason for this war. Surrendering central control would mean that we wasted billions of dollars in our invasion of Iraq.

In the end, I am sure Iraq will foster a new breed of terrorists. I am sure that a few will try to attack America. I am sure some will succeed. I am also sure that any successful attacks will be spun to the advantage of the party in power - and used to justify more empire building.

So lets just drop the platitudes about creating a democratic Iraq. We all know that if it looks too hard, that idea will be scrapped and the image of a democratic Iraq will be the only sign of democracy in Babylon.

Mcwop wrote:
"All this talk of disaster in Iraq makes my head spin. In Baltimore we average 300 murders per year for a city of 500,000. Do people honestly think things are going to turn around and be 100% peaceful? It took officials here 5 years to finally have a year with less than 300 murders. Heck when you think of all the murders in the U.S. each year, it even puts 9/11 into an interesting perspective."

This is part of the reason why the whole concept of a "War on Terror" was sort of pointless. Terrorism is a tactic that causes little risk to Americans. It is horrible to see the tragic deaths attributed to terrorists, but I think it is no different than seeing the senseless deaths attributed to poverty or black market drug trade. Furthermore, it is an enemy without a focus. It can be any policy direction the people in power chose to make it - thus the "War on Terror" became the war to overthrow Saddam Hussein.

We need to acknowledge that this war had nothing at all to do with any of the public rationales stated by the people in power. Replacing Saddam Hussein has been a goal of the United States since Saddam threatened our oil trade with Kuwait before Gulf War I. Wolfowitz, Perle, and others were members of think tanks that advocated Clinton's policy stance toward Iraq, and they are the people that are most responsible for our present situation. They advocated securing strategic control of Iraq's oil and geographical location to maintain American preeminence as China and the EU began to rise. In this sense, the invasion of Iraq has been a success.

The only thing left to worry about visa vie Iraq are the public relations problems associated with continued attacks on Americans. I think that the administration policy will be to replace the American troops with Iraqi conscripts while replacing the civilian leaders with an American puppet dictator. The media can be controlled and the news can be spun to convince the electorate that this is just an intermediary stage before Democracy takes bloom. They can then stage elections for the cameras, and appoint people to office that will maintain our grasp of Iraq. The liberals the point out the truth will be labeled "traitors" and the details will disappear down the memory hole.

We would not allow a democratic Iraq to foment democratic revolutions in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, etc. The results would be too unpredictable, and since we support the people that currently maintain their power in these nations, the outcomes may not be favorable to us. Democracy is a ruse to fool the rubes - nothing more.

This is why Internationalization is not an option. Giving control of Iraq to the rest of the world basically removes our entire reason for this war. Surrendering central control would mean that we wasted billions of dollars in our invasion of Iraq.

In the end, I am sure Iraq will foster a new breed of terrorists. I am sure that a few will try to attack America. I am sure some will succeed. I am also sure that any successful attacks will be spun to the advantage of the party in power - and used to justify more empire building.

So lets just drop the platitudes about creating a democratic Iraq. We all know that if it looks too hard, that idea will be scrapped and the image of a democratic Iraq will be the only sign of democracy in Babylon.

Mcwop wrote:
"All this talk of disaster in Iraq makes my head spin. In Baltimore we average 300 murders per year for a city of 500,000. Do people honestly think things are going to turn around and be 100% peaceful? It took officials here 5 years to finally have a year with less than 300 murders. Heck when you think of all the murders in the U.S. each year, it even puts 9/11 into an interesting perspective."

This is part of the reason why the whole concept of a "War on Terror" was sort of pointless. Terrorism is a tactic that causes little risk to Americans. It is horrible to see the tragic deaths attributed to terrorists, but I think it is no different than seeing the senseless deaths attributed to poverty or black market drug trade. Furthermore, it is an enemy without a focus. It can be any policy direction the people in power chose to make it - thus the "War on Terror" became the war to overthrow Saddam Hussein.

We need to acknowledge that this war had nothing at all to do with any of the public rationales stated by the people in power. Replacing Saddam Hussein has been a goal of the United States since Saddam threatened our oil trade with Kuwait before Gulf War I. Wolfowitz, Perle, and others were members of think tanks that advocated Clinton's policy stance toward Iraq, and they are the people that are most responsible for our present situation. They advocated securing strategic control of Iraq's oil and geographical location to maintain American preeminence as China and the EU began to rise. In this sense, the invasion of Iraq has been a success.

The only thing left to worry about visa vie Iraq are the public relations problems associated with continued attacks on Americans. I think that the administration policy will be to replace the American troops with Iraqi conscripts while replacing the civilian leaders with an American puppet dictator. The media can be controlled and the news can be spun to convince the electorate that this is just an intermediary stage before Democracy takes bloom. They can then stage elections for the cameras, and appoint people to office that will maintain our grasp of Iraq. The liberals the point out the truth will be labeled "traitors" and the details will disappear down the memory hole.

We would not allow a democratic Iraq to foment democratic revolutions in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, etc. The results would be too unpredictable, and since we support the people that currently maintain their power in these nations, the outcomes may not be favorable to us. Democracy is a ruse to fool the rubes - nothing more.

This is why Internationalization is not an option. Giving control of Iraq to the rest of the world basically removes our entire reason for this war. Surrendering central control would mean that we wasted billions of dollars in our invasion of Iraq.

In the end, I am sure Iraq will foster a new breed of terrorists. I am sure that a few will try to attack America. I am sure some will succeed. I am also sure that any successful attacks will be spun to the advantage of the party in power - and used to justify more empire building.

So lets just drop the platitudes about creating a democratic Iraq. We all know that if it looks too hard, that idea will be scrapped and the image of a democratic Iraq will be the only sign of democracy in Babylon.

Steven, you are wrong about the analogy with the British evacuation of Boston. With the countryside littered with RPG, who needs Fort Ti? No French Navy was needed at Boston.

For that matter, no outside help was needed at Dien Bien Phu to use another analogy. If we accept Arnold Kling's definition of success, then Vietnam was a success. Today Vietnam is a progressing country with relatively good relations with the US. The tragedy of Vietnam is we could have had the same outcome had we left years earlier.

Bakho,

How many M-1s were killed by RPG's? Four? Five? Certainly less than ten. RPG's are company level support weapons, nothing more. Their battlefield role in no way compares with the Artillery windfall the Colonials gained from Fort Ticonderoga. Where are the Iraqi resistance heavy weapons? They will not win without them.

The French navy was not needed to take Boston, but the Continental Army certainly was. The Iraqi resistance has no equivalent, and no prospect of acquiring one. Furthermore, the lack of the French Navy, or any naval power at all for that matter, was keenly felt when the Brits escaped from Boston. A shortcoming that was pointedly rectifed for Yorktown.

No outside help required for the Viet Minh to take Dien Bien Phu? That statement is just daft. Where the hell do you think they got the medium and heavy artillery they used to transform that citadel into "Hell in a Very Small Place"? _Don't_ say they captured it from the French. They used a fair amount of American built equipment, true, but the vast majority was furnished from stocks captured from the Kuomintang by the Chinese Communists. They used a lot of Soviet built arty as well, also furnished by the ChiComs.

Iraq has been strategicly isolated to a degree that MACV could have only dreamed of for Vietnam.

"Today Vietnam is a progressing country..."

Let's see, Freedom House ranks all countries for political and civil liberties freedom. It does it from 1 to 7, where 1 is best, and 7 is worst. Vietnam's ratings are:

"7,7". A pair of 7's! The absolute worst possible ranking:

http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/turk.htm

And the Heritage Foundation ranks countries according to economic freedom:

http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/

For economic freedom, Vietnam ranks 135th out of 156 countries. In other words, there are only about 20 countries WORSE than Vietnam.

I can't imagine anyone who is even REMOTELY interested in freedom (and I know Arnold Kling is) calling the Vietnam of today a "success."

But they were even worse so progressing is the right word.

But they were a lot worse so progressing is the right word.

But they were a lot worse so progressing is the right word.

Give some credit to our host. Brad called for more troops in Iraq back in April.

But then, he was calling for another armored artillery division ...

It's not clear to me that artillery is of much use in the present situation, unless the sort of indiscriminate destruction of neighborhoods where Baathist hold-outs might be holed up is the desired tactic.

The administration has -- repeatedly, over and over, more than once, and redundantly -- said they need, not more manpower, but better intelligence. (There's a joke there that ought to be made at least as often as the administration
admits this need.) Gathering such intelligence is the work of translators and investigators. Cops, basically. Does the military even have another 1000 detectives, interrogators, forensic chemists, statistical analysts, photo-analysts, whatever? We can do deficit spending for dollars we don't (yet) have, but it's hard to deploy real manpower assets that do not actually exist (yet).

Interestingly, there is current pressure on academia to ensure that more college students funded by the federal government wind up after college employed in federal service. Doing intellegence, among other things. Since our host actually IS in academia, I'm curious if he has encountered this pressure. Is there a gifted senior with skills in "following the money", picking up on unapparent trends, developing incentives to tip the "Prisoner's Dilemma" toward more prosecution-friendly defections ... is there an economics standout who would do well in intelligence work, whom you have encouraged to make a difference in Iraq? After all, we NEED more good troops over there.

"Why are we ruled by these evil morons?" might be partially explained by the notion that the best and brightest will stand upon their principles and refuse to participate.

Patrick S,

“… that is a low bar for “normality”” Limiting the comparison to the prior worst periods rather misses the point. Prior regimes managed to make the railroads (ok, water, electricity, markets, schools) run for long periods. At least some Iraqis will remember that it was the US and UK that insisted on maintaining sanctions that make "normalcy" difficult for Saddam in latter years, whatever the virtues of sanctions from an external perspective. The comparison also leaves out things like unemployment rates, expectations, domestic vs occupying authority. The “bar” is the one Iraqis impose, and they seem unhappy about the way things are.

Steve R,

Your predictions…based on what? There are differences between this situation and Revolutionary North America, no question. There will always be differences between any two conficts. One way around the details is to look for larger consistencies. Here’s one possibility. Can you name an occupying army that has managed to hold on against a domestic insurgency in the last century? If you find one or two (iffy - count India in Kashmir if you like), then how does that work out as a share of the total?

Your following post, regarding making peace the best option for all Iraq’s fighting factions, is right on the money. I’m not yet convinced, however, we have what it takes to kick the Ba’athists hard enough, in short enough order, that we shouldn’t explore other avenues. Anyhow, let’s get started.

My predictions are those of a layman with an interest in military history, and are nothing more than my own opinion. I Am Not An Expert, by any means.

"Can you name an occupying army that has managed to hold on against a domestic insurgency in the last century? If you find one or two (iffy - count India in Kashmir if you like), then how does that work out as a share of the total?"

Damn near any given government in Africa deals with continuing insurgencies throughout said government's hold on power. The Burmese government has suppressed various ethnic insurgencies for several decades. As has the Indian government. And Mexico. The Sri Lankan counterinsurgency effort has definate ups and downs, but despite decades of fighting, they have not lost yet.

Your question is a good one, but in this case the question should be "How many domestic insurgencies succeed without high levels of external support?" Support being defined as manpower, money, weapons and cross-border sanctuaries for rest and refit of insurgents in the field. Cuba comes to mind as a definate affirmative. Nicaragua is a possibility, but I have no hard figures for the support they may have received from Cuba. Grenada, perhaps.

The closest analog to the situation in Iraq is the British-led counterinsurgency campaign in Mayala, a (so far) ethnicly based guerrilla movement composed of elements who are relatively easily identifed and separated from the majority of the population. The ethnicly based nature of the current insurgency, coupled with the strategic isolation of the insurgents (no cross-border sanctuaries will be a real long-term killer) bodes ill for said insurgents. In the long term.

" Can you name an occupying army that has managed to hold on against a domestic insurgency in the last century?"

The Soviet Army in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Patrick reminds us that insurgencies are not limited to the Third World, an all too common blind spot. Add to his examples the Soviet defeat of the Ukrainian insurgency after WWII.

For unsuccessful Western insurgencies, we have the IRA and the ETA. North America features the Quebecois nutjobs of the late sixties and early seventies. Hmmm, does the AIM seizure of Wounded Knee count as a failed effort to spark an insurgency in the USA?

A counter example of a successful insurgency with relatively little external support: Algeria.

Obviously reading UN inspection documents leads to totally unfounded concerns for the actual whereabouts of Iraqi WMD.

Patrick, the Soviets sure were quite the role models.

Steven, if the insurgents have enough political support, the insurgency can live on quite well without larger arms. The IRA has never been a military threat to the UK. Likewise, the Palestinians aren't close to pushing the Israelis out. The only demonstrated way to defeat a widely held insurgency through militarily means is via mass killings. Killing the people to save the village is likely not tolerable in the U.S. You seem to be of the mode, "when your only tool is a hammer..." Insurgency is a political problem.

To succeed in this case, we have to create a political climate that weakens the political support of the Baathists while strengthening the legitimacy of the new regime. Democratic elections may well do this. It isn't like the Baathists have a compelling case for outside support. Hopefully Iran can provide an object lesson on the dangers of radical Islam. We have to provide the security needed for those elections to occur (and as importantly for the economy to rebound). There are good reasons opponents are targeting police stations.

"We can do deficit spending for dollars we don't (yet) have, but it's hard to deploy real manpower assets that do not actually exist (yet)."

The unemployment rate in Iraq is most often reported to be in the neighborhood of 50%. So saying that the assets do not actually exist yet seems a bit hard to comprehend.

"You seem to be of the mode, "when your only tool is a hammer..." Insurgency is a political problem."

Oh, I'm not proposing anything, these are just my thoughts on what will probably happen, not what I want to happen.Certainly it is a political problem. See my earlier post about convincing the various active and potential insurgent groups to cease fire. A key point that seems to have escaped the Neocons is that it is generally the loser who decides when a war ends, by laying down arms - not the winner.

As to mass killings as a way of defeating insurgency... well, no. that is the simplet way, but a less wasteful of lives method is possible. Again, the British counter insurgency campaign in Malaya is a case in point. I. e., the insurgency is (so far) largely combined to an ethnic minority which in the present case is even more strategicly isolated than the ethnic Chinese insurgency in Malaya.

As to the mass killings, that is what will probably happen if we fail. I strongly doubt that Iraq as a state will survive an American defeat.

and is that bad?

An American defeat or the collapse of Iraq as a state? I'd prefer to avoid both.

As in the movies the bad guy looses, but that doesn't mean that the guy who wins is good nor do i see why a splitting of Iraq would be bad, especially in the long run

The Sunni's are used to getting the lions share of the oil revenues. I think they will fight to keep them. The Kurds and Shi'as have several centuries of payback stored up for the Sunnis. I doubt the situation will get as bad as Somalia or rwanda, because unlike those states, Iraq is in the Oil Bidniss and there will be strong interantional pressure to stabilize the region.

Even if the USA were to say "that's it, I'm outa here" tomorrow, someone would go back in sooner or later. An imploding Iraq would cause too much turmoil among Europe's oil suppliers.

A large part of Iraqi oil comes from the desert were there are no people so i don't think those wells will dry up. Besides money speaks and it is unbelievable how well sworn enemies can work together to make a dime.

Also an independent kurdistan would likely be stable

A large part of Iraqi oil comes from the desert were there are no people so i don't think those wells will dry up. Besides money speaks and it is unbelievable how well sworn enemies can work together to make a dime.

Also an independent kurdistan would likely be stable

Independant Kurdistan in northern Iraq? Iran and Turkey would puke with terror if that happened.

The oil is mostly in the desert, but that desert is cottrolled by the Kurd and the Shi'a. oth groups have been screwed so hard for so long by the Sunni that it will take a lot of talative moeny for them to cut deals they may not now think they need to cut.

The neighbours would puke at the tought. But they can't do anything about it after it is done. And if you look at Kosovo, where they hate each other even more and the money is so much smaller and the enemies work so well together to make money (illegally)

The neighbours would puke at the tought. But they can't do anything about it after it is done. And if you look at Kosovo, where they hate each other even more and the money is so much smaller and the enemies work so well together to make money (illegally)