February 11, 2003
The Increasingly-Strong Case for National Health Insurance

Daniel Davies points out that the rapid approach of genetic screening makes national health insurance inevitable--at least if we don't want to have a *huge* problem as those whose genes are bad for expensive-to-treat diseases find themselves very, very poor indeed. D-squared Digest -- A fat young man without a good word for anyone: ...Solutions? Sorry, don't really have one, unless one seriously thinks that the genie of genetic screening can be pushed back in the bottle. I'd note, however, that the engine of most of these "problems of asymmetric information" (in this case, the adverse selection problem which makes the pooled equilibrium solution with private information untenable) is usually an embedded option. In this case, it's the option of the insured party to choose whether or not to buy insurance. Since you can't force them to buy the product, they will only do so when it's to their advantage, and this turns out to be enough to knock down the existence of the market. I speak as a member of a health insurance scheme (the National Health Service) which doesn't have the property that you can refuse to buy it if you don't want it, and would humbly suggest...

Posted by DeLong at 06:24 PM