Marshall Eubanks points out, correctly, that while the British alliance in 1939 was no help to Poland, the Polish alliance was a great help to Britain--it may have won World War II:
Posted by DeLong at October 22, 2004 11:49 AM | TrackBackBrad DeLong's Semi-Daily Journal: A Weblog: Comment on I'm No Neville Chamberlain...: The English - Polish alliance probably saved Europe from a German victory. While the English could not in practice help the Poles much (although I wonder if Churchill couldn't have come up with some ideas), the Poles, on July 25, 1939, (37 days before the start of the War) gave the British and the French complete details of how they had been reading German Enigma traffic, including reverse engineered Polish Enigma replicas.
My personal feeling is that July 25th should be a Holiday. Without that intelligence transfer and the near complete penetration into internal German communications it provided, the English would probably have been defeated.
So the Poles came to the aid of the English in a decisive way. Pity that the English could not have returned the favor.
Details of how the Poles used repeated indicators to break Enigma are available from Decrypted Secrets, F.L. Bauer, Springer, 2000.
Lynne Olson's "A Question of Honor : The Kosciuszko Squadron" is a fantastic book that recounts the experiences primarily of Polish airmen, who played a remarkably huge role in defending England during the Battle for Britain.
Posted by: Drew at October 22, 2004 02:04 PMSpeaking of the Polish solutions of Enigma, I just want to mention Marion Reshevsky, who solved the original Enigma using group theory. He is often forgotten in the rush to worship at the shrine of Bletchly Park.
Posted by: Dick Thompson at October 22, 2004 02:16 PMIt's a good point, and one I think I agree with.
But..and there is a but. In the end we (the USA) broke the codes by using electronic computers. If the British had not had the Polish help then it would have been slower, but I think by '45 the task was quite easy with technology, and presumably in the absence of the Polish help, that would have been advanced.
Posted by: James at October 22, 2004 03:16 PMThe defeat of Nazism was of no help to Poland?
I suppose one could argue that the Soviet Union was worse for them, but wouldn't that reflect badly mostly on the FDR-Truman Admin. rather than the Brits?
Posted by: Patrick R. Sullivan at October 22, 2004 04:01 PMMuch as I think breaking Enigma was important, it wasnt decisive.
The theater it had the most impact on was the Battle of the Atlantic, and at the end of the day, the Atlantic was held open by aircraft. Once aircraft, either long-range bombers or short range aircraft on escort carriers, could escort convoys, wolf pack tactics stopped working.
Crack Enimga messages were useful on other fronts, but not decisive to the victory.
Ian Whitchurch
Posted by: Ian Whitchurch at October 22, 2004 04:22 PMAccording to John Keegan in this book, The Second World War, five percent of the pilots who took part in the Battle of Britain were Poles, but they accounted for fifteen percent of the losses claimed to have been inflicted on the Luftwaffe.
Posted by: Stuart Levine at October 22, 2004 06:41 PM*"Once aircraft, either long-range bombers or short range aircraft on escort carriers, could escort convoys, wolf pack tactics stopped working."*
True, but the Allies did not achieve that level of air coverage over the Atlantic until late '42 at the earliest (more like Spring '43), and by that time the real danger to the Allied shipping lanes to Britain and Murmansk had subsided as the Germans became occupied elsewhere.
It was in '40 and '41 (what the U-Boat commanders called the 'happy time') however, when the Wolfpacks nearly succeeded in strangling England's supply line, and it was at this time that the ability to decipher enigma provided the greatest strategic value.
Posted by: Night Owl at October 22, 2004 10:45 PMAnother accomplishment, this of the Polish resistance, was to capture a test-fired V-2 and communicate the details to the British.
And, strange to say, the Greek alliance with the British, which looked like a sure loser for the Brits, resulted in Hitler's invasion of Russia being delayed by a month. So you just never can tell.....
Posted by: serial catowner at October 23, 2004 07:35 AMHello;
Some comments.
Of course, what "won the war" is indeterminate, as the experiment cannot be rerun after a change of variables, but...
A response to James:
>But..and there is a but. In the end we (the USA) broke the codes
> by using electronic computers.
The Enigma decrypts were done using so called "Bombes", which were electromechanical (electronic computers were used against the SZ 40 / 42 cipher teletypes, not the Enigma). Even though by late 1942 there were some 3000 decrypts per day, the break was always tenuous, and was theatened by various improvements on the other side. The shear mass of decrypted material was essential to keeping the system going.
Perhaps the biggest clue can be obtained from the other side. The British used "Typex" throughout the War, and Typex was an Enigma type system strengthened by the UK. The Germans never seriously tried to decrypt Typex, because they thought it was impossible. Until July, 1939, the British also thought that decrypting Enigma was impossible. Would they or the Americans have put the level of resources required to break and keep up with Enigma from scratch ? Fortunately, we will never know.
On the Battle of the Atlantic
I have been told and have read that there was a very close correlation between the breaking of the Naval Enigma keynets under Alan Turing and the success of the Battle of the Atlantic against German U Boots.
I decided to put this to the test.
The Battle of the Atlantic started in earnest in May, 1940, without real assistance from Enigma decrypts.
By May, 1941, the British were able to decrypt Naval Enigma within one day of receipt (needed for serious operational use).
From 1 February 1942 to mid December, 1942
there was a blackout of Naval Enigma, because the the addition of a fourth rotor
to the Naval Enigma. (This made decryption of Naval Enigma 26 times more difficult, and took one day decrypts up to 17 days.) This enhancement was cracked in late 1942, and the decrypts started flooding in again by Mid-December, 1942.
In 1943 the Naval codes were broken routinely.
So, using data from
http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsUboats.htm
we have (roughly)
Naval Enigma Decryption
May 1940 - April 1941 - Not operationally useful
May 1941 - January 1942 - Operational Useful
February 1942 - December 1942 - Not operationally useful
January 1943 - December 1943 - Operationally useful
U Boat forces
May 1940 - April 1941 - ~ 25 U boats operational
May 1941 - January 1942 - 30 to 90 U boats operational
February 1942 - December 1942 - 100 to 200+ U boats operational
January 1943 - December 1943 - 240+ boats operational
Atlantic U Boat Losses (including Italian)
May 1940 - April 1941 - 13 lost or 1.08 / month or ~ 4% / month
May 1941 - January 1942 - 27 lost or 2.7 / month or ~ 5 - 9 % / month
February 1942 - December 1942 - 61 lost or 5.5 / month or 3 - 5 % / month
January 1943 - December 1943 - 204 lost or 17 / month or ~ 7 % / month
Allied Atlantic Ship Losses (all causes)
May 1940 - April 1941 - 505 ships or 42 / month
May 1941 - January 1942 - 264 ships or 29 / month
February 1942 - December 1942 - 1173 ships or 107 / month
January 1943 - December 1943 - 328 ships or 27 / month
Allied Atlantic Tonnage Losses (all causes)
May 1940 - April 1941 - 2,951,000 tons or 245,917 tons per month
May 1941 - January 1942 - 1,596,000 tons or 177,333 tons per month
February 1942 - December 1942 - 5,657,000 tons or 514,273 tons per month
January 1943 - December 1943 - 1,917,000 tons or 159,750 tons per month
So the (proportional) rate of U boat loss is lower when the Enigma decrypts are
available, and the ship losses higher, by something like a factor of 2 or 3.
I cautiously conclude that the data do support a substantial relationship between Enigma decryption and success in the Battle of the Atlantic.
Whether a factor of 2 or 3 was enough to "win the War" I will leave to brighter minds than mine.
Regards
Posted by: Marshall Eubanks at October 23, 2004 11:33 AMMarshall,
Great post.
From what I understand, the Polish mathematicians' work was absolutely crucial in solving the problem. But its usefulness also critically depended on the German conviction that the code was unbreakable--which they seem to have believed religiously.
On a lighter note, Robert Harris' "Enigma" is a very engaging thriller on the subject of breaking the Enigma code.
Posted by: walons at October 23, 2004 03:24 PMI hate to admit it, but I was surprised to see Patrick Sullivan make an ontopic post that advanced the discussion. I was expecting him to make a virulent republican polemical lie.
It's a reminder that people aren't consistent. Don't expect them to be consistent. It's a form of stereotyping, a form of prejudice.
Patrick Sullivan:
"The defeat of Nazism was of no help to Poland?"
You're being facetious right? Of course,
the defeat of Nazism was of great help to Poland.
But we're talking about 1939/40 not 1944/45.
Personally I concur with the views that:
1. The decryption of Enigma hastened the end
of the war and played a vital part in Battle of
Britain - I think the British would have
held out anyway but with much greater losses.
What really determined the outcome of the war was
entry of US and Hitler's invasion of Russia.
2. A French/British offensive in 1939 could have
allowed the Poles to hold out longer but would
ultimately not have changed much. Poland's fate
was sealed with the signing of Ribentrop-Molotov
and the invasion of the Soviet Army resulting in
an impossible two front defensive war (which was
when Polish defenses, which, contrary to some
popular wisdom, were still holding - an organized
retreat rather than a rout - finally collapsed).
There's some outside chance that in the face of determined action of the French/British Stalin would have opted not to invade. But really, Lithuania, Byelorus, Ukraina - it's was too tempting of a prize, even at the cost of pissing of the Western powers.
Once the Soviets joined in it was just a matter of mop up operations for the Germans which means Hitler was free to switch the bulk of his forces to the Western front. At best an offensive action on the Western Front could have saved Norway (and
maybe, maybe, Finland) by delaying Hitler's plans, but not Poland.
2. This is not an excuse for Chamberlain.
The fact that Britain was not ready to help Poland
in any meaningful way on August 1st is itself his
fault. He sold out at Munich. But if you sell out
you should at least get a decent prize. That is,
Britain should've starting preparing for the war
right after Munich - this was the time when,
as Brad suggest, Chamberlain should've said
"we bluffed, we lost, let us double our defense
expenditures so it won't happen again"
3. Hence, Britain did benefit from the alliance
with Poland in 1939 (less casualties in BoB,
though not the difference between victory and
defeat) and at the same time could not have
done much to help the Poles (due to lack of
previous foresight and preparation).
The British guarantee of aid was a bluff, one
which Hitler called correctly (perhaps because
it was a bluff on top of a bluff on top of a
bluff, which constituted the whole policy of
appeasment).
4. In some ways the "phony war" of 1939 on
the Western Front WAS the continuation of the
policy of appeasment. The Polish-French (I'm
not so sure of the details of the Polish-British)
mutual defense treaty called for, in the case of
German invasion of Poland:
4.1. An immidiate attack on Germany by the
French Air force.
4.2. Beginning of minor military attacks and
skrimishes 3 days from the day of
mobilization.
4.3 Beginning of a major offensive in the
West not more than 15 days since the day
of the mobilization.
4.1. and 4.2 never occured. Given that France
declared war on the third, it's obligation under
4.3 would've meant an offensive on (at the
earliest) the 18th. Which is when, perhaps not
coincidentally, Stalin invaded. In that instant
the outcome of the 1939 campaign was pretty much
determined. Hence I can't see how it would have made much much difference. But it's no secret that both Western powers in the first weeks of
the war, prior to the Soviet invasion, were
hoping for a peace settlement which would have
given Germany Danzig and the Polish corridor (or
at least they seemed to have sincerely believed
that this was all that Hitler wanted).
Serial catowner:
"Another accomplishment, this of the Polish resistance, was to capture a test-fired V-2 and communicate the details to the British."
Hmm, I'm proud to say my grandfather took part
in that action as an officer in the Home Army.
They actually managed to ship the damn thing to
the Brits, not just "details".
James: In the end we (the USA) broke the codes by using electronic computers.
Ah yes, of course you did, at the famous cryptanalysis centre in Bletchley Park, New Jersey. In fact, I believe the effort was led by the great American mathematician, Alan Turing, and built on the efforts of that other great American cryptanalyst, Marian Rejewski. In fact, the world's first electronic computer, Colossus, was constructed in the Post Office research laboratory in Dollis Hill, a suburb of London, Massachusetts.
You twit.
On a more serious note: David Kahn (Seizing the Enigma) estimates that without Enigma, Overlord would have been impossible (due to shipping losses) in 1944. With an invasion in 1945, the war could have gone on into 1946 or 1947. Except that, of course, it wouldn't. Instead, the first atomic bombs would have been used on their originally intended targets in Germany, and the war in Europe would have finished in the second half of 1945. Whether this is a better outcome than the real-world situation is left as an exercise for the reader.
War three months longer: nine months less bloody ground combat in Europe; more ships sunk in the Atlantic; less aid to the Soviet Union; less success on the Eastern Front; less progress in the Pacific (but probably not a very much longer war against Japan)... too many imponderables.