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March 09, 2005
Do You Think My Methods Are Unsound?
I see no method at all, sir:
World Tribune.com -- Army report: U.S. lost control in Iraq three months after invasion: WASHINGTON – The U.S. military lost its dominance in Iraq shortly after its invasion in 2003, a study concluded.... "In the two to three months of ambiguous transition, U.S. forces slowly lost the momentum and the initiative gained over an off-balanced enemy," the report said. "The United States, its Army and its coalition of the willing have been playing catch-up ever since."
The report was authored by Maj. Isaiah Wilson, the official historian of the U.S. Army for the Iraq war. Wilson also served as a war planner for the army's 101st Airborne Division until March 2004, Middle East Newsline reported. His report, not yet endorsed as official army history, has been presented to several academic conferences.
In November 2003, the military drafted a formal plan for stability and post-combat operations, Wilson said. Termed Phase-4, the plan was meant to follow such stages as preparation for combat, initial operations and combat. "There was no Phase IV plan," the report said. "While there may have been plans at the national level, and even within various agencies within the war zone, none of these plans operationalized the problem beyond regime collapse. There was no adequate operational plan for stability operations and support operations."...
The report disclosed the lack of planning by the U.S. military for the occupation of Iraq. Over the last year, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his aides have been blamed for lack of post-war planning based on their assessment that the military campaign in Iraq would be brief and quickly lead to a democratic and stable post-Saddam Hussein government.... Wilson said army planners failed to understand or accept the prospect that Iraqis would resist the U.S. forces after the fall of the Saddam regime. He deemed the military performance in Iraq mediocre and said the army could lose the war.
"U.S. war planners, practitioners and the civilian leadership conceived of the war far too narrowly," the report said. "This overly simplistic conception of the war led to a cascading undercutting of the war effort: too few troops, too little coordination with civilian and governmental/non-governmental agencies and too little allotted time to achieve success."
I did see Thomas Barnett yesterday at his luncheon talk. After listening to him, I came away with the following message: It is now clear that we have failed at post-lightning war stabilization and society-building--political society, civil society, and commercial society--efforts in Iraq, but that this is going to be the last such failure. The U.S. Army knows that it has failed, and doesn't like to fail in the same way twice.
He also has three great lines:
- "Martin van Creveld is very good, but he generalizes immediately from the West Bank to the world as a whole. The world as a whole is not like the West Bank."
- "Robert Kaplan is very good, but he generalizes immediately from West Africa to the world as a whole. The world as a whole is not like West Africa."
- "Yes, as far as the Core is concerned, you can think of me as the second coming of Norman Angell. But I am Norman Angell with nuclear weapons."
(Of course, you need to have read Martin van Creveld, Robert Kaplan, and Norman Angell to understand these).
Posted by DeLong at March 9, 2005 12:06 PM
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Via Brad DeLong we have the World Tribune quoting from an army report. "U.S. war planners, practitioners and the civilian leadership conceived of the war far too narrowly," the report said. "This overly simplistic conception of the war led to [Read More]
Tracked on March 9, 2005 01:34 PM
Comments
J,
Glad to see you are not immune to the formatting problems on your site that plague the rest of us! Can you reformat please? Thanks.
Cranky
Posted by: Cranky Observer at March 9, 2005 12:13 PM
> t is now clear that we have failed at
> post-lightning war stabilization and
> society-building--political society, civil
> society, and commercial society--efforts in
> Iraq,
Well, it would be clear if anyone in the Bush Administration would admit it. Which is a bit in conflict with some of the posts I found on Barnett's web site.
> but that this is going to be the last such
> failure. The U.S. Army knows that it has failed,
> and doesn't like to fail in the same way twice.
And it will get another opportunity when? Iran? Ha ha ha... well, not funny.
I personally agree that the United States did fail (and fail the Iraqi people whom we claimed to be liberating) in the post-war phase of the invasion. But I don't agree that it was necessarily the fault of the "Army". The uniformed services, particularly the Marines but also the Army, had the capability to develop a postwar plan. The State Departement _did_ develop such a plan. Hell, the NYPD, LAPD, and Istanbul Police Depts together coudl have developed a workable plan.
Why weren't these plans developed and/or implemented? I don't know the answer to that, but I DO know who is responsible: Rumsfeld, Cheney, and W Bush. Until they are held accountable there will be NO lessons learned.
Cranky
Posted by: Cranky Observer at March 9, 2005 12:24 PM
We are forgetting that the reason the post-blitz portion of the Iraq occupation went badly is that the blitz went so well. Rummy said so. If we had just failed a little more at the blitz, we could have done better with the occupation. That is clear as clear can be. This stuff from Wilson is, therefore, pure revisionism. (Funny how people named "Wilson" keep getting things about the Iraq war so badly wrong.) The lack of a post-blitz plan is a trivial matter, a matter of opinion, a red herring...treasonous humbug...democracy...a free people...Saddam was a threat...must destroy the UN to save it...
Posted by: kharris at March 9, 2005 01:23 PM
kharris-
Why does Wilson hate freedom?
Posted by: Nicholas Mycroft at March 9, 2005 01:48 PM
My reaction was the same as Cranky's -- the Army and State Dept did have a plan, and Rumsfeld threw it out the window, because conservative anti-intellectualism decreed that a plan meticulously devised by experts over a period of years couldn't possibly be better than what Rummy et al. could pull out of their collective asses. While I imagine the Army will do their best to use these lessons to tinker with that plan, since it was never tested, it'll be more difficult than usual, and they'll probably go into the next war without a lot of lessons learned in this area. ("Don't do the stupid-ass things we already knew not to do" doesn't really count as a lesson learned.)
Posted by: Redshift at March 9, 2005 01:52 PM
Just for the record, the actual quote from the film goes:
Kurtz: Are my methods unsound?
Willard: I don't see any methods at all, sir.
http://www.filmsite.org/apoc4.html
Posted by: ArthurKC at March 9, 2005 01:54 PM
> ("Don't do the stupid-ass things we already knew
> not to do" doesn't really count as a lesson
> learned.)
My understanding was that lesson was learned in Vietnam. Unfortunately, as Redshift points out, Rumsfeld and Cheney did not agree.
My guess is that the US military has been damaged for at least 20 years, worse than post-Vietnam. After Vietnam they thought they couldn't trust the politicians but could still trust themselves. Now they know that when the master cracks the whip they will jump like everyone else...
Cranky
Posted by: Cranky Observer at March 9, 2005 02:02 PM
Well-stated, Cranky.
Part of the damage is that some ass kissers moved up a notch when Shinseki was booted out for stating the obvious truth.
And these weren't run-of-the-mill ass kissers. This bunch maintained lip lock knowing that no plan and too few troops would most likely mean more deaths and a longer stay in Iraq.
Posted by: Ottnott at March 9, 2005 03:28 PM
I threw away Barnett's 'New Map' book before I even finished it.
I don't even remember why, and I'm afraid I can't even check anymore.
Posted by: Josh Narins at March 9, 2005 03:36 PM
This whole mess seems like a bad dream. I still do not know the real reason(s) we invaded Iraq. Can anybody tell me? Does anybody know?
Posted by: JRossi at March 9, 2005 04:33 PM
Actually, Kaplan generalizes from West Africa (The Coming Anarchy), the Balkans (Balkan's Ghosts), the Middle East and the Caucasus (Eastward to Tartary), Afghanistan and Pakistan (Soldiers of God), and the Western United States (Empire Wilderness).
Posted by: Eric Anderson at March 9, 2005 04:48 PM
I don't agree that we learn from history. I know Iraq is not Vietnam, but some of the parallels are eerie. We had the Powell doctrine, which is from the lessons of Vietnam and then threw it out the window when we went into Iraq. The problems are more a problem with the administration than with the armed forces. What will the Army do when Bush wants to invade Iran, will they refuse if they don't get more troops?
A part of learning from your mistakes is admitting you made them. Until Bush and crew start coming clean about what went wrong they'll continue to fail.
Posted by: Unstable Isotope at March 9, 2005 05:29 PM
>>> Actually, Kaplan generalizes [...]
I get the impression from Kaplan's /Atlantic/ pieces that he is preparing the intelligesia to accept the reality of a military coup in the United States.
Posted by: Oddball at March 9, 2005 05:33 PM
it's amazing how after people see barnett's lecture they start to talk like him, or in this case, write. It's fun that the strategist that will have the most effect on our generation - our AT Mahan, our Angell, has a weblog, a website, and a presentation that you can see on C-Span. How cool is that?
Posted by: jared bailey at March 9, 2005 06:53 PM
At the end of the US Civil War, after Lee had surrendered to Grant at Appomatix, it was up to Sherman to negotiate with armies still in the field. Sherman was scared shitless that the Confederate Army would dissolve and break up into bands of partisans. A surrender of uniformed forces is by the book. Partisan warfare is to be avoided at all costs.
Sherman originally negotiated a deal with Joe Johnson that brought the wrath of the Administration (this was just after LIncoln was shot). Sherman then had to re-negotiate, but fortunately, it worked. There were a few small groups like Jesse James, but partisan activity was limited.
Any military, never ever wants to fight partisans. Partisans made the British miserable in America. Partisan warfare could have doubled the US Civil War casualties (the war with casualties greater than all other US wars combined).
Sherman learned his lesson first hand in the Seminole War. Shinseki talked about this. There is not one West Point grad that has not studied Sherman. The entire ARMY knows this. Partisans in Iraq will eventually drive the US out.
The military understands the dynamics. Our naive neo-confederate politicians must learn this. There is a reason why revisionist neo-confederate history is no substitute for real history. For the same reason, supply-side, Voodoo economics is no substitute for the real thing.
Posted by: bakho at March 9, 2005 07:59 PM