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March 09, 2005
Paul Blustein on David Mulford and Company
Blustein on Mulford
Paul Blustein does not believe that David Mulford played a constructive role in the Argentine financial crisis:
pp. 125-31: Now the silver-haired Mulford had an idea... a debt "swap."... The purpose was to eliminate... the large amounts of interest and principal payments Argentina was required to make during the 2001-2005 period.... the payments would be stretched out so taht much more would fall due in the years after 2005.... Argentina would gain time to recover and avoid default.... The... megaswap... ranks among the most infamous deals that Wall Street has ever peddled to a government.... For CSFB and a half dozen other Wall Street firms, the megaswap would be a bonanza... more than $90 million in fees.... For Argentina, it would be a bust, rendering the country's solvency even more questionable than it was already....
The new name of the game was "liability management"... arranging for debtors to stretch out or reduce their debt burdens.... In most cases, these deals were used by countries with firm market standing to save money. Mexico and Brazil... used swaps to retire... bonds... difficult to trade. Argentina's situation was different.... [t]he deal Mulford was proposing would increase Argentina's debt costs rather than decrease them; that was the price... to postpone its debt payments....
The appeal the deal had for Cavallo was obvious. Mulford's message... was that for reasons unrelated to his stewardship... Argentina was facing a liquidity crisis... $80 billion... due in the next four and a half years.... There was no need to default or impose a haircut; investors would be happy to reschedule.... Once that was accomplished, markets would start to settle down, giving Cavallo the leeway he needed to work his magic....
Ridicule... greeted this line of reasoning as the swap's terms became clear. Desirable as it might be to reduce near-term payments... the cost was far too high.... The IMF... had kind words for it in public.... But behind the scenes... the swap drew scron from the Research Department.... Mussa's anger boiled over in a table-pounding, finger-pointing exhibition.... Mussa's staff had calculated that the transaction would save $12 billion in debt payments from 2001 to 2005... at an effective interest cost of 16 percent.... To borrow so much at such a high cost made no sense for a country that was already having grave difficulty....
The swap's champions proclaimed the deal a triumph... $29.5 billion worth of securities.... "We have beaten those who were betting against Argentina," Cavallo declared.... Mulford... predicted "the market will now recover," with yields falling so that "future financing will be done at substantially lower rates"....
The markets' disappointing reaction to the megaswap is subject to conflicting explanations.... Mulford and other bankers... blamed the Argentines, accusing them of making two market-rattling mistakes. First, the government continued auctions of treasury bills in which local banks were reportedly pressured to bu.... Second, Cavallo sprang another weekend surprise that some analysts interpreted as undermining credibility... a subsidy would be paid to exporters... a duty charged to importers.... The measure was akin to a 7% devaluation of the peso for trade purposes....
Although these moves were unhelpful, it is a stretch to call them the cause of the letdown that followed the megaswap.... [T]he swap did not produce the miraculous effects that Mulford had predicted, and it arguably made matters worse...
Paul Blustein (2005), And the Money Came Rolling in (and Out): Wall Street, the IMF, and the Bankrupting of Argentina (New York: Public Affairs: 15486482459).
Posted by DeLong at March 9, 2005 05:57 PM
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July 15, 2001
A LATIN TRAGEDY
By Paul Krugman - New York Times
In the 1990's Argentina staged a dramatic recovery from decades of economic mismanagement, and in the process became an icon of the new world order. But last week the Argentine government found that it could roll over short-term debt only by offering a 14 percent interest rate, five points higher than a month earlier. And the buzz on Wall Street is that the question about an eventual Argentine debt default is no longer whether, but when.
Both the markets and the Argentine government are treating the issue as mainly one of deficit spending. Indeed, in a desperate effort to regain market confidence, President Fernando de la Rúa has called for draconian spending cuts.
But Argentina's fundamental problem isn't fiscal; it's monetary. Ten years ago Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo, the nation's economic hero, introduced a much- acclaimed monetary system, the nation's "currency board." Now he finds his handiwork threatened by that system's tragic flaw.
First, a word about the dire budget numbers you may have heard. Argentina, we are told, has a public debt equal to 45 percent of its G.D.P.; it has a budget deficit of more than 2 percent of G.D.P. Gee — the budget numbers are almost as bad as they were in the United States when the elder George Bush was president!
Why does a level of debt and deficits that caused only tut-tutting here create panic in Argentina? To some extent it's a vicious circle: because investors believe default is likely, they demand usurious interest rates that may well push the country into default. But the main answer is that behind a mildly troubled budget lies a deeply troubled economy.
Argentina's economy surged between 1990 and 1998, but it has been steadily contracting ever since. Unemployment, which stayed high even during the good years, has risen above 16 percent. This dismal performance contributes to the budget problem in at least three ways. A depressed economy means low tax receipts; it's hard to slash spending or raise taxes when the populace is already feeling a lot of economic pain; and it's hard to convince lenders that you will grow out of your problems when your economy is, in fact, shrinking. It's easy to criticize Argentina's political leadership for its inability to eliminate the budget deficit. But when did you last see our own leaders raise taxes and cut spending in the face of a nasty recession? ...
Posted by: anne at March 9, 2005 06:18 PM
Domingo Cavallo needed to drop the currency peg, but was continually urged to keep the peg as the economy first slowed, then entered a recession phase, and finally a depression. The peg had to be dropped, for Argentina currency was pricing its exports out of its neighbor countries and southern Europe. Drop the peg, but the peg was not dropped.
Posted by: anne at March 9, 2005 06:48 PM
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/26/international/americas/26argent.html?ei=1&en=bb0e8837128cd3f8&ex=1111418099&pagewanted=all&position=
Argentina's Economic Rally Defies Forecasts
By LARRY ROHTER
BUENOS AIRES - When the Argentine economy collapsed in December 2001, doomsday predictions abounded. Unless it adopted orthodox economic policies and quickly cut a deal with its foreign creditors, hyperinflation would surely follow, the peso would become worthless, investment and foreign reserves would vanish and any prospect of growth would be strangled.
But three years after Argentina declared a record debt default of more than $100 billion, the largest in history, the apocalypse has not arrived. Instead, the economy has grown by 8 percent for two consecutive years, exports have zoomed, the currency is stable, investors are gradually returning and unemployment has eased from record highs - all without a debt settlement or the standard measures required by the International Monetary Fund for its approval.
Argentina's recovery has been undeniable, and it has been achieved at least in part by ignoring and even defying economic and political orthodoxy. Rather than moving to immediately satisfy bondholders, private banks and the I.M.F., as other developing countries have done in less severe crises, the Peronist-led government chose to stimulate internal consumption first and told creditors to get in line with everyone else.
"This is a remarkable historical event, one that challenges 25 years of failed policies," said Mark Weisbrot, an economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, a liberal research group in Washington. "While other countries are just limping along, Argentina is experiencing very healthy growth with no sign that it is unsustainable, and they've done it without having to make any concessions to get foreign capital inflows."
The consequences of that decision can be seen in government statistics and in stores, where consumers once again were spending robustly before Christmas. More than two million jobs have been created since the depths of the crisis early in 2002, and according to official figures, inflation-adjusted income has also bounced back, returning almost to the level of the late 1990's. That is when the crisis emerged, as Argentina sought to tighten its belt according to I.M.F. prescriptions, only to collapse into the worst depression in its history, which also set off a political crisis....
Posted by: anne at March 9, 2005 06:55 PM