Louis Uchitelle writes about the danger of deflation--and wonders why more people aren't worrying about it. I think the answer is that people are worrying about it. However, it's not yet a crisis, or even a clear and present danger. But it does seem to me that it could become a clear and present danger in a year, if things do not break favorably.
Cost-Cutting Can Start a Ruinous Circle: ...Why isn't that danger uppermost in everyone's mind? Why are forecasters like James Glassman, a senior economist at J. P. Morgan Chase, so optimistic? In a nutshell, they expect an infusion of demand from somewhere that will reverse the cost-cutting and persuade companies to expand investment, production and hiring. Their main hopes are more tax cuts, more growth in federal spending and more interest rate cuts by the Federal Reserve. They also count on people to finance consumption by continuing to extract equity from their homes, which are still rising in value. Mainly, though, it is stimulus from Washington that for Mr. Glassman will save the day. "If Washington cannot get us moving toward full employment within a year," he said, "then there will be more federal stimulus. We have learned a lot since the Depression about how to fix the economy."
n Alice in Wonderland fashion, we talk of expansion and ignore the contraction all around us. We convince ourselves that out of cost-cutting will come prosperity. But while cost-cutting can lift a single company or two, when practiced widely enough it can pull down an economy. And that is happening today.
Few economists acknowledge this dynamic. Corporate cost-cutting and labor-saving layoffs appear in the forecasts as the golden road to greater productivity and rising profits. Never mind that we have just fired the workers and extinguished the salaries that would have been spent on the merchandise and services to fatten the profits. With sales revenue failing to rise, we cut costs more. The process feeds on itself — until there are not enough workers and salaries left to generate sales and profits.
There is hyperbole in this description, but not much. As a nation, we are caught in the strangest and perhaps most perilous recovery since the Depression — featuring a dynamic that William Dudley, chief domestic economist at Goldman Sachs, characterizes as "the corporate paradox of thrift."
"If everyone tries to cut costs and save more, no one saves more," he said. "If you and everyone else cut costs, costs do indeed go down, but revenue also goes down, so profits eventually go down, too. Collectively, we can't cut our way to prosperity."
Individual companies — defending themselves, not the economy — have good reason to throw themselves into this behavior. In one profit report after another this summer, the story has been the same: Sales revenue was flat or barely rose in the second quarter, but don't worry, profits were up. Cost-cutting and labor-saving efficiencies fattened the bottom line, and revenue will soon rise as lower costs allow us to cut prices and take sales away from competitors.
That is fine, for a while, for the winning company. But consider what happens in an imaginary country where Burger King and McDonald's are the entire business sector and the total national output — 100 hamburgers a day, evenly divided between the companies — matches the demand from this nation's consumers. Demand and sales revenue, however, stay flat. So Burger King lays off two workers and uses the saved wages partly to fatten profits and partly to discount prices by just enough to take sales and revenue away from McDonald's. And McDonald's responds in kind.
But soon, the four laid-off workers, with little income, buy fewer hamburgers, and the nation's total consumption drops to 95 hamburgers a day. That sets off another round of cost-cutting and price discounting, and our imaginary nation sinks gradually into stagnation or deep recession not unlike America in the 1930's.
Why isn't that danger uppermost in everyone's mind? Why are forecasters like James Glassman, a senior economist at J. P. Morgan Chase, so optimistic? In a nutshell, they expect an infusion of demand from somewhere that will reverse the cost-cutting and persuade companies to expand investment, production and hiring. Their main hopes are more tax cuts, more growth in federal spending and more interest rate cuts by the Federal Reserve. They also count on people to finance consumption by continuing to extract equity from their homes, which are still rising in value.
Mainly, though, it is stimulus from Washington that for Mr. Glassman will save the day. "If Washington cannot get us moving toward full employment within a year," he said, "then there will be more federal stimulus. We have learned a lot since the Depression about how to fix the economy."
BUT perhaps not enough. Perhaps we have become too accustomed to the other post-World War II recoveries, which were so different. There were no excesses to overcome from a stock market bubble and an insane rush by business to expand far beyond demand. Instead, when consumption rose, there was shortage and rising prices. To control inflation, the Fed pushed up interest rates. In response, consumption subsided, provoking a recession — until rates came down and pent-up demand reasserted itself. Business stepped up investment to keep output abreast of demand, and recovery was on its way.
In the current cycle, however, consumption — particularly for cars, housing and appliances — never tapered off from very high levels during the nine-month recession that started in January of last year. It has still not tapered off, but it is not rising, either, and that is a problem. Recovery requires increased consumption and business investment to make the economy grow. The danger today is that demand will decline instead, and recession will return — or there will be prolonged stagnation. Unfortunately, Mr. Dudley's "corporate paradox of thrift" is pushing hard in that direction.
It's an interesting point in general: a concern is only politically operational if there problem is already there. Demographics are such that we know that Social Security is going to be virtually bankcrupt within a decade or so. But even this kind of certainty - it's pretty much as certain as it gets in economics - is not enough to be politically operational.
To your mediocre average politician what's the point to sacrifice immediate political capital for a remote and highly uncertain future reward (assuming (s)he would actually care to understand what we're talking about). A week time is the long-run on Wall Street as well as Washington...
What is more curious is that voters and many analysts seem to think the same way. It may have to do with the fact that the political arena is not only the place where political compromises are struck but the vector and the focus of political analysis as well. In other words, politics most often have a life of their own... and very often that's pretty much the only sign of life there is out there. The rest is just a decor.
Posted by: Jean-Philippe Stijns on August 25, 2002 12:31 AM"We know that social security is going to be virtually bankrupt within a decade or so...."
Rubbish. Rubbish. Rubbish.
Such projections have repeatedly been set out by those who wish to destroy a program that has been a boon to millions and millions of Americans since the New Deal.
I can remember a commercial by Microsoft in 2000, in which a smarty child made the same comment. Rubbish then, rubbish now. I suggest a look to the economics of the program. If you wish to do away with social security, say so. If you wish to privatize social security, say so and explain how you intend to pay for such a transition.
Enough now of pretending that social security is soon doomed.
Posted by: on August 25, 2002 08:47 AMIt seems to me that the post bubble has to run the course. If you encourage companies to expand now your just encouraging a worse condition later. If you have alot of excess capacity now why encourage more.
What is surprising is the housing market. Where is all this money coming from to buy these expensive homes. Greenspan seems to feel that real estate is the new economy. Other economists are saying that this real estate boom is different and more stable than Japan because in Japan the bubble was is comercial real estate and the US has no fears since the price inflation is only in homes. Will home values really be the new ecomy for the 2000s as technology was 90s?
Posted by: on August 25, 2002 09:59 AMArgument:
DeLong and Krugman contend the macro problem is not excess capacity but insufficient demand. Excess capacity is a problem specific to an industry, while innsufficient demand is the problem for our economy as a whole. Eventually fiber optic capacity will be more fully used, however the economy need not grow at 1% till then.
Perhaps home prices are rising too rapidly, but that problem will be solved as new supply is built. Meanwhile the economy is growing too slowly to employ several million more people, and prices are sluggish enough to cause worry about deflation in time. Japan has sacrificed a decade of growth by not trying to prevent and stem deflation. We must not imitate Japan.
Posted by: on August 25, 2002 10:20 AMDr. Delong has pointed out that our potential growth has increased significantly while real growth has not. I understand this. The problem then becomes using telecom for example, if you can produce 100 phone systems a year and only 10 are needed what do you do? You certainly don't encourage a company to build a plant to build more phone systems. And if 90 more phones are not needed or wanted there is a problem. Who do Agere, Cienna and corning sell a million miles of fibre optics cable to when ATT wants only a mile of cable and World com cancels their order for 2 miles of wire.
Posted by: on August 25, 2002 10:53 AMI would be really grateful if Brad or anyone else could answer a naive question of mine. I agree that deflation looks like something that is a lot nastier than mild inflation. But why is it hard to treat? What's wrong with Krugman's proposal for Japan - the announcement of a (positive) inflation target and the printing of money to achieve it. This is not politically difficult (in a fundamental sense it sd not be unpopular though I admit there are institutions which are there to resist it like Central Banks). But leaving that aside, why does everyone refer to deflation as some increadibly difficult policy problem when this option exists? I'd much rather deal with this as a politician than crunch a boom.
Brad - anyone?
Posted by: Nigel Hawthorne on August 26, 2002 05:31 AMWhat struck me about the Uchitelle article is that, like a lot of attempts to make economics racy, he first has to claim that lots of economists are missing the big picture before he then goes on to straighten them out. Aren't lots of people worried about deflation? Haven't I been hearing comparisons with Japan for quite some time. Good issue, but wrong approach. Uchitelle (who deserves lots of credit for keeping economics readable and interesting much fo the time) fails here because part of what he is trying to say, that there is a lack of concern, just doesn't seem true. Good economists are aware of the deflation argument - some are convinced and others are not.
About the "why is deflation difficult to deal with" question. I don't have your answer, but Krugman seems to have. Read his NYT piece. Beyond that, the problem with deflation is that it is just about synonymous with recession. Inflation transfers wealth from some parts of the economy to others without the recipients having to make any contribution to the general wellfare, it reduces efficiency and so forth, but it is not often (in developed economies) associated with outright declines in output, especially at when held to a moderate pace. Inflation is associated with growth, deflation with contraction. That is why worry that the cure may be tricky is is important.
Posted by: K Harris on August 26, 2002 06:39 AMUchitelle appears correct. Few economists have written about the possibility of deflation and generally they have been dismissed or hooted at. Wall Street economists dismissed the problem in Japan for years and opted for micro cures to a macro problem. "Re-structure Japanese industry. Feel the pain and all will be well in time," went the refrain on Japan. Wall Street cheered the Argentina currency peg as the economy went from recession to depression.
I have little understanding of why the Japanese central bank has not adopted a specific inflation target and began buying Japanese debt and allowing the currency to depreciate to achieve the target. Perhaps there is so little pressure on the Japanese central bank, because Japanese people are generally well off. The problem is not massive deflation but a slow price erosion and slow growth. Japanese families appear concerned but there has been no perceived crisis.
Posted by: on August 26, 2002 07:48 AMK Harris's comment doesn't make much sense to me. Printing money not just treating deflation - as a financial phenomenon. The treatment for deflation is also the treatment for the recession in the real economy. You can't meet the inflation target without generating demand. You generate demand by printing money and having the government spend it or giving it away - if necessary as coupons which lose their value if not spent quickly.
So that doesn't just solve the deflation as a financial phenomenon. It solves the real economic problem which is economic stagnation or decline. Moreover, amongst economic problems its not such a hard ask politically - to give money away, though as in any change in direction there will be those consulting the war manuals of a few wars ago who think its all very irresponsible. I think the Bank of Japan is on record as saying that printing money like this is 'not consistent with sound central banking practice'. So there you go - better to have sound practice than to help the economy.
Posted by: Nigel Hawthorne on August 27, 2002 01:44 AMThe problem is to have policy prescriptions that are reasonable for a policitical-economic body. Directly inflating Japan is beyond consideration for the Japanese electorate.
The central bank can buy Yen bonds, and the finance ministry can "talk down" the Yen and gradual micro structure reforms can continue. Radical change is politicall and culturally an impossibility
Posted by: on August 27, 2002 09:08 AM