Next February the Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis is going to release its first estimates of production and productivity for the year 2002. When they do, everyone is going to sit up and take notice--because the numbers will be very surprising. We today already know (although very few think about it) what those numbers will be in rough outline: some 13/16 of the data for the year-to-year growth rates from 2001 to 2002 is already baked in the cake. So let's take a look at what next February's data releases are going to show:
The growth rate of output per hour between 2001 and 2002 is going to be absolutely huge. Labor productivity growth will--unless our forecasts of what has happened in the third quarter and will happen in the fourth quarter are really, really off--be faster than in any year since the Korean War. The extraordinarily, ridiculously high productivity growth rates in the fourth quarter of 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 guarantee it.

Labor productivity growth in 2002 relative to 2001 is a far cry from the 0.9 percent per year of the period from the mid-1970s productivity slowdown to the mid-1990s. Labor productivity growth in 2002 relative to 2001 is even a far cry from the 2.5% per year of 1996-2000 (or the 2.1% per year of 1996-2001). We know, arithmetically, where this productivity growth came from: output rose in the fall of 2001 and the winter of 2002 even as American businesses shed workers and cut back on hours. We don't know much about the economic processes that allowed businesses to increase their productivity so much as they tried to deal with the late recession (1992 and 1971, also end-of-recession years, saw rapid productivity growth, but not this rapid). The drop in productivity growth in the recession year 2001 was not unanticipated: productivity growth always falls in a recession year (and, indeed, productivity has fallen in three of the five previous recession years). But the strong bounceback of productivity growth this year was not something that I had anticipated.
The relatively slow growth of aggregate demand that we see in 2002--a level of real output growth that looks like 2.5 percent per year--coupled with rapid productivity growth means that 2002 is turning out to be a lousy year for the American worker. It looks as though America's workers will work 2.1 percent fewer hours in 2002 than in 2001--and 3.3 percent fewer hours than in 2000. If you wonder why America's workers are not as happy as in past years, even though the recession is over, just look at the graph below: there is more slack in the labor market today than in any year since 1994.



Very striking. I've spent a decent amount of time arguing against non-economists when they say that "higher productivity will cause unemployment." But that seems to be the story of the past year.
The situation screams for more expansionary macroeconomic policy. Where are the Keynesian economists when we need them? (Oh, I forgot...budget surpluses are what is politically correct now)
Posted by: Arnold Kling on September 14, 2002 04:33 AMIs the need to spur growth, a need for a fiscal stimulus or for a monetary stimulus? Also, the effects of the series of tax cuts to come seem to limit the possibility of raising government expenditure. Remember, Alan Greenspan warned about increasing expenditure [a bit late Alan]. My hope is that the Fed will chhose to lower interest rates if growth continues to be sluggish, though I am getting the impression the Fed may settle for GDP growth of about 2%.
Posted by: on September 14, 2002 12:58 PMI don't think there is anything unorthodox in noticing that technological progress can work against employment. Most of the times, unemployment is absorbed by the sectors that grow out of this technological progress, though.
The problem here, I believe, is that the IT sector is itself in a poor state, and all other businesses have stocked up on IT investment (won't last forever hopefully.) So paradoxically, the very sector responsible for most of the innovation has been shedding workers in great numbers...
For that to happen, you need a demand glut that puts the break on (IT) investment, coupled with long lags on the effect of IT spending on productivity. Seems like we have both here.
My blindspot is a lack of historical perspective on these things. How have other technological shifts worked out?
My hunch is that few technological revolutions have been so disproportionaly associated with investment spending rather than consumption. It's all relative, computers and internet services are obviously also an object of consumption. This could be making the business cycle possibly more prone to this kind of weird (non-)recession / deflation.
Posted by: Jean-Philippe Stijns on September 14, 2002 09:41 PMThere is no reason the technology advance should lower employment in an economy as a whole if fiscal policy eases transitions and monetary policy is stimulative. The need is to have policies to continually aid in the absorbing of displaced workers. Overall, the point is how much better off we can all we with technology advance.
Posted by: on September 15, 2002 10:15 AMThere is no question we're better off as a whole with technological advance. But the smoothing of the transition thanks to well conceived policies is more often assumed than actual. There is no point in denying that there can be loosers in times of technological progress. Ask carriage drivers when the automobile came around... :)
Posted by: Jean-Philippe Stijns on September 16, 2002 06:02 PMI used to be a progrmmer in the 1980s in large organizations in NYC and I always perceived that our users were less evolved technologically than we were. It takes time for people adapt to new technology. This was very generational meaning that older people were less inclined to buy and use new technology than younger people. So to see productiveity changes in the work world means that older workers are retiring and younger one replacing them. I don't know if my last statement that is really true but I might explain the change in productivity that way.
S H
How much of the increase in productivity in 2002 is simply due to the expansion and the fact that we don't measure hours worked all that well? Productivity growth falls when we go into a recession, but we know that it's not that negative productivity shocks are necessarily causing recessions, but that firms reduce output by cutting back hours worked rather than laying off workers, and the BLS isn't able to fully capture the reduction in hours worked. Likewise, when firms start to increase output at the beginning of an expansion they increase hours worked first before hiring workers, and the increase in hours often doesn't show up.
Brad's chart makes it clear that real and impressive gains in productivity have occurred, but has anyone come up with a good way to wash out the business cycle effect on productivity?