The Financial Times now sounds very pessimistic on the strength of the U.S. recovery as well. I don't understand how they--or anyone--can take the surge in vehicle purchases this quarter as a positive sign, and read it as anything other than a temporary blip that will borrow GDP growth from the fourth quarter.
FT.com Home US: ...For some time now, US economic activity has circulated in an uneasy but temporarily stable holding pattern. Consumers keep spending.... Meanwhile businesses hold back on investments, waiting for a definite upturn in profits. Recent retail sales figures show that consumer spending, about two-thirds of the economy, has remained strong and is likely to produce a healthy headline growth rate of 3.5-4 per cent for the economy as a whole in the third quarter of the year. But about half of the robust 0.8 per cent growth in August was supplied by extraordinarily strong vehicle sales.... From an optimistic point of view, the rise in sales is a powerful indicator of confidence in the future.... The pessimistic interpretation is that car sales have been artificially boosted by zero financing promotions by dealers, with households merely bringing planned purchases forward. This implies that when the one-off boost to sales has passed, consumption will join the rest of the economy in the doldrums...
By Alan Beattie | Published: September 20 2002
As the US baseball season moves towards its autumn climax, the economy recalls the famous malapropism of the great Yankees player Yogi Berra: "it's like déjà vu all over again".
This time last year economists were looking anxiously at a number of weak points in the US economy. Officials at the Federal Reserve, whose interest rate setting open market committee meets next week, are faced with similar conditions. Businesses are still worried about their future profit and are dismissing employees. Falling stock prices are taking their toll on consumer confidence, prompting fears of a sharp retrenchment in household spending. The Dow Jones industrial average fell by nearly 4 per cent this week and has now lost all the gains it made over the summer. And the US is preparing for a possible war of unknown duration and uncertain cost.
While some recent signals have provided reassurance that the economy is continuing to sputter along, there is still no sign of the strong, durable and broad-based recovery that policymakers were expecting.
And until there is, the stalling job market will evoke memories of a similarly worrisome episode from rather longer ago: the "jobless recovery" of the early 1990s, where uncertainty about the strength and duration of the upturn kept unemployment high long after growth had restarted.
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"There must now be serious disappointment with the fact that a self-sustaining recovery is not yet under way," says John Lonski, chief economist at Moody's, the investor services agency.
For some time now, US economic activity has circulated in an uneasy but temporarily stable holding pattern. Consumers keep spending, though not always strongly enough to keep the economy at trend growth. Meanwhile businesses hold back on investments, waiting for a definite upturn in profits.
Recent retail sales figures show that consumer spending, about two-thirds of the economy, has remained strong and is likely to produce a healthy headline growth rate of 3.5-4 per cent for the economy as a whole in the third quarter of the year.
But this spending is uneven. About half of the robust 0.8 per cent growth in August was supplied by extraordinarily strong vehicle sales, of which the implications are unhelpfully ambiguous.
Cars, along with houses, are among the easiest purchases to defer. So, from an optimistic point of view, the rise in sales is a powerful indicator of confidence in the future, more reliable than the survey-based measures of consumer confidence, which have been rather gloomy.
The pessimistic interpretation is that car sales have been artificially boosted by zero financing promotions by dealers, with households merely bringing planned purchases forward. This implies that when the one-off boost to sales has passed, consumption will join the rest of the economy in the doldrums. To make matters worse, one large weakness from the 1990s boom remains: the overhang of household debt that could at some point overwhelm even the American consumer's legendary optimism.
The behaviour of the business community is the opposite to that of the consumer: fewer debts but a greater reluctance to spend. Companies have rebuilt their balance sheets, leaving them freer to fund more investment.
Indeed, the most recent figures show an uptick in durable goods orders, the first hopeful sign that the long-awaited rise in capital spending - which Fed officials originally predicted for the third quarter - has started at last.
But the disappointing performance of profits could easily push back a sustained upturn into next year. And with businesses uncertain about the future, they are reluctant to take on new staff. Monthly new claims for unemployment benefits are now consistently above the 400,000 level traditionally associated with a recession.
The serious risk for the Federal Reserve is that the gloom in the boardroom may spread to the consumer. For the moment, the Fed seems to have hunkered down to wait for clear signals either way. US monetary policymakers are undoubtedly dis- appointed that the recovery has done little more than bump along so far this year.
"For a while now, when it comes to the economy, the glass has either been half full or half empty," Robert McTeer, president of the Dallas Fed and a member of the Fed's open markets committee, said this month. "I must say, however, that half full has become a bit of a stretch lately."
That said, the overall attitude at the Fed appears to be one of watchful concern rather than trigger-happy activism. The widespread belief remains that the Fed will leave interest rates on hold next week .
"For the Fed to cut rates, they have to answer in the affirmative to one of three questions," says Bruce Kasman, US economist at the investment bank JP Morgan Chase. "Is the rate of growth heading to 2 per cent or lower; is there an imminent threat of deflation; or is the financial sector causing problems for the rest of the economy?" Unless there are truly dramatic movements in stock markets in the coming week, following Thursday's falls, none of these appears yet to be the case.
Those paid to bet on interest rates in the futures markets continue to expect rates to be left on hold. Still, this week the perceived probability of a surprise quarter-point cut next week drifted up towards 25 per cent as the effect of the falls in equity prices sank in.
The last imponderable that could come to upset the delicate equilibrium in the US economy is the prospect of war with Iraq. So far, apart from a war premium of between $3 and $8 a barrel that already seems to have been priced into the oil markets, it is difficult to see a dramatic effect on the economy from the gathering clouds of conflict. This implies that if the war turns out to be protracted or to set off a wider Middle East conflagration, there could be further destabilising reactions to come in financial markets.
Part of the market's reluctance to react reflects the fact that the cost and nature of of any possible war are unknown.
The Bush administration's economic team has been attempting to play down the direct effect of the cost of a war, thus eliminating economics as a constraint on foreign policy. Larry Lindsey, Mr Bush's chief economic adviser, in a possibly misplaced attempt to give reassurance, mused last week that a war might cost 1-2 per cent of gross domestic product, about $100bn-$200bn, (£64bn-£128bn), a figure the White House subsequently pointedly failed to endorse.
This figure is larger than other estimates, including an internal Pentagon reckoning of $50bn. But even at a time when the government finances are due to slide into deficit, such a one-off cost would be a small addition to the US's $3,600bn public debt and might even provide a useful boost to spending.
More worrying than the direct cost, or even the arithmetic effect of higher oil prices, is that the prospect of war simply adds another source of uncertainty, further dissuading businesses from investing or consumers from taking on more debt.
"The standard rule of thumb for a $10-a-barrel rise in oil prices is that it takes only 0.2-0.3 percentage points of growth off the US economy," says Mr Kasman. The effect on the US, as an oil producer, is a little more muted than for pure oil importers such as Japan. But history suggests there is some extra effect on confidence from a particularly large oil shock or from conflict, economic or military, that causes it. "Every time oil prices double, the US economy seems to be in recession a year later," Mr Kasman says.
Even in the absence of a war with Iraq, the economy's present performance recalls another of Mr Berra's remarks, made when his batting was going through a lean patch. "Slump? I ain't in no slump. I just ain't hittin'."
Posted by DeLong at September 20, 2002 11:01 PM | TrackbackStephen Roach has been increasingly concerned about a slowing of growth in Europe, Japan, and Latin America, as well as in the United States.
We appear to be recovering from the recession too slowly for job creation to be significant or to stimulate more global growth. The absence of job creation must finally cut comsumer spending, and there does not seem to be a reason for industry to replace consumer spending with investment. Quite a potential problem.
Posted by: on September 21, 2002 02:08 PMNot to worry. Our President has a nifty magic trick involving four dollar bills that surely holds the key to our salvation. Prosperity is just around the corner!
Posted by: FMguru on September 21, 2002 02:39 PM"self-sustaining recovery"may be the key, even if our standard models don't usually capture that notion very well.
Posted by: Jean-Philippe Stijns on September 21, 2002 07:27 PMCars add about 1% this quarter and will likely subtract about the same from Q4. Although, keep in mind that ever since the auto companies went to 0% financing, analysts have suggested that the continuing sales and production is borrowing from the subsequent quarter. Instead, we just keep buying more and more cars.
Growth this year while zigging and zagging will average about 3%. Not Bad at all. Not great in a post recession upswing but this was a pretty mild recession.
Heres my question. What's potential GDP in the US ? In the go-go days, Greenspan suggested it could be close to 3.5% but things are different now. You yourself have questioned the hours-worked data (we could be working more hours, not less). As such, could potential growth be a touch lower, say 2.5% to 3.0% ?
Posted by: 49eels on September 22, 2002 08:52 AMOne other thing, doesnt the 0% financing deal suggest that monetary policy works (in the extreme?)
Posted by: 49eels on September 22, 2002 08:54 AMThough there is no telling how long consumers will keep splurging, debt loads relative to incomes are high and rising, losses in retirement accounts extend 30 months and are far deeper than in any other bear market of the last 50 years.
Forever drawing equity out of homes will not suffice for retirements. Consumers are going to have to save more, thus slowing growth at some point. Unless business investment more than fills for a decline in consumer demand, we are going to grow slowly for some time.
Should the potential full employment growth rate of the economy be 4 to 5%, we are likely to grow slowly enough to risk deflation. Should the potential growth rate be 2 to 3%, we have sadly misunderstood what looks like a productivity spurt.
Posted by: on September 22, 2002 09:09 AMMonetary policy does work, and more loosening may be needed. Japan shows that tight monetary policy after a bubble and economic slowing can result in a decade of anemic growth. Europe shows the growth lag that results from too conservative monetary policy and artificial fiscal constraints.
During the 90's we grew twice as fast as Europe, and eight times as fast as Japan, and we should credit fine monetary and fiscal policy.
Now the-tax-cut-that-ate-Kansas will limit fiscal policy, so monetary policy will be all the more important.
Posted by: on September 22, 2002 09:45 AM>Europe shows the growth lag that results from too conservative monetary policy and artificial fiscal constraints.<
Inflation in the Eurozone accelerates beyond the European Central Bank's guideline of max 2% when the average unemployment rate across the zone is still high. The basic problem is that the NAIRU is too high. That is what needs to be addressed.
Posted by: Bob Briant (UK) on September 22, 2002 11:06 AMTrue, Bob. But I am not sure Europeans want to turn their labor market into a great efficient jungle. That's, to my understanding, not their favorite beat. They may change, though, and they may not have a choice for ever. It'll be interesting to watch.
Posted by: Jean-Philippe Stijns on September 22, 2002 09:51 PMjean-philippe, It would be better if economic literacy were rather more advanced in Europe so electors had more informed insight into policy options.
Portraying all alternatives to the status quo as "the jungle" - which is what a string of political leaders in France did in the early 1990s - doesn't help to generate the social consensus for the changes needed to get Europe's high unemployment rate down without a surge in inflation. Another case in point is that La Fontaine, Germany's finance minister till March 1999 when Schroeder pressed him to resign, had been trailing around a prescription that a general wage hike would help resolve Germany's high unemployment when analysts already knew that total employee compensation costs there, at prevailing exchange rates, were higher than in other industrialised economies.
In today's morning news, prices on Germany's stock market fell in response to Schroeder's election victory. London share prices are just reported to have hit a new six-year low. We now have a situation in which annual GDP growth is verging on stagnant in both Japan and Germany, the second and third largest global economies in terms of GDP, while the discussion here is whether the US economy will have a double-dip recession or even go into a deflationary spiral. And, for the record, I tend to be an optimist in case anyone wonders.
Posted by: Bob Briant (UK) on September 23, 2002 09:13 AMI aggree, Bob. I am just concerned when European economists, and policy-makers for that matter, tend to err on each side of the dogmative spectrum regarding the labor market. Also, labor market flexibility unavoidably introduce uncertainty and higher adaptation costs into workers' life.
I see no a-priori reason why the optimum needs to be a corner solution with respect to labor market flexibility. It's a question we should only be able to answer with some insight into our "collective preferences" as well as with knowledge of the economics of the labour market and their implications for general welfare, now and tomorrow.
Posted by: Jean-Philippe Stijns on September 24, 2002 12:18 PM>Inflation in the Eurozone accelerates beyond the European Central Bank's guideline of max 2% when the average unemployment rate across the zone is still high. The basic problem is that the NAIRU is too high. That is what needs to be addressed.<
This turns NAIRU on its head. OK Lets maintain an interest rate at the level consistent with NAIRU say whatever it is.
The European Central Bank doesn't do this. It's guiding principle is to maintain an inflation rate of 2 percent irregardless of the unemployment rate it could be above or below the NAIRU, and I really think that right now it is well above that rate. In addition there is a limitation on government deficits. This means Europe simple can't handle downturns. As far as the 2 percent target US inflation has been above 2 percent every year save one since 1990. I mean why 2 percent? Why not 2.5 percent like the Bank of England? (That incidently is close to US rates over the past 10 years). Or if we wanted to look at a really rigid labor market look at Sweden-yet they are doing far better than the countries suffering under the European Central Bank regime.