The New York Times's Tom Redburn quotes Alan Blinder on just how strong the U.S. economy was in the 1990s--on how the stock market bubble and its popping is not the real story:
The Bubble Has Burst, but Strengths Remain: "The big illusion about the 90's was in the stock market, which came to believe its own hype," Mr. Blinder said. "But for the essentials — for jobs, wages and productivity — [the 1990s were] very real indeed."
as the economic success of the 1990's largely an illusion? Was it all little more than an elaborate stage set propped up by a speculative bubble in technology, by cheerleaders for the new economy who wildly overestimated the potential for growth and by phony accounting that only temporarily hid huge losses at companies like Enron and WorldCom, which have since gone bankrupt?
To many people, in retrospect, it certainly looks that way.
But just as Americans fell victim to "irrational exuberance" in the late 1990's, exaggerating the underlying strength of the economy, today's equally fashionable pessimism appears overdone as well. And that means there are still plenty of good reasons to be confident about the health of the American economy over the next decade.
"The 90's were not quite as good as people thought in 1999," said Peter R. Orszag, a Brookings Institution economist who was co-editor of a new book, "American Economic Policy in the 1990's" (MIT Press). "But the vitality of the U.S. economic system remains intact. It is very dangerous to extrapolate from a temporary economic downturn to assuming that we are facing a dismal decade ahead."
These days, it is easy to forget just how much the economy accomplished in recent years.
Even after the latest revisions shaved earlier estimates, the annualized rate of productivity growth — which measures our ability to improve the nation's standard of living by producing more in each hour of work — appears to have been a robust 2.6 percent from 1995 through 2000. And despite the usual tendency to fall sharply in a recession, those productivity numbers are holding up well through the current slowdown.
Contrast that with the meager annual productivity growth of just 1.4 percent from the early 1970's to the early 1990's. Under relentless pressure from highly competitive markets and with the help of continued advances in technology, American business can be expected, most experts now agree, to continue to achieve average productivity gains of at least 2 percent a year.
Those gains have translated into real benefits for nearly all Americans. The official unemployment rate fell below 4 percent in the late 1990's for the first time since the 1960's, reaching the state of economic nirvana that experts call full employment, in which essentially any working-age person who wants a job can find one. The unemployment rate has since risen, but it remains considerably lower than at comparable stages in past economic cycles.
Wage increases for the average worker, whose income had stagnated in real terms for two decades, easily outpaced the low rate of inflation from 1993 through 2001. Poverty fell sharply as those at the bottom of the income ladder shared in the gains for the first time in a generation. Many more people became homeowners and, yes, investors, enjoying improvements in personal wealth that even with falling stock prices remain far above the levels of a decade ago.
"The 90's still look like quite a good decade," said Alan Blinder, a former top official at the Federal Reserve who was co-author of "The Fabulous Decade," a chapter of a book published this year by the Russell Sage Foundation, "The Roaring Nineties: Can Full Employment Be Sustained?"
"Not as fabulous as some thought at the time," added Mr. Blinder, who teaches economics at Princeton University, "but fabulous nonetheless."
There is no reason to expect a repeat of the runaway boom of the late 1990's, in either the real economy or the stock market. But the lessons to be drawn from the achievements of the decade suggest that the American economy is capable of considerably more than most experts thought only a few years ago.
"The 90's showed that full employment is an achievable goal without running the risk of higher inflation," said Jared Bernstein, an economist at the labor-supported Economic Policy Institute in Washington, who is co-author of a new book on the subject. "There were a lot of mainstream economists who didn't think we would ever be capable of doing that again."
In tight labor markets, the benefits of economic growth are more broadly shared, particularly among lower-skilled workers who suddenly become a lot more attractive to employers.
The best thing about the market's collapse is that it turns attention back to the things that really matter in the economy.
"The big illusion about the 90's was in the stock market, which came to believe its own hype," Mr. Blinder said. "But for the essentials — for jobs, wages and productivity — it was very real indeed."
Steve Roach, chief economist at Morgan Stanley, is feeling a bit more negative. Click HERE for The Costs of Bursting Bubbles.
Posted by: richard on September 22, 2002 05:01 PMBlinder isn't likely to be honest about the 90s, given his own implication. Roach, again, hits the nail on the head.
Posted by: Andrew Boucher on September 23, 2002 05:19 AMI can't believe readers of this blog prefer Steve Roach to Allen Blinder. I would have thought the macroeconomic credentials went rather substantially in the other direction.
See today's ramblings by Roach on "The Perils of Price Stability."
To paraphrase: Inflation was bad. Deflation would be bad. Now Roach assures us price stability is also bad.
Posted by: Jim Harris on September 23, 2002 06:33 AMSure, I don't always agree with Roach. But he's spot on in the link provided by the first comment. About the U.S. housing bubble. And U.S. consumer debt. If Blinder is willing to say that the Japanese economy in the '80s was also a "fabulous" decade, ok then I'll accept that he can say the same about the US economy in the 90s. Would he?
Posted by: Andrew Boucher on September 23, 2002 09:09 AMIndeed the Japanese economy in the 80's was fabulous. Were you in Japan in 1970, 1980 and 1990, you would realize the astonishing progress that was made. Astonishing. Wonderful development.
That the Bank of Japan botched policy from 1998 and on, and brought Japan to a liquidity trap does not negate the wonder of growth from 1970 to 1990, and the legacy of well-being that is evident through Japan today.
Alan Blinder is quite right. Imagine the gains that were made in employment for millions of Americans, African-Americans for instance because of the growth in the 90's. African-American unemployment had never fallen below 10% until the 90's.
Posted by: on September 23, 2002 09:22 AMBoJ only started botching things in 1998?!? That's awfully generous.
How much hind-sight does it take to arrive at the conclusion that allowin a bubble to form merits a big black mark in the "botched" column?
Seems to me they started messing up in the 80s. Just as Greenspan did in '96 when he a> believed a bubble was forming, b> had an idea of what it would take to deflate it (raising margin requirements -- thanks to Steve Roach, or one of his minions more likely, for pouring through the meeting minutes to find that nugget), but c> did nothing.
-Motts
Posted by: Motts McGregor on September 23, 2002 01:49 PM
There's been an awful lot of botching going on in Japan by parties other than the BofJ.
The issue of whether our own Fed should have tightened to prevent the bubble has been discussed fairly thoroughly, including on this web site. I can only say that it is a tough thing for a central bank to manage both (output)price stability and asset prices, if the latter is even in its charter. If the Fed was to avert an asset price bubble with tighter money, what then of general price stability? Oh, I forgot. Steve Roach thinks that is a bad thing, too.
The remarks above on the BOJ are spot on, by the way.
Posted by: Jim Harris on September 24, 2002 08:16 AMSorry, I meant to say the Bank of Japan had botched things from 1988 on. First, property price rises should have given the bank pause. Second, the rapid decline of stocks and slowing of growth from the beginning of 1990 should have served as another warning. The last years of the Japanese expansion brought the bubbles in real estate and stocks. The collapse of the bubbles and failure of the bank to counter the economic slowing brought the deflation and liquidity trap.
Posted by: on September 24, 2002 10:34 AM