William Bundy (1998), A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang: 0809091518).

p. 271: "Sheikh Mujibur Rahman... was peremptorily arrested and detained.... This arrest, the heavy-handed and brutal behavior of the Pakistani troops, and the many atrocities set off an outcry of protest in the world press. At least some expression of disapproval and concern by an American government seemed called for, since the United States had frequently spoken out in similar situations over the years and under Presidents of both parties. Not so the Nixon Administration..."

p. 272: "[T]he Pakistani crackdown led to a massive outflow of refugees... from East Pakistan to West Bengal... rough estimates were... by the fall as many as 10 million..."

p. 284: "From March to December [1971] the central problem was the behavior of Yahya Khan, a man proud, stubborn, politically insensitive, and inept. Yahya turned the maintenance of law and order in East Pakistan into the most provocative type of military operation with the least control of excesses. He arrested a bona fide political leader, Mujib, who had just shown prowess at the polls, and then for months kept alive a threat to try him.... Yahya was about as hopeless a partner-client as could be imagined. The case was far from unique in American experience at the height of the Cold War..."

p. 421: "[Allende's] domestic economic policies were recklessly populist, leading quickly to currency devaluation, very high inflation, and steadily growing economic difficulties for all classes. As opposition to him grew, Allende turned in early 1973 to moves that seemed to many to be clearly aimed at installing a dictatorial regime and suppressing opposition. (One key action, for example, was to deny any newsprint supplies to the main opposition paper.) Certainly this alarmist view was strongly held by Eduardo Frei, the former President..."

pp. 422-423: "Kissinger stoutly denied that their was any American involvement in the 1973 coup. It was a denial that seemed credible at the time and has essentially stood up since, insofar as it relates to the planning and execution of the coup. That the United States would not oppose a coup, however, had clearly been the dominant impression... and was confirmed when the Administration moved rapidly not only to recognize the Pinochet regime but to start talks on renewed financial help. The new regime was imprisoning thousands of Allende adherents and embarking on other acts of repression.... Pinochet's regime was from the first particularly stiff.... Thus... what stood out was not Allende's behavior but the military character of the new regime and its initial repressive acts, including the arrest and detention of several U.S. citizens. Leftists were joined by liberals and many moderates in seeing the murdered Allende as a martyr for having pursued progressive policies after having been democratically elected. In the battle for public opinon, this view won hands down, despite the statement by ex-President Frei in early October that 'a civil war was being well prepared by the Marxists' and that only the action of Chile's armed forces had saved his life and those of many other liberals and moderates."

p. 596 n. 49: "Interview, October 10, 1973, with a Madrid paper. Quoted in Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 406, 1245.

pp. 198-199: "In the 1964 election, Allende, a proclaimed Socialist and often at odds with the local Communist Party, had received substantial financial help and other forms of support from Communist and Communist-front organizations with ties to Moscow. Partly in response to these efforts and partly for more specific reasons including the welfare of U.S. corporations operating in Chile, a large semi-covert U.S. operation was mounted [in 1964]. Its main propaganda focused on the dangers of a Communist-leaning regime, but local anti-Allende organizations were also given support.... Some funds were also provided to the Christian Democratic Party (through channels unknown to Frei). Sophisticated Chileans were generally aware of what was going on, on both sides, and had come to take such outside information almost for granted."

p. 201: "When the results of the 1970 election became clear, a high-level meeting in Washington on September 8 focused on ways that Chile might hold a new election in which Frei would again be eligible. Alessandri himself publicly proposed that, if elected President, he would rule only long enough to set up such an election; in the United States others devised far-out schemes to the same end, some involving interim military rule. Frei himself lent no support to such ideas...

"The Forty Committee's project to get a new election, called Track 1, was set in motion.... [T]he decision-making trio turned to a much stronger alternative... Track II... Nixon's real hope and the heart of his policy toward Chile.... Nixon personally gave Richard Helms the widest possible authority... to prevent Allende's presidency by any means whatever, at whatever cost or risk of failure...

"From mid-September... a small task force... made plans that focused on military intervention and particularly on the removal of Chile's Army Chief of Staff, General Rene Schneider... a staunch upholder of the Constitution.... [A]rms deliveries [to plotters] did continue, and U.S. officials in Chile did not protest or object when two botched attempts to kidnap Schneider were made.... Finally, on October 22, a group of military conspirators ambushed Schneider's car and wounded him fatally.... A U.S. judicial proceeding would surely have concluded that U.S. agents (acting on presidential authority) had been at least accessories before the fact and co-conspirators in the kidnapping, and thus in the killing that resulted from it."