

Investment with Uncertainty and Asymmetric Adjustment Costs

Paul Krugman's version of Avinash Dixit's model...

Paul Krugman (1989), *Exchange Rate Instability* (Cambridge: MIT Press: 0262111403).

Avinash Dixit (1989), "Entry and Exit Decisions of a Firm Under Fluctuating Exchange Rates," *Journal of Political Economy*.

Begin with a firm that must spend an irrecoverable fixed cost F to enter a market (but that can drop out of the market at cost zero by abandoning its assets). While the firm is in the market, it earns operating profits:

$$\pi_t = e^{p_t} - 1$$

where Dixit interprets e^p as an exchange rate (and the firm as an exporter selling into some foreign market), but other interpretations are valid as well. And the firm discounts future profits at a (risk-neutral) interest rate r .

We assume that p follows a *diffusion process*, or a *continuous time random walk*. That is, we say that for any time interval Δt (no matter how short):

$$E_t(p_{t+\Delta t}) = p_t$$

$$E_t[(p_{t+\Delta t} - p_t)^2] = \sigma^2 \Delta t$$

Given this environment—with the demand for its product random-walking all over the place—the firm has to decide (a) when to invest F and enter the market, and (b) when to exit.

We solve this by defining two value functions, representing the value to a firm that behaves optimally of being in and out of the market as a function of the current value of the demand variable p . We start to figure out what these value functions are by nailing down some boundary conditions. The firm will abandon its capital and exit the market at some p^0 at which:

$$V_o(p^0) = V_i(p^0)$$

The firm will invest the fixed cost F and enter the market at some p^1 at which:

$$V_i(p^1) = V_o(p^1) + F$$

And we continue the process of determining the value function by the standard procedure of thinking of the value of being in the state I or O as an asset that must yield a competitive return:

$$rV_I(p_t) = (e^{p_t} - 1) + E_t \frac{dV_I(p_t)}{dt}$$

$$rV_O(p_t) = E_t \frac{dV_O(p_t)}{dt}$$

But what are these expectations? Well...

$$E_t \frac{V_I(p_{t+\Delta t}) - V_I(p_t)}{\Delta t} = E_t \frac{V_I(p_t)(\Delta p) + (1/2)V''_I(p_t)(\Delta p)^2 + \dots}{\Delta t} =$$

$$\frac{V'_I(p_t)E_t(\Delta p) + (1/2)V''_I(p_t)E_t(\Delta p)^2 + \dots}{\Delta t} = \frac{(1/2)V''_I(p_t)\sigma^2(\Delta t) + \dots}{\Delta t} =$$

$$(1/2)V''_I(p_t)\sigma^2$$

in the limit as Δt approaches zero, I assert that:

$$E_t \frac{dV_I(p_t)}{dt} = (\sigma^2/2)V''_I(p_t)$$

$$E_t \frac{dV_O(p_t)}{dt} = (\sigma^2/2)V''_O(p_t)$$

And the differential equations for the value functions as functions of the state variable p are:

$$rV_I(p) = \frac{e^p - 1}{r} + \frac{\sigma^2 V''_I(p)}{2r}$$

$$rV_O(p) = \frac{\sigma^2 V''_O(p)}{2r}$$

Let me write down the general solutions:

$$V_I(p) = \frac{e^p}{r - \sigma^2/2} - \frac{1}{r} + Ae^{\sqrt{\frac{2r}{\sigma^2}}p} + Be^{-\sqrt{\frac{2r}{\sigma^2}}p}$$

$$V_O(p) = Ce^{\sqrt{\frac{2r}{\sigma^2}}p} + De^{-\sqrt{\frac{2r}{\sigma^2}}p}$$

And invoke boundary conditions—that when p is large, the value of being in should be “near” its fundamental value; and that when p is very very small, the value of being out should be “near” zero—to claim that A and D must be zero. So we have:

$$V_I(p_I) = \frac{e^{p_I}}{r - \sigma^2/2} - \frac{1}{r} + B e^{-\sqrt{\frac{2r}{\sigma^2}} p_I}$$

$$V_O(p_I) = C e^{\sqrt{\frac{2r}{\sigma^2}} p_I}$$

And we have our boundary conditions for the states at which the firm enters and exits the market:

$$V_I(p^I) = V_O(p^I) + F$$

$$V_O(p^O) = V_I(p^O)$$

But we have four unknowns— B , C , p^O , and p^I —and only two equilibrium conditions. We need two more: “smooth pasting” conditions that come from the requirement that p^I and p^O be not just the points at which the firm switches from being out to in and from in to out, but that they be the *optimal* points at which to enter and exit. Not only must the value functions be equal at those two points, they must be tangent:

$$V'_I(p^I) = V'_O(p^I)$$

$$V'_I(p^O) = V'_O(p^O)$$